Endnotes

  1. So, in Plato, Socrates requires of Euthyphro not to teach him ἕν τι ἢ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν: “one or two particulars of the multitude of things that are just and right; but to show him the original pattern itself, by which everything that is just and good becomes so.” And again, ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ’ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ: “Show me the original image or picture, that I may see what sort of a thing it is, and when I look upon it, and make use of it as the original pattern, I may be able to affirm that an action performed by you or any other person, if it be of such a sort, is just and good; and, if it be not of such a sort, then I cannot affirm it to be so.” (Euthyphro.) Posce exemplar honesti: “Enquire after the original pattern of virtue.” (Lucan, Pharsalia.)

  2. Οἶδε τό γ’ αἰσχρὸν, χανόνι τοῦ χαλοῦ μαθών: “He knows what vice is, having been taught by the rule of virtue.” (Euripides, Fabulae.) Adsit Regula, peccatis quæ pœnas irroget æquas, says Horace (Satirae 3.) Now by the same rule by which punishments are justly proportioned, crimes must be distinguished amongst themselves; and therefore much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes from good actions. So that it is at bottom a rule which can do this, that is required.

  3. Formula quædam constituenda est: quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus: “There ought to be some rule established: which if we follow in comparing things with each other, we shall never fall short of our duty.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  4. Πῶς οἷόν τε ἀτέκμαρτα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεύρετα τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα ἐν ἀνθρώποις; Ἔστιν οὖν [κανών τις]: “How is it possible that those things which are necessary for men [to know or to do] should be such, as they can have no certainty of knowing or finding out? There must then be [some rule].” (Arrian, Discourses of Epictetus.)

  5. Ubi virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? “Where is virtue then, if there be nothing within our own power?” (Cicero, Academica.) הוא עמוד התורה והמצוה⁠ ⁠… רשות לכל אדם נתונה אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה: “There is a power given to every man, if he be but willing to incline himself to the way that is good⁠ ⁠… This is the support of the law and the commandments.” (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Teshubah, V, 1, 3.) הרשות היא הבחירה: “This power is what we call free will.” (Isaac Abravanel, Nahalot Abot.)

  6. Lacrymæ pondera vocis habent: “Tears have the force of words.” (Ovid, Epistulæ Ex Ponto, III.)

  7. Oculi, supercilia, frons, vultus denique totus, qui sermo qui dam tacitus mentis est, etc.: “The eyes, the eyebrows, and indeed the whole countenance are a kind of tacit speech of the mind, etc.(Cicero, “Against Piso.”) Nutu signisque loquuntur: “They [Piramus and Thisbe] speak to each other by nods and signs.” (Ovid, Metamorphoses.) Est actio quasi sermo corporis: “Every action is a sort of a speech of the body.” (Cicero, De Oratore, and often repeated by him.)

  8. איש און מולל ברגליו: “A wicked man speaks by his feet.” (Proverbs 6:12⁠–⁠13.)

  9. Τὸν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν περιεπάτησεν: “Without saying anything against the argument about motion, he got up and walked about.” (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism.) So Menedemus reproved luxury by eating only olives (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Menedemus.) And others are mentioned by Plutarch, who ἄνευ φωνῆς ἃ δεῖ φράζειν, did declare “what they had to say without making use of words.” (“De Garrulitate.”)

  10. Roscius, in Macrobius’s Saturnalia.

  11. Where we find φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις⁠ ⁠… ἐς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντες: “that friends and fellow-citizens fell into each other’s hands.” (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War.)

  12. Τοὶς οἰκείους ὡς πολεμίους ἠμύνοντο: “They revenged themselves upon their own people, as if they had been their enemies.” (Diodorus Siculus Bibliotheca historica.)

  13. Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia.

  14. Cicero. (Editor’s note.)

  15. Ἀνθρώποισιν οὐκ ἐχρῆν ποτὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἰσχύειν πλέον: “There never could be any necessity that men’s tongues should be of more force [to declare their intentions] than their actions.” (Euripides, Hecuba.) Quasi intersit, audiam, an videam: “As if there were any difference whether I hear you, or see you.” (Cicero, Ad Atticum.)

  16. Ἡμεῖς τὸν ὠνούμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ὠνεῖσθαί φαμεν Πλάτωνα κ.τ.λ.: “He who buys Plato’s books, we say, buys Plato.” (Plutarch, Isis and Osiris.)

  17. Virgil (in The Eclogues) and Theocritus (in The Idyls).

  18. ותטמ שמשמ: “On the bed together.” (Rashi, Commentary on the Torah, on Genesis 26:8.)

  19. Only ענון נשוק וחיבוק, “kissing and embracing her,” according to Moses Alshek. (Torat Mosheh, on Genesis 26:8.)

  20. Ὦτα γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀνθρώποισι ἐόντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλμῶν: “Men do not usually give so much credit to their ears, as to their eyes.” (Herodotus, The Persian Wars.)

  21. That instance of Menelaus and his guest Alexander, in Arrian, might be subjoined to this. Εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἶδεν φιλοφρονουμένους ἀλλήλους, ἠπίστησεν ἂν τῷ λέγοντι οὐκ εἶναι φίλους αὐτούς: “If anyone saw them treating each other in a very friendly manner, he would not believe a person who should say that they were not friends.” (Arrian, Discourses of Epictetus.)

  22. De duplici martyrio ad Fortunatum, Desiderius Erasmus.

  23. Something like this is that in one of Gregory Nazinzen’s orations (Contra Julianum imperatorem.) When some Christians, who had been ensnared by Julian, asked, πῶς Χριστὸν ἠρνήμεθα: “How have we denied Christ?” They were answered, ὅτι κατὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐθυμιάσατε: “you have offered incense on the altar.”

  24. Τὰ ψευδῆ πράγματα διώκων: “Pursuing things that are false.” (Johannes Chrysostom, Expositiones in Psalmos.) Καὶ στολισμὸς ἀνδρὸς, καὶ γέλως, καὶ βῆμα ποδὸς ἀναγγέλλει περὶ αὐτοῦ: “Nay the habit of a man, or his laugh, or the step of his foot, will discover who he is,” as Basil speaks: and therefore greater things must do it more. (Chrysostom, The Prayer.)

  25. As that word Βλιτρι (Blitri) in Diogenes Laërtius’s Life of Zeno, which word has no meaning at all.

  26. Αἰγύπτιοι⁠ ⁠… τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἔμπαλιν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἀνθρώποισι ἐστήσαντο ἤθεά τε καὶ νόμους, κ.τ.λ.: “The Egyptians⁠ ⁠… have established a great many laws and customs, quite contrary to those of other people.” (Herodotus, The Persian Wars.)

  27. המתפלל לא יעמוד בתפלה⁠ ⁠… בראש מגולה: “He that prays, must not have his head uncovered while he is praying.” (Maimonodes in Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Tefillah, V, 5, and others everywhere.)

  28. Θεὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐιδέναι, τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ἀρνοῦνται: “They profess to know God, but in works they deny him.” (Epistle to Titus 1:16.) And τὸ ἔργοις ἀρνεῖσθαι Θεὸν ὐπερ τὸ εὶπεῖν ἐν στόματι: “To deny God by our works is worse than to deny him by our words.” (Johannes Chrysostom, Commentary on the Psalms.)

  29. Λόγος ἔργου σκιή: “Words are the images of our deeds.” (Plutarch, Moralia.) Res loquitur ipsa: quæ semper valet plurimum: “The thing speaks itself, which is always of very great force.” (Cicero, Pro Tito Annio Milone.) Quid verba audiam, cum facta videam? “What signifies my hearing of words, when I see the facts?” (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations.) Αὐτὰ βοᾷ τὰ πράγματα, κᾂν τῇ φωνῇ σιωπᾷς: “The facts themselves speak out aloud, though you are silent with your voice.” (Basil of Caesarea.)

  30. This we know. For they are different to different nations; we coin them as we please, etc. φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον: “The names of things are not founded in nature, but are only artificial signs.” (Aristotle, Organon.) And though Plato seems to be of another mind, yet when Cratylus says, Ονόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν, “that the propriety of the name is founded in the nature of every thing,” it is as much to be questioned whether anything more be meant than this, that some names of things are more natural or proper than others. For he says that this rectitude of names is the same καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις, “with the Greeks and with the Barbarians;” that it is [only] such as is sufficient δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαςτόν ἐςτι τῶν ὄντων, “to signify what every thing is;” such as may render them κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια⁠ ⁠… τοῖς πράγμασιν, etc. “as like the things as is possible, etc.(Plato, Cratylus.) That lepidum et festivum argumentum, “that witty and jocular argument,” which Publius Nigidius in Aulus Gellius makes use of to show, cur videri possint verba esse naturalia magis quam arbitraria, “why words seem rather to be natural than arbitrary,” deserves only to be laughed at. (Attic Nights.)

  31. רֵישׁ, the Hebrew word Resh.

  32. רֵישׁ, the Arabic word Resh. So Aben Ezra observes that אבה, Abab, in Hebrew is to “will,” in Arabic to “nill” (though in Arabic the word is written אבי, Abi): and in another place, that the same word even in the same language sometimes signifies דבר והפכו, a thing and its contrary. And everyone knows, that the greater part of our words have different senses and uses. The word עגוז (Gnigon) in Arabic, according to Giggeius and Golius, has 70 or 80, and some (two at least) contrary the one to the other.

  33. This is ποιεῖν ψεῦδος: “to act a lie.” (Revelation 21:27.) Plato uses the same way of speaking. Ψεῦδος, says he, μηδεὶς μηδὲν⁠ ⁠… μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ πράξειεν: “No man should tell a lie either by word or deed.” (Laws.) The contrary to this is in Aristotle: ἀληθεύειν⁠ ⁠… ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν: “to perform the truth both in words and in deeds;” and ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύειν: “to live in the truth.” (Nicomachean Ethics.) And in Sefer Bereshit לכת באמת: “to walk in the truth,” and דרך אמת: “in the way of truth.”

  34. Actum generale verbum est, sive verbis sive re quid agatur: “An act is a general expression, and signifies anything that is acted either by words or deeds.” (Justinian, Digest.)

  35. As it must be, because Ὀρθὸν ἡ ἁλήθεἰ ἀεί: “Truth is always right.” (Sophocles, Antigone.)

  36. Τῷ λογικῷ ζώῳ ἡ ἀυτὴ πρᾶξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον: “An action which is done according to nature, or according to reason, is the same in a creature endowed with reason”; that is, according to truth, which it is the office of reason to discover. (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations.) Nunquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia dicit: “Nature never dictates one thing, and reason a different thing.” (Juvenal, Satires.)

  37. Ἔδωκεν [ὁ Θεὸς] ἀντὶ δέλτου τὸν κόσμον: “[God] has given us the world, as it were for a book to read in.” (Johannes Chrysostom, Homilies on First Corinthians.)

  38. What Hierocles says of his ἐγκόσμιοι Θεοὶ, “Gods that govern this world,” is true in respect of everything. Τῷ Θέιῳ νόμῳ κατακολουθούντων ἐστί⁠ ⁠… τοῦτο ἀυτοὺς εἶναι τίθεσθαι, δ γεγόνασι: “The supposing them to be what they are⁠ ⁠… is paying obedience to the law of God.” (Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.) There is a passage somewhere in Sefer ha-Ikkarim (II, 28) much like this: where it is said (as I remember) that he, who worships an Angel מצד מה הוא שליח ה (“as being what he is, the messenger of God”) is not guilty of idolatry. (Joseph Albo.)

  39. הקב״ה נקרא אמת וכו׳: “The holy Being is called truth.” In Reshit Hokmah and others (Elijah ben Moses de Vidas). And St. Chrysostom defines truth in the same words, which philosophers apply to the Deity. Ἀλήθεια τὸ ὄντως ὄν: “Truth is that which has a real existence.” (Paraphrasing the Eleatic in Plato’s Sophist.)

  40. Ἀλήθεια γὰρ ὀπαδὸς θεοῦ: “For truth is the companion of God.” (Philo Judaeus, On the Life of Moses.)

  41. Ποιμνας⁠ ⁠… ὡς ἄνδρας⁠ ⁠… ἔχων: “Treating his flocks⁠ ⁠… like men,” is in Sophocles the character of Ajax, when his head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monstrous and mad extravagances of Caesar Caligula, one is that he treated his horse Incitatus as a man. (Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars.)

  42. Horace argues after the same manner: Si quis lectica nitidam gestare amet agnam; Huic vestem, ut gnatæ, paret, etc.⁠ ⁠… Interdicto huic omne adimat ius Prætor, etc.⁠ ⁠… Quid? si quis gnatam pro mutâ devovet agnâ Integer est animi? Ne dixeris: “If anyone should take pleasure in carrying a very pretty lamb about with him in his chariot, and clad it like his daughter, etc., ought not the magistrate to take the power out of such a one’s hands? etc. But what if any man should attempt to offer his daughter as a sacrifice instead of a dumb lamb, would you say that he was in his right senses? I am sure you would not.” (Satires.) If it be against truth and nature to use a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much against truth to use a daughter as a lamb.

  43. Καθ’ αὑτο⁠ ⁠… μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν τὸ δ’ αληθει καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν: “A lie is base and blameworthy of itself, and truth is beautiful and praiseworthy.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Est quiddam, quod suâ vi nos alliciat ad sese, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate; quod genus, virtus, scientia, veritas est: “There is something that wins our affections by its own native force, something that does not catch us by any profit that it brings, but attracts us by its superior execellency; something of this kind is virtue, knowledge, truth.” (Cicero, De Inventione.) “Truth is a sweet thing” (a festival saying in Plutarch).

  44. O magna vis veritatis, etc.: “O the great force of truth, etc.(Cicero, For Marcus Cœlius.) A good man עושה האמת מפני שהוא אמת: “does the truth, because it is the truth.” (Maimonides.)

  45. Plura vera discrepantia esse non possunt: “Be there never so many truths, they cannot be inconsistent with each other.” (Cicero, Academica Priora.)

  46. Oblivione voluntaria: “By a voluntary forgetfulness.” (Cicero, Letters to Friends.)

  47. In the Civil Law he is said to act, who does omit. Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur facere adversus ea qua non facit. (Digestorum, seu Pandectarum.)

  48. Est quodam prodire tenus: “It is something to go, though it be but a little way, or to make a small progress.” (Horace, Epistles.)

  49. Disces quamdiu voles: tamdiu autem velle debebis quoad te, quantum proficias, non pœnitebit: “You may learn as long as you please, and you ought to please, so long as you are not uneasy at any improvement of yourself,” says Cicero to his son. (De Officiis.)

  50. Nulla virtus virtuti contraria est: “No one virtue can be contradictory to any other virtue.” (Seneca, De Clementi.)

  51. עגי באותה שעה: “Poor at that particular time:” according to that determination in a case something like this, which occurs in Mishnah Peah V, 4.

  52. Utrique simul consulendum est. Dabo egenti; sed ut ipse non egeam, etc.: “Regard is to be had to both at the same time; I will give to one in want, yet so that I may not want myself, etc.(Seneca, De Beneficiis.) Ita te aliorum miserescat, ne tui alios misereat: “Take pity of others, but do it in such a manner as not to stand in need of the pity of others yourself.” (Plautus, Trinummi.)

  53. Sextus Empiricus seems to be fond of that filthy saying of Zeno, in relation to what is storied of Jocasta and Oedipus: μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μόρίον τῆς μητρὸς⁠ ⁠… τρῖψαι, κ.τ.λ. any more, than to rub with the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only τρίψις is considered; as if all was nothing more, but barely τρίψις; but this is an incomplete idea of the act [Clarke chastely refuses to translate this, but the gist of it is that Sextus Empricus, in Outlines of Pyrrhonism, claims that Zeno says that rubbing your mother’s naughty bits with your own shouldn’t be considered any stranger than rubbing some more mundane part of her with your hand —⁠Editor]. For τρίψις τοῦ μόρίον is more than τρίψις by itself: and τρίψις τοῦ μόρίον τῆς μητρὸς is still more: and certainly τρίβειν τὴν χεῖρα τῇ χειρὶ is a different thing from τρίβειν τὸ μορίον τῷ μορίῳ, etc. He might as well have said, that to rub a red hot piece of iron with one’s bare hand is the same as to rub one that is cold, or any other innocent piece of matter: for all is but τρίψις. Thus men, affecting to appear freethinkers, show themselves to be but half-thinkers, or less: they do not take in the whole of that which is to be considered.

  54. Sunt res quædam ex tempore, et ex consilio, non ex sua natura considerandæ⁠ ⁠… Quid tempora petant, aut quid personis dignum sit, considerandum est, etc.: “Some things are to be considered, not as they are in their own nature, but the particular time and the intention are to be taken into the account⁠ ⁠… We are to consider what the times require, and what is proper, for such and such persons, etc.(Cicero, De Inventione.)

  55. Οὐ λέγεις φιλόπονον τόν διά παιδισκάριον ἀγρυπνοῦντα: “You will not say that a person is industrious, because he once watched all night with his daughter.” (Arrian, Discourses of Epictetus.) Amico ægro aliquis assidet: probamus. At hoc si hereditatis causâ facit, vultur est, cadaver expectat: “A man watches with a sick friend: it is allowed to be a good action; but if he did it in order to make himself his heir, he is a vulture, and watched for the carcass.” (Seneca, Epistles.)

  56. Οὐ γὰρ εἷς ἀρνήσεώς ἐστι τρόπος: “There are more ways than one of denying a thing.” (Johannes Chrysostom, De Anna.)

  57. Τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἁγαθῶν, ἡ ἀλήθεια, καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος ὅρος τῆς πονηρίας, τὸ ψεῦδος: “Of all the good things in the world, truth is the best, and falsehood is the utmost boundary of all evil.” (Basil.)

  58. Notwithstanding that paradox of the Stoics, Ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα, “That all sins are equal, and all duties equal,” in Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes Laërtius, and others, which might easily be confuted from their own words in Cicero. For if sinning be like passing a line, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, to sin being equal to going beyond that line, to go more (or farther) beyond that line must be to sin more. Who sees not the falsity of that, nec bono viro meliorem⁠ ⁠… nec forti fortiorem, nec sapiente sapientiorem posse fieri, “that it is impossible for a good man to be better⁠ ⁠… or a strong man to be stronger, or a wise man wiser?” (Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum) and so on. Nullum inter scelus et erratum discrimen facere, “to make no difference betwixt notorious wickedness and mere mistakes” (as St. Jerome expresses their opinion: if that epistle to Celantia be his) is to alter or destroy the natures of things.

  59. Sure that Wiseman was but a bad accountant, who reckoned, τὴν μεγίστην οὐσίαν ἀποβάλὼν, δραχμὴν μίαν ἐκβεβληκέναι: “that he who throws away the greatest estate, throws away but a drachm.” (Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis.)

  60. This is confessed in Cicero. Illud interest, quod in servo necando, si adsit injuria, semel peccatur: in patris vita violanda multa peccantur, etc. Multitudine peccatorum præstat, etc.: “There is this difference: that he who kills a slave, if it be done wrongfully, is guilty of sin in that one respect only; but he that wickedly takes away the life of his father, sins in many respects, etc. He excels in the multitude of his sins, etc.(Paradoxa Stoicorum.)

  61. This may serve for an answer to Chrysippus, and them who say, εἰ ἀληθὲς ἀληθοῦς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ψεῦδος ψεύδους· οὕτως οὐδὲ ἀπάτη ἀπάτης, οὐδὲ ἁμάρτημα ἁμαρτήματος, κ.τ.λ.: “That if no one truth be greater than another truth, nor no one falsehood greater than another falsehood; then neither is one fraud nor one sin greater than another.” (In Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Zeno of Citium.)

  62. Queis paria esse ferè placuit peccata, laborant, Cùm ventum ad verum est: sensus moresque repugnant, Atque ipsa utilitas: “They, who would have all sins to be equal, labor under great difficulty when they come to the truth; for they find it contrary to reason, to morality, and to the interest of mankind.” (Horace, Satires.)

  63. Therefore they, who denied there was either good or evil (Φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν: “good or evil in the nature of things”), were much in the right to make thorough work, and to say there was nothing in nature either true or false. See Sextus Empiricus (Pros Ethikous) and Diogenes Laërtius (Life of Pyrrho).

  64. Quod [extremum, et ultimum bonorum] omnium philosophorum sententiâ tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat: ipsum autem nusquàm: “That which is the [ultimate end or final good] according to the opinion of all philosophers, must be something to which all other things ought to be referred, but itself referred to nothing.” (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum.)

  65. There was among the old philosophers such an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the fines bonorum et malorum, “the limits of good and evil,” that if Varro computes rightly, the number might be raised to 288. (St. Augustine, City of God.)

  66. Quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est: “That which is truly honorable, and valuable upon its own account, is the only thing that ought to be esteemed really good.” (Cato, in Cicero’s De finibus bonorum et malorum.)

  67. Qui [omnes] permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt⁠ ⁠… quia honestum est: “Who [everybody] do abundance of things for this reason only⁠ ⁠… because they are honorable in themselves.” (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum.)

  68. It is commonly placed among ends, and is considered as such in those ways of speaking; honestum esse propter se expetendum: “that which is honorable ought to be sought after for its own sake.” (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum.) Finem bonorum esse honestè vivere: “The perfection of all goodness and virtue is to live by the rules of true honor.” (Ibid., and the like.)

  69. To say Quod laudabile est, omne honestum est: “what is truly praiseworthy, is truly honorable,” or anything like that, is, to say nothing. For how shall one know what is truly laudabile, “praiseworthy?”

  70. Τέλος εἶπε [Ζήνων] τὸ ὁμολογουμένως al. ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν· Ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις: “The perfection of man says [Zeno] is to live agreeably to, or to follow, nature; and that is to live virtuously, for nature leads us to that.” (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Zeno.)

  71. Vivere ex hominis naturâ: “To live agreeably to the nature of man.” (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum.) It is true, he adds undique perfectâ et nihil requirente: “every way perfect and wanting nothing,” but those words have either no meaning, or such as will not much mend the matter. For what is natura undique perfecta et nihil requirens: “a nature every way perfect and wanting nothing?” Besides, moral religion does not consist in following nature already perfect, but by the practice of religion we aim at the perfecting of our natures.

  72. Celebrated everywhere.

  73. Τό μέν ούν ούτω διορίσασθαι τὰς οὶγαθὰς πράξεις, τὰς κατα τὸν δρθόν γινομένας λόγον, τὰς πονηρὰς τοὐναντίον, ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ίκανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημᾶναι: “To define good actions thus, viz. that they are done according to right reason, and bad actions the contrary; is indeed true, but is not sufficient to declare the nature of them by showing what actions are truly such.” (Andronicus of Rhodes [from a commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics sometimes attributed to Andronicus —⁠Editor].)

  74. Nec solum jus et injuria a natura dijudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta et turpia. Nam communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit easque in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia: “Not only right and wrong are different in the nature of things, but all sorts of honorable and base actions are so likewise: for common sense makes us understand things, and lays the first rudiments of them in our minds, in such a manner that we make honorable things to consist in their being virtuous, and base things to consist in their being vicious.” (Cicero, De Legibus.) Κριτήριά φησιν [ὁ Χρύσιππος] εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν: “Chrysippus says that sensation and reflection are the rules by which we form our judgment of things.” (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Zeno.)

  75. They are usually called principia naturæ, lex (or leges) naturæ, προλήψεις κοιναὶ, or φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, νόμος φυσικὸς, etc. “the principles of nature, the law (or laws) of nature, first apprehensions of things, universal or natural notions, the law of nature, etc.

  76. The set of these practical principles (or a habit flowing from them) is what, I think, goes by the name of Synteresis.

  77. Unaquæque gens hoc legem naturæ putat, quod didicit: “Every nation think that to be the law of nature, which they have been taught.” (St. Jerome, Against Jovianus.)

  78. Under which word these delicate men comprehend labor. When Epicurus, in Lucian’s The Double Indictment, is asked, Κακὸν ἡγῇ τὸν πόνον: “Whether he thought labor an evil?” he answers, Ναί: “Yea.” And Mindyrides (Σμενδυρίδης, according to Herodotus in his Histories, ὃς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χλιδῆς εἷς ἀνὴρ ἀπίκετο: “Smyndirides⁠ ⁠… a man who carried luxury to the highest degree”) proceeded so far in his aversion to labor, that ejus latus alieno labore condoluit⁠ ⁠… qui cum vidisset fodientem, et altiùs rastrum allevantem, lassum se fieri (ῥῆγμα λαβεῖν in Athenæus) questus vetuit illum opus in conspectu suo facere: “it gave him a pain in his side to see another man labor⁠ ⁠… : when he saw anyone digging or lifting a heavy rake, he complained that it made him weary (‘demolished him,’ it is in Athenæus) and forbade the person doing any more work in his sight.” (Seneca, De Ira.)

  79. Ad hæc [voluptatem, et dolorem] et quæ sequamur, et quæ fugiamus, refert omnia [Aristippus]: “[Aristippus] referred everything [to pleasure and pain] which we pursue or avoid.” (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum.)

  80. Velim definias, quid sit voluptas: de quo omnis hæc quæstio est: “I would have you define what pleasure is, for this whole question is about that.” (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum.) The disputes about pleasure between the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, Hieronymus, etc. are well known: whether the end was pleasure of body or mind; whether it was voluptas in motu, or in statu (stabilitate); quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet, or quae percipitur, omni dolore detracto; ἠ ἐν κινήσει, or ἠ καταστηματικὴ etc. (Cicero, Diogenes Laërtius, et al.)

  81. Negat Epicurus jucundè vivi posse, nisi cum virtute vivatur: “Epicurus denies that anyone can live pleasantly that does not live virtuously.” (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations.) But for all that, their pleasures have not continued to be always like those in the little gardens of Gargettus. Nor indeed do they seem to be very virtuous even there. For Epicurus not only had his Leontium (or, as he amorously called her, Λεοντάριον, “his pretty poppet”), a famous harlot; but she πᾶσί τε τοῖς Επικουρείοις συνήν ἐν τοῖς κήποις: “laid with all the Epicureans in the gardens.” (Athenæus, Deipnosophistae.) And in his book περὶ τέλους (“Of Perfection”) he is said to have written thus, Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθόν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν (χειλῶν Athenæus) ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι’ ἀφροδισίων, κ.τ.λ.: “There is nothing that I esteem good, if you take away the pleasure which arises from eating and drinking and women.” (See this and more in Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Epicurus.)

  82. St. Jerome uses the plural number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time. Philosophorum sententia est, μεσότητας ἀρετὰς, ὑπερβολὰς κακίας εἶναι: “It is the opinion of the philosophers that virtues consist in the middle, and vices in the extremes.” (Letter to Demetrias.)

  83. Ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται, ἁμαρτάνεταικαὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται⁠ ⁠… Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα, κ.τ.λ.⁠ ⁠… Μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν: “Every excess is a crime, and every defect is blameworthy, but the medium is commendable.⁠ ⁠… Virtue then is a habit of our own procuring, and consists in the middle.⁠ ⁠… Which middle is between the two extremes; the one of excess, and the other of defect.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Perhaps Pythagoras (and after him Plato, and others), when he said (in Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Pythagoras) τήν ἀρετὴν ἁρμονίαν εἷναι, “that virtue was a kind of harmony,” might have some such thought as this.

  84. When he says it must be taken ὁύτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ, “according to the direction of right reason” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics), it is not by that acertained. See note 82.

  85. Οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι, κ.τ.λ.: “It is not easy to determine the particular manner and the particular persons.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Therefore Rabbi Albo might have spared that censure, where he blames himself for expressing himself too generally, when he says, כמו שראוי יבעת הראוי ובמקוס הראוי, “after a due manner, in a convenient time, and in proper place,” without telling him what that manner, time, place is. (Sefer ha-Ikkarim I, 8.)

  86. That man, says he, cannot be neglected, who endeavors δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν, ἐις ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ: “to make himself a righteous man, by laboring after virtue, that he may be as like God as it is possible for a man to be.” (Republic.) And in another place, our φυγὴ ἐνθένδε is ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: “fleeing from thence is being like unto God so far as we can be.” (Theaetetus.) St. Augustine seems to agree with him, in that sentence of his, Religionis summa est imitari quem colis: “The highest pitch of religion is to imitate the being you worship.” (The City of God.)

  87. Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς τὶ ποιοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι θεῷ ὅμοιον, ἔφη, Ἐὰν άληθεύωσι: “Pythagoras, being asked what it was that any man could do like what God does, answered: Speak the truth.” (Joannes Stobaeus, On Truth.)

  88. There is certainly not that difficulty or perplexity in morality, which Cicero seems to suppose, when he says, Consuetudo exercitatioque capienda, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus: “That use and exercise are necessary to make us good reasoners about what is our duty.” (De Officiis.)

  89. What it is in nature. כפי מה שהואבוא: “According to what the thing is,” to use Maimonides’s words. And thus that in Arrian is true, Νόμος βιωτικός ἐστιν ούτος, το ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει πράττειν: “The rule of life is, to do whatever is agreeable to nature.” (Discourses of Epictetus.) Omni in re quid sit veri, videre et tueri decet: “We ought to find out and to maintain what is true, about everything.” (Cicero, De Officiis.) This is indeed the way of truth.

  90. Because there is scarce anything which one or other will not say. Quid enim dici potest de illo, qui nigram dixit esse nivem, etc.: “What can we say of a man that affirms black to be white, etc.(Lactantius, Divine Institutes.)

  91. Conveniet cùm in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum:⁠ ⁠… à litibus verò quantùm liceat, et nescio an paulo plus etiam quàm liceat, abhorrentem.⁠ ⁠… Habenda autem est ratio rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi finere flagitiosum est: “It is but reasonable that we should be liberal in giving, and not severe in our demands:⁠ ⁠… we should be averse to any contention, as far as is lawful, nay I don’t know if we should not go a little farther.⁠ ⁠… But we must have regard to our own private circumstances, for it is a wicked thing in us to hurt them.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  92. Τὸν φιλέοντ’ ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, τον δ’ έχθρὸν ἐᾶσαι: “Invite your friend to supper, but let your enemy alone.” (Hesiod, Works and Days.)

  93. Τὸ πένεσθαι οὐκ ὀμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον: “For a poor man not to own himself to be poor is a base thing; but for him not to endeavor to be otherwise is a baser thing still.” (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War.)

  94. For ἔργον δ’ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος: “no endeavor is any reproach.” (Hesiod, Works and Days.)

  95. Suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius, quam de alterius commodis detrahendum: “Every man ought to bear the evils he is under, rather than deprive others of their advantages.” (Cicero, De Officiis.) According to Plato, a man should choose to die, πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, “rather than do an unjust thing.”

  96. Οὕτω καὶ ἰατρὸς νοσοῦντα ἐξαπατᾷ,⁠ ⁠… καὶ δεινὸν οὐδέν: “Thus a physician deceives a sick person,⁠ ⁠… and there is nothing shocking in it.” (Maximus Tyrius, Dissertations.)

  97. To that question, Si quis ad te confugiat, qui mendacio tuo possit à morte liberari, non es mentiturus? “If a man should come to you who should be saved from death by your telling a lie, would you tell one?” St. Augustine answers in the negative, and concludes, Restat ut nunquam boni mentiantur.⁠ ⁠… Quanto fortiùs, quanto excellentiùs dices, nec prodam, nec mentiar: “It remains then that good men should never tell a lie.⁠ ⁠… How much more courageous, how much better is it to say: I will neither betray him nor tell a lie.” (De Mendacio.)

  98. In such pressing cases, under imminent danger, the world is wont to make great allowances. Οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγῇ δῆτα τὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν;⁠ ⁠… Οὐκ, ἐι τὸ σωθῆναί γε τὸ ψεῦδος φέρει: “Is it not then a base thing to say what is false?⁠ ⁠… No, not if the falsity will save anyone.” (Sophocles, Philoctetes.) Even they, who say, השח שיחה בטלה עובר במעשה: “that he who speaks falsehood transgresses indeed,” and, עשה לדבר אמת אפילו במילי דעלמא: “that it is a positive precept to speak the truth in common discourse;” and, חמשקר כאלו עובד ע״ז: “that a liar is like an idolater;” say also, אבל לשים שלום מותר: “that it is better to preserve peace.” (Eliezer Azkari, Sefer Haredim and various places.) And Aben Ezra says of Abraham, דחה אבימלך בדברים כפי צורך השעה: “that he urged Abimelech with such words as the necessity of that time required.” (Commentary on the Torah on Genesis 20:12.) In short, some have permitted, in desperate cases, mendacio tanquam veneno uti, “to make use of a lie as you do of poison.” (Sextus the Pythogorean, Sentences of Sextus.)

  99. אסור⁠ ⁠… לשבר כליו בחמתו וכו׳: “It is forbidden⁠ ⁠… to break your own vessels in your anger.” (Judah ben Samuel, Sefer Hasidim.)

  100. Who does not detest that thought of Caligula, de Homeri carminibus abolendis, etc.? about destroying Homer’s verses, etc. (Suetonius, Lives of the Caesars.)

  101. The Stoics must certainly therefore be much too scrupulous, when they affirm (if they were in earnest), that οὐδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον ὡς ἔτυχε σαλεύειν τῷ σοφῷ ὁ λόγος ἐπιτρέπει: “reason commands a wise man, not so much as to move his fingers, as it were by chance.” (Clemens Alexandrinus, Paedagogus.) Especially since this is, at least ordinarily, a thing perfectly indifferent by proposition IX.

  102. Tu si hic sis, aliter sentias: “You would be of another opinion, if you were in my circumstances.” (Terence, The Andrian.)

  103. Felicitas cui præcipua fuerit homini, non est humani judicii: cùm prosperitatem ipsam alius alio modo, et suopte ingenio quisque terminet: “No man can judge what the happiness of another man consists in; because some make their happiness to consist in one thing, and some in another, according to their several dispositions.” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.)

  104. It is not possible, in Joseph Albo’s words, לתת לאיש כדרכיו שוה בשוה ולשער העונשים במדה במשקל וכו׳: “to give to every man according to equity, with regard to his ways, and to estimate punishments by measure and weight.” (Sefer ha-Ikkarim I, 8.)

  105. Inter hominem et belluam hoc maximè interest, quod hæc⁠ ⁠… ad id solum quod adest, quodque præsens est, se accommodat, paululum admodum sentiens præteritum aut futurum, etc.: “Herein lies the chief difference between a man and a beast, that this latter conforms itself to that only which is present and before it, having but a very small sense of what is past or to come, etc.(Cicero, De Officiis.) Nos et venturo torquemur et præterito. Timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum præsentibus miser est: “But we torment ourselves with what is to come, and with what is past: for by our foresight we anticipate the torment of fear, and by our memory we bring back that torment which is past. No man is miserable by the present things alone.” (Seneca, Epistles.)

  106. Præsens tempus brevissimum est, adeo quidem, ut quibusdam nullum videatur, etc.: “The present time is as short as is possible, insomuch that some have imagined it to be a mere nothing, etc.(Seneca, De Brevitate Vitae.) ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτοὶ μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι χρόνος: “When we have no succession of thoughts, or if we have, but forget them, then time seems to us to be nothing.” (Aristotle, Physics.)

  107. אין השם חפץ שתמות בהמה הגם וכו׳: “God takes no delight that a beast should die, if there be no reason for its dying.” (Aben Ezra.) עושה צער לבהמה תנם⁠ ⁠… בא לדין וכו׳: “He that put a beast to any pain, without a just reason for so doing, shall be accountable for it.” (Judah ben Samuel, Sefer Hasidim.)

  108. The rants of those men, who assert, μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονῆν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ἥδεῖον τι εἶναι, “that there is no difference in pleasures, that nothing can be more than pleasant,” nay, Φύσει οὐδὲν ἡδὺ, ἢ ἀηδὲς, “that there is nothing that is naturally pleasant or unpleasant,” in Diogenes Laërtius (Life of Aristippus), can surely affect nobody who has sense, or is alive. Nor that of the Stoics, in Plutarch, ὅτι ἀγαθὸ ὁ χρόνος οὐκ αὔξει προσγιγνόμενος, κ.τ.λ., “That the continuance of any good makes no addition to it.” (Moralia.) As if an age was not more than a moment, and (therefore) an age’s happiness more than a moment’s.

  109. Nocet [fit noxa] empta dolore voluptas: “Pleasure, that is procured by pain, is so much real hurt.” (Horace, Epistles.) And, multo corrupta dolore voluptas: “Pleasure vitiated by much pain.” (Horace, Sermons.)

  110. As when that Pompey, mentioned by Valerius Maximus, by burning his finger, escaped the torture. (Facta et dicta memorabilia.).

  111. Bona malis paria non sunt, etiam pari numero: nec lætitia ulla minimo mœrore pensanda: “Good things are not equal to evil things, though they were the same in number; nor is any joy an equivalent for the least sorrow.” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.)

  112. Οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ: “We think that happiness must have some pleasure mixed with it.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics).

  113. Or ὁιονεὶ καθεύδοντός κατάστασις: “like a man in a deep sleep.” (Aristippus, in Diogenes Laërtius’s Life of Aristippus.)

  114. This is truly Bonum summum, quò tendimus omnes: “the chief good, which we all aim at.” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura). Ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἑτέρου χάριν αἱρόυμεθα, πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τέλος γὰρ αὕτη: “We choose all other things, except happiness, for the sake of something else; but that is itself the end.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  115. Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo quæ possides? quae⁠ ⁠…: “God does not give us any good things, whence then comes all that we have? which.⁠ ⁠…” (Seneca, De Beneficiis.)

  116. Παντὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ κακία καὶ κακοδαιμονία ἐστίν: “Everything that is contrary to the nature of any being, is evil and misery to it.” (Arrian, Enchiridion of Epictetus.)

  117. Τίνων ἡδονῶν καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὀρθὸν μεταλαμβάνομεν: “There are some pleasures which we claim by the dictates of right reason.” (Simplicius). Rectè facit, animo quando obsequitur suo: quod omnes homines facere oportet, dum id modo fiat bono: “He does right who follows the dictates of his own mind, as all men ought to do, if they do it in a proper manner.” (Plautus, Amphitryon.)

  118. Habebit philosophus amplas opes; sed nulli detractas etc.: “A philosopher would have large possessions, but then he would not have them taken from others, etc.(Seneca, De Vita Beata.) Here he seems to confess the folly of the Stoics, who denied themselves many pleasures that were honest and almost necessary; living in tubs, feeding upon raw herbs and water, going about in a sordid garment, with a rough beard, staff, and satchel, etc.

  119. Quid rectum sit, apparet: quid expediat, obscurum est: ita tamen, ut⁠ ⁠… dubitare non possimus, quin ea maximè conducant, quæ sunt rectissima: “It is very evident what right is; but it is very difficult to say what is expedient; but yet there can be no doubt, but that those things which are most right are most conducive to our happiness.” (Cicero, Letters to Friends.)

  120. Quis hoc statuit, quod æquum sit in Quinctium, id iniquum esse in Nævium? “Who has decreed that what is equitable with regard to Quinctius, should be unjust with respect to Nævius?” (Cicero, For Publius Quinctius.)

  121. That question in Plato, Τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδεῖξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώττομεν, κ.τ.λ., “If anyone should affirm that all our thoughts are only mere dreams, and that we are now asleep, what demonstrative proof could be brought to the contrary?” may have place among the velitations of philosophers: but a man can scarce propose it seriously to himself. If he does, the answer will attend it. (Theaetetus.)

  122. = a.

  123. = e.

  124. = ae.

  125. See André Tacquet’s Elementa Geometriæ 1.5, page 3, Number XII. But the thing appears from the bare inspection of these quantities: b, ab, aeb, aeib, aeiob, etc.

  126. “Things that are equal to the same thing, are equal to one another,” and “things that are each equal to a third thing, are also equal to each other” (versions of Euclid’s first postulate). If men, in their inferences, or in comparing their ideas, do many times not actually make use of such maxims; yet the thing is really the same. For what these maxims express, the mind sees without taking notice of the words.

  127. Under the word “reason” I comprehend the intuition of the truth of axioms. For certainly to discern the respect which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the proposition necessarily true, is an act of reason, though performed quick, or perhaps all at once.

  128. If many believed, according to Socrates (in Lucian’s Halcyon) that ὅσην ἔχει τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ὑπεροχὴν πρὸς τὸ Σωκράτους ἢ Χαιρεφῶντος εἶδος, τηλικοῦτον καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ διάνοιαν ἀνάλογον διαφέρειν τῆς περὶ ἡμᾶς διαθέσεως, “so much as the magnitude of the world exceeds the bulk of Socrates and Chærophon; so far are their powers, reason, and understanding beyond the capacity of one of us,” what may we think of the God of the world? Therefore Cicero seems to express himself too boldly where he writes, Est⁠ ⁠… homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est: “That God and man are allied to each other by reason. And where reason is in common to any persons, right reason is so likewise.” (De Legibus.)

  129. Upon this account it is, that I add the word “given” at the end of my description of reason.

  130. Simplex et nuda veritas est luculentior; quia satis ornata per se est: adeoque ornamentis extrinsecus additis fucata corrumpitur: mendacium verò specie placet alienâ, etc.: “Pure and naked truth is so much the clearer, because it has ornaments enough of its own; and therefore, when it is daubed over with external additional ornaments, it is corrupted by them, so that a lie is therefore pleasing, because it appears in the shape that is not its own, etc.(Lactantius, Divine Institutes.)

  131. That way, which some Sceptics take to prove the inexistence of truth, has nothing in it, unless it be a contradiction. If anything, say they, is demonstrated to be true, how shall it be known that that demonstration is true? Εἰ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, ζητηθήσεται πάλιν, πῶς ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον: “If by another demonstration, how shall we know that this is true? and so on forever.” (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians.) Nor do I well comprehend St. Chrysostom’s meaning, when he says, Τὸ λογισμοῖς ἀποδεχθέν, κᾄν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, οὐδέπω πληροφορίαν τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει καὶ πίστιν ἱκανήν: “That what is demonstrated by reasoning, though it may indeed be true, yet it does not afford sufficient proof or conviction to the mind.” (Against the Anomoeans.) For as no man truly believes anything, unless he has a reason for believing it: so no reason can be stronger than demonstration.

  132. Haud alio fidei proniore lapsu, quàm ubi falsæ rei gravis autor existit: “Men being never more easily drawn into a wrong belief, than when the author of a falsity is a grave person.” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.)

  133. That manner of demonstration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced directly from that which is false, is only a way of showing that an assertion is true, because its contradictory is false; founded in that known rule, Contradictoriæ nec simul veræ, nec simul falsæ esse possunt, etc., “That contradictory propositions can neither be true at the same time, nor false at the same time, etc.

  134. Cujus [summi rectoris et domini] ad naturam apta ratio vera illa et summa lex à philosophis dicitur: “The reason [of the supreme lord and governor] which is accommodated to the nature of things, is, by philosophers, called the true and chief law.” (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum.) Νόμος ἀψευδὴς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεῖνος ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος, θνητοῦ φθαρτός, ἐν χαρτιδίοις ἢ στήλαις, ἄψυχος ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἄφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοίᾳ τυπωθείς: “Right reason is an unerring law, not to be defaced by any mortal man, as if it were a lifeless thing written upon paper or pillars which must decay: but it proceeds from an immortal being, and is itself immortal, and engraven on an immortal soul.” (Philo Judaeus, Every Good Man Is Free.) More to this purpose might easily be collected.

  135. Λόγος ἐστὶν ἐικὼν Θεοῦ: “reason is the image of God.” (Philo Judaeus, De Monarchia.)

  136. Τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς σου μέρος: “The governing part of the soul.” (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations.) Or as it is in [Pseudo-]Plutarch, τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος: “the supreme part of the soul.” (Placita Philosophorum.) Principatus, “the principal part,” in Cicero. Summus in anima gradus. (Tertullian, De Anima.)

  137. Criterion. (Editor’s note.)

  138. Religio cogi non potest, verbis potiùs quàm verberibus res agenda est, ut sit voluntas: “Religion cannot be forced upon anyone, it must be done by words and not by blows, that it may be a thing of choice.” (Lactantius, Divine Institutes.)

  139. Tantulus ille⁠ ⁠… sol: “The sun⁠ ⁠… that small thing.” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura.) Poor creature!

  140. Nec nimio solis major rota⁠ ⁠… Esse potest, nostris quàm sensibus esse videtur: “The orb of the sun cannot be much bigger than it appears to our senses.” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura.) Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse quàm videatur, etc.: “Epicurus thought it might be less than it appears, etc.(Cicero, Academica.)

  141. Natura etiam nullo docente profecta ab iis, quorum, ex prima et inchoata intelligentia, genera cognovit, confirmat ipsa per se rationem, et perficit: “For nature, without any teaching, proceeds upon those general truths which we are convinced of, as soon as we begin to have any understanding, and confirms and perfects them by reason.” (Cicero, De Legibus.)

  142. Semina nobis scientiæ dedit [natura] scientiam non dedit: “The seeds or principles of knowledge are given us [by nature], but not knowledge itself.” (Seneca, Epistles.)

  143. Si sani sunt [sensus], et valentes, et omnia removentur, quæ obstant et impediunt: “If [the senses] be sound and strong, and if everything be removed out of the way that might obstruct or hinder them.” (Cicero, Academica Priora.)

  144. Socrates’s saying, in Cicero, nihil se scire, nisi id ipsum: “that he knew nothing but this,” viz. that he knew nothing, savors of an affected humility, and must not be understood strictly. But they, who followed, went further (… omnes pæne veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt: “… almost all the ancients, who affirmed, that nothing could be known, nothing perceived, nothing understood”): and particularly Arcefilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: “Arcefilas denied that anything could be certainly known, not so much as that which Socrates reserved to himself.” And thus the absurdity grew to a size that was monstrous. For no man can act, or even be alive, if he knows nothing at all. Besides, to know that one knows nothing is a contradiction, and not to know that he knows even that, is not to know whether he knows anything or not; and that is to know for ought he knows. (Quotes from Cicero’s Academica.)

  145. Nec scire fas est omnia: “Nor is it possible to know all things.” (Horace, Odes.)

  146. This was the opinion of a wise man. חגוך לגער על פי דרכו גם כי יזקין לא יסור ממנה: “Train up a child in the way that he should go; and when he is old, he will not depart from it.” (Proverbs 22:6.) For הלימזד בימי הנערות הוא כפתוח, על האבז⁠ ⁠… והלימוד בימי הזקנה כפתוח על החול: “learning in the days of youth, is like graving upon a stone⁠ ⁠… and learning, in the days of old age, is like marking upon the sand.” (Elisha ben Abraham ben Judah, Kab we-Naki.) Οὐ μικρὸν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν: “It is not a small but a very great advantage, or indeed all that can be, to be accustomed to such and such things from our very youth.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  147. Τετράκις ἔλεγον ἐξ ἠθέων τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι· ἔνθα τε νῦν καταδύεται, ενθεΰτεν δίς επαντεΤλαι, και ενθεν νΰν ανατελλει, ενθαΰτα δις καταδΰναι: “That the sun had risen four times contrary to what it usually does, viz. risen twice where it now sets, and set twice, where it now rises.” (Histories: Euterpe.)

  148. עולם כמנהגו הולך: “The world goes on in its usual course.” (Avodah Zarah.)

  149. פתי יאמין לכל דבר: “A fool believes everything that he hears.” (Proverbs 14:15) (which sure one may convert thus, המאמין לכל דבר פתי הוא: “He that believes everything that he hears, is a fool”).

  150. Statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximè videtur esse sapientis: “It seems requisite that a man must be himself wise, in order to determine who is a wise man.” (Cicero, Academica Priora.)

  151. Non numero hæc judicantur, sed pondere: “these are to be judged of, not by number, but by weight,” as Cicero speaks upon another occasion (De Officiis). Therefore I cannot, without a degree of indignation, find a sort of writers pleasing themselves with having discovered some uncivilized nations, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, etc., and then applying their observations to the service of atheism. As if ignorance could prove anything, or alter its nature by being general!

  152. Aristotle’s known rule is Ἔνδοξα, τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις, ἢ τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις: “Those things are probable, which seem so to all men, or to most men, or to wise men: or which seem so to such as these, viz. to all, or to a great many, or to the most knowing and those of the best reputation.” (Topics.) But it is not applicable to all cases.

  153. Δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι παῤ ἀυτῶν [πρεσβυτῶν] πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστι: “It seems best to enquire of old men, who have gone over the way that you are to go, what sort of a way it is.” (Plato, Republic.)

  154. When Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, Πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τ’ αφροδίσια, “What relish he had of women,” he answered, Εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ἀσμενέστατα μέν τοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγών⁠ ⁠… παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία: “Be quiet, Sir. I flee from them as gladly as I would run away from a mad or a cruel master⁠ ⁠… there is great ease and freedom from all such things when a man is grown old.” (Plato, Republic, et al.)

  155. Ἐν βραχεῖ σφυρήλατον νοῦν περιεχούτα: “That contains solid sense in a small compass.” (Plutarch, De Garrulitate.)

  156. Prerequisites. (Editor’s note.)

  157. Sicut ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει (è Thucydides) ita recta ingenia debilitat verecundia, perversa confirmat audacia: “As ignorance carries impudence along with it (out of Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War) and reputation makes men lazy; so modesty weakens great geniuses, and impatience confirms the obstinate.” (Pliny, the younger, Epistles.)

  158. Ὅταν τι βουλόμεθα ἀκριβὲς νοῆσαι, ἐις ἐρημίαν αποδιδράσκομεν, τὰς ὄψεις, τὰ ὦτα ἐπιφράττομεν, ἀποταττόμεθα ταῖς αισθήσεσι: “When we would consider a thing very exactly, we retire into some private place, we wink our eyes, and stop our ears, and renounce all our bodily senses.” (Philo Judaeus, Legum Allegoriæ.)

  159. Aliis nullus est deorum respectus, aliis pudendus: “Some do not worship the Gods at all, and others do it in a shameful manner.” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.) The former part of this observation is in truth the effect of the latter.

  160. Pudet dicere frequentiam salutandi, etc.: “I am ashamed to relate what sort of visits they make to each other, etc.(Jerome, Epistles.)

  161. Τὰ χρηστ’ ἐπιστάμεθα, καὶ γιγνώσκομεν, Οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ’ οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὕπο, κ.τ.λ.: “We know and understand what is good, but we do not labor after it; some out of laziness, etc.(Euripides, Hippolytus.)

  162. פאת, “fate” in Arabic is “to die”: and from hence the word fatum, “fate,” seems to come (as many Latin words do, from that and other Eastern languages), death, if anything, being fatal and necessary. Yet, it does not follow that therefore the time or manner of dying is unmoveably fixed. Οὑ πάντα καθαρῶς οὐδὲ διαρρήδην ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιέχει, ἀλλ̔ ὅσα καθόλου: “Fate does not contain in it all things clearly and distinctly, but only general things.” (Plutarch, Moralia.) Chrysippus, in Aulus Gellus, seems to explain himself much after the same manner. The ancients moreover seem many times to make fate conditional. Similis si cura fuisset, Nec pater omnipotens Trojam, nec fata vetabant Stare, etc.: “If the same care had been taken, neither Jupiter nor fate would have hindered Troy from standing at this time, etc. (Virgil, Aeneid.)

  163. What the Pharisees say, according to Josephus, seems to be right. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον, τινὰ δ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνειν τε καὶ οὐ γίνεσθαι: “The Pharisees say some things, but not all, are the work of fate, for some are in our own power, and some may by accident not come to pass.” (Antiquities of the Jews.) Rabbi Albo, in relation to human actions (and the consequent events), explains this opinion thus: מקצתן בחיריות ומקצתן מכרחות ומקצתן מעודבות מן ההכרח והבחירה וכו׳: “Some of them are perfectly free, some of them are forced, and some of them have a mixture of choice and force.” (Sefer ha-Ikkarim IV, 5.) But for men to charge their own faults upon fate or fortune has been an old practice: ἐθελοκακήσαντας⁠ ⁠… ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἐκείνην ἀπολογίαν, κ.τ.λ.: “voluntary evildoers⁠ ⁠… have recourse to that common apology.” (Lucian, Apologia.)

  164. Dimidium dacti, qui cœpit, habet. Sapere aude: “He that has made a good beginning, has half finished his work: take courage then enough to be wise.” (Horace, Epistles.) Aristotle goes further than that old adagial saying (ἀρχή ἥμισυ παντός: “The beginning is half the work”). His words are, Δοκεῖ πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντός εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή: “The beginning is more than half the whole business.” (Nicomachean Ethics.)

  165. Οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω κακῶς συντέτακται τῶν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων, ὥστ’ ἀβουλοῦντος αὐτοῦ προϊέναι πόδας ἢ φθέγγεσθαι γλῶτταν κ.τ.λ.: “No living creatures are so badly constituted, as that their feet will move, and their tongues speak, whether they will or no.” (Plutarch, De Communibus Notitiis Adversus Stoicos.) That in Tibullus, Cùm bene juravi, pes tamen ipso redit: “Though I had directly sworn to the contrary, yet my feet would come back again,” is a little poetic sally. (Elegies.)

  166. Ὅλως δέ πᾶσα ἀργία καὶ τῆς τυχούσης πράξεώς ἐστιν ἐυμαρεστέρα· οἷον, Οὐ φονεύσεις, οὐ μοιχεύσεις, κ.τ.λ.: “In general, the forbearing to do a thing is very easy: as thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery.” (Basil of Caesarea, Homily on Psalm 1.)

  167. Z + Y + X, that is, Z, Y, and X added together.

  168. One might with the Στασιῶται, “stationary philosophers,” (so called by Aristotle, in Sextus Empiricus, in opposition to those philosophers who maintained that nothing continued fixed, but everything was in motion) as well deny that there is any such thing as motion, as say there is motion without a mover; or, which is the same, a First mover.

  169. Ηρῶτον μεταβάλλον: “Something that first emits any alteration to be made in a thing.” (Plato.) Ἀρχὴ κινήσεωσ ἁπάσης: “The principle of all motion.” (Plato.) Πρῶτον κινοῶν: “The First mover.” (Aristotle.)

  170. The greatest men among the ancients denied the possibility of such an ascent. Οὔτε γὰρ τόδ’ ἐκ τοῦδε δυνατὸν ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον: “it is impossible for one thing to proceed from another and so on forever.” If there could be such a process, then all the parts of it but the last would be μέσα, “intermediate ones”; and then εἴπερ μηδέν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδέν ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.: “if there be no first, there can be no cause at all.” (Aristotle, Metaphysics.) To suppose one thing moved by another, this by another, and so on ἐπ’ ἄπειον, “infinitely,” is to suppose ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδυνατὸν’ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε κινοῦν ἔσται οὔτε κινού μενον, μὴ οὔσης ἀρχῆς τῆς κινούσης: “a thing that is impossible; for nothing can either move or be moved in this manner, without any beginning of motion.” (Simplicius, On Aristotle’s On The Heavens.) Not only those Arabian philosophers called מדברים (Hebrew) אלמחכלמון (Arabic), “the rational” (a sect who maintained that the world was eternal), but many of the elder Jews have agreed with the Greeks in this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former see The Guide for the Perplexed I (Maimonides) et. al. and particularly Sefer ha-Kuzari V (Jehudah Ha-Levi): where their first argument seems to be strong (and much the same with the fourth in Emunoth ve-Deoth I, Saadya Gaon) אם היה חולף אין לו ראשית הנה האישים הנמצאים בזמן החולף עד העת הזאת אין תכלית להם ומה שאין לו תכלית לא יצא אל הפועל: “If there be any succession which has no beginning, then the number of those men, who existed during that whole succession down to the present time, must be infinite, and that which is infinite cannot be the effect of any other thing.” For though, as Joseph Moscato observes, these reasonings of the Medabberim לא לרצון היו לפניו [המורה], “rational philosophers, were not agreeable to him” (Kol Jehudah); yet most certainly, let the series of causes and effects be what it will, it is just as long downward as upward; and if they are infinite and inexhaustible one way, they must be so the other too: and then what Saadya Gaon says, takes place אם לא תגיע ההויה אלינו נהיה וכו: “If we had no beginning, we could not now exist.” There is another argument of this kind in [Pseudo-]Justin Martyr, which deserves notice, what stress soever may be laid upon it. Εἰ τὸ μέλλον μέρος τοῦ χρόνου, οὔπω ἐστίν’ ἦν δὲ καὶ τὸ γελονὸς μέρος τοῦ χρόνου πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι μέλλον’ ἦν ἄρα ὅτε οὐκ ἦν τὸ γεγονὸς μέρος τοῦ χρόνου: “If the future part of time, says he, has no existence, and the part of time that is past was future before it was present, then there was a time when that part of time which is past had no existence.” (Confutatio Dogmatum Quorundam Asistotelicorum.)

  171. Aristotle himself, who asserts the eternity of motion, asserts also the necessity of a first and eternal mover.

  172. Σειρὴν χρυσείην ἐξ οὐρανόθεν: “A golden chain hanging down from heaven⁠ ⁠…” (Homer, Iliad.) Aurea de cœlo⁠ ⁠… funis: “a golden rope reaching down from heaven” is mentioned too by Lucretius. (De Rerum Natura.)

  173. אי אפשר שישתלשל ענין מעלה ועלול אל בלתי תכלית: “It is impossible that causes and effects can be connected with each other without end.” (Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim II, 11.) Where more may be seen of this השתלשלות, “concatenation,” out of Ibn Sinai, Maimonides, etc.

  174. The chain must be fastened περί ῥίον Οὐλύμποιο: “to the top of Olympus.” Invenietur pressius intuenti à summo Deo usque ad ultimam rerum fæcem⁠ ⁠… connexio: et hæc est Homeri catena aurea, quam pendere de cœlo in terras Deum jussisse commemorat: “Whoever considers the thing closely (says Macrobius in his Commentary on Somnium Scipionis) will see that there is a connection of things from the supreme God to the lowest dregs that are⁠ ⁠… : and this is Homer’s golden chain, which he tells you God commanded to hang down from heaven to the earth.” This matter might be illustrated by other similitudes (even שלשלת הקבלה, “the chain of the Kabbalah,” might serve for one): but I shall set down but one more: and in that indeed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the same taken either way. It occurs in Hobot Ha-Lebabot I, and afterward in Reshit Hokmah. Suppose a row of blind men, of which the last laid his hand upon the shoulder of the man next before him, he on the shoulder of the next before him, and so on till the foremost grew to be quite out of sight; and somebody asking what guide this string of blind men had at the head of them, it should be answered that they had no guide, nor any head, but one held by another, and so went on, ad infinitum, would any rational creature accept this for a just answer? Is it not to say that infinite blindness (or blindness, if it be infinite) supplies the place of sight, or of a guide?

  175. So Aristotle says of the First Mover, Οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.: “It is impossible for it to be otherwise; it is necessary.” (Metaphysics.) And after him the Arabic philosophers, Maimonides, Albo, among others teach all that God exists necessarily: מן השקר העדרו: “To suppose him not to be implies a falsity;” or “He cannot be supposed not to be.” This seems to be the import of that name by which God calls himself, in Moses’s history: אהיה אשר אהיה, “I am that I am;” or in one word, אהיה, “I will be;” which, in the mouth of one who speaks of Him in the third person, is יחיה or יחוה, “He will be.” So Philo explains it: Εἶναι πέφυκα: “Existence belongs to his very nature.” So Abravanel: אני אהיה בעבור שאהיה כי אין מציאותי תלוי בזולתי אלא בעצמי: “I am, because I am; for my existence does not depend upon anything without me, but is from myself,” adding moreover that it showed God to be, not like other beings, איפשרי המציאות: “a being that might or might not have existed,” but מחוייב המציאות מצד עצמו: “whose existence flows necessarily from himself,” a Necessary being. And so Levi ben Gershom, יורה זה השם שהוא הנמצא אשר ימצא מעצמותו: “The very name (of God) shows this, for it signifies a being that exists of itself, or from its own nature.” I omit others who write after the same manner. There have been even Heathens who seemed to think that some such name as this belonged to the Deity, and for the same reason. For as אהוה: Eheveh, “I shall be,” and thence יהוה: Jehovah, “He shall be,” are used above, so Plutarch says that in addressing to Him the second person Εἶ (תהיה or תהוה⁠—Tehejeh or Teheveh) “Thou shalt be,” is ἀυτοτελὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ προσαγόρευσις καὶ προσφώνησις, “the most complete appellation or title of God,” and that by this compellation we give him ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀψευδῆ καὶ μόνην μόνῳ προσήκουσαν τὴν τοῦ εἶναι προσαγόρευσιν. Ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστιν οὐδέν: “the true, the certain, and the only title that is peculiar to the self-existent being; for self-existence does not belong to any of us.” (Plutarch, Moralia.) It is τὸ ἀίδιον καὶ ἀγενητὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον: “that which is eternal, which never had any beginning, and which is incorruptible,” that is, ὄντως ὄν, “the being that truly exists.”

  176. Something must be מחוייב המציאות, “necessarily existent,” otherwise לא יהיה דבר נמצא כלל, “there could be no beings at all;” everything cannot be אפשר מציאות: “precarious or such as might not have existed, etc.” (The Guide for the Perplexed et. al.)

  177. This needs no demonstration. But there is a very old one in Emunoth ve-Deoth and after in Sefer Hobot Ha-Lebabot: עושה את עצמו אל ימלט מאחד משני דברים שעשה את עצמו קודם הויתו או אחר הויתו ושניהם אי אפשר וכו׳: “He, who makes himself, must be said to do one of these two things, viz. either to have made himself before he existed, or else to have made himself after he existed, either of which is impossible.”

  178. What relation or analogy there is between time (a flux of moments) and eternal (unchangeable) existence, how any being should not be older now than he was 5,000 years ago, etc., are speculations attended with insuperable difficulties. Nor are they at all cleared by that of Timæus in Plato: Ὡς ποτ’ ἀἴδιον παράδειγμα τόν ἰδανικὸν κόσμον ὅδε ὠρανός ἐγεννάθη, οὕτως ὡς πρός παράδειγμα τόν αἰῶνα ὅδε χρόνος σύν κόσμῳ ἐδαμιουργήθη: “As the heavens were formerly made according to the eternal pattern of the world in the intellectual mind, so time was made with this world according to the pattern of an age;” or that in Philo: Ἀιὼν ἀναγράφεται τοῦ νοητοῦ βίος κόσμου, ὡς αἰσθητοῦ χρόνος: “An age is described to be the length of the intellectual world, as time is the length of the visible world.” Many philosophers therefore have thought themselves obliged to deny that God exists in time. Τό, τ’ ἦν, τό, τ’ ἔσται, χρόνου γεγονότος εἴδη, φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀίδιον οὐσίαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς, κ.τ.λ.: “Past and future are parts of that time which is made (with the world), and it is very wrong to apply these to an eternal being.” (Plato.) Ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς, χρὴ φάναι, καὶ ἔστι κατ’ οὐδένα χρόνον ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν ἀκίνητον, καὶ ἄχρονον καὶ ἀνέγκλιτον, καὶ οὗ πρότερον, οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ὕστερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον· ἀλλ’ εἷς ὢν ἑνὶ τῷ νῦν τὸ ἀεὶ πεπλήρωκε, κ.τ.λ.: “We must allow that God exists, though not in any time, but in a duration that has no succession, that is eternal and invariable, before which there was nothing, nor will there be any after or later than it; and that he is a single being who fills all eternity as if it were a single moment.” (Plutarch.) השם יתעלה אין יחם בינו ובין הזמן וכו׳: “That name (Jehovah) shall be exalted; there is no proportion betwixt it and the present time.” (Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed I, 52.) אינו מצוי בזמן: “He (God) does not exist in time.” (Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed.) Joseph Albo has a whole chapter to show שה״י אינו נופל תחת הזמן: “that he, whose name is blessed, cannot be compared (as to his duration) with the time that now is.” But then he owns that their Rabbis do not mean הזמן בשלוח, “time in general,” or זמן סתם, “mere duration,” or that בלתי נספר ומשוער והוא המשך שהיה קודם מציאות הגלגל וכו׳: “time which cannot be reckoned, and which is duration itself, and was before the world was;” but הזמן המשוער בתנועת הגלגל נקרא סדר זמניס לא זמן בשלוח וכו׳, “that time which is reckoned by the motion of the world, and is called the order or succession of time, and not absolute time.” (Sefer ha-Ikkarim, II, 18.) In short, they reckon (to use Gedalyah ben Solomon Lipschütz’s words in Ez Shatul) שזמן האמתי הוא נברא והמשך אינו קרוי זמן: “that time, properly so called, is created, and that duration is not called time.” And so, what they say does not include all the present difficulty; “time,” in their use of the word, being confined to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet see Sefer ha-Ikkarim II, 19. הש״י א״א שיאמר עליו שיש לו יותר זמן היום ממה שהיה לו בימי דויד וממה שהיה לו כשברא העולם: “Blessed be that name (Jehovah), it is not possible to affirm, concerning him, that he is older today than he was in the days of David, or than he was when he first created this world.” (Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim II, 19.)

  179. Οἶδα μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἐπίσταμενος δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν τρόπον⁠ ⁠… ὅτι ἄναρχός ἔστιν [ὁ Θεὸς], καὶ ἀγέννητος, καὶ ἀἴδιος, οἶδα· τὸ δὲ πῶς οὐκ οἶδα: “There are a great many things that I understand, without knowing the particular manner how they are so.⁠ ⁠… I know that God is without beginning and unbegotten, but I know not the manner how he is so.” So Chrysostom, De Incomprehensibili Dei Natura.

  180. Simonides had good reason still to double upon Hiero the number of days allowed for answering that question, Quid, aut quale sit Deus? “What or what sort of a being is God?” (in Cicero, De Natura Deorum.)

  181. Nec viget quidquam simile aut secundum: “Nor is there any being in the world like or anything near to him.” (Horace, Odes.)

  182. In The Guide for the Perplexed (I, 57) Maimonides, having proved that there must be some Being who exists necessarily, or whose existence is necessary בבחינת עצמז “if we examine into his nature,” proceeds from this necessity of existence to derive incorporeity, absolute simplicity, perfection, and particularly unity, המחוייב המציאות אי אפשר בו השניות כלל לא דומה ולא הפך וכו: “It is impossible that the number two can be applied to that which exists necessarily; there is nothing that can be compared to it, nor no reverse of it.”

  183. Therefore, by Plato He is called Ὀ εἷς: “the One.”

  184. Deus, si perfectus est,⁠ ⁠… ut esse debet, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia: “God, if He is a perfect being,⁠ ⁠… as He must be, can be but One, that all things may be in Him.” If there could be more Gods than one, tantum singulis deerit, quantum in cæteris fuerit: “everyone would want what the other had.” (Lactantius, Divine Institutes.)

  185. As light and darkness are. Δύο γὰρ ἐξισάζοντα ἀλλήλοις κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν, φθαρτικὰ ἔσται πάντως τῆς ἀλλήλων συστάσεως: “For two things that are equal, and directly contrary, destroy each other entirely.” (St. Basil, Hexaemeron.) There can be no such law between them, as is said to be among the Heathen deities. Θεοῖσι δ’ ὡδ’ ἔχει νόμος. Ούδεὶς άπαντᾷν βούλεται προθυμίᾳ Τῇ τοῦ θέλοντος, κ.τ.λ.: “The law amongst the Gods is this, that when any one of them would have anything, no other God contradicts what he desires.” (Euripides, Hippolytus.)

  186. Ἀπόλωλεν ἡ ἀλήθει’, ἐπεὶ σὺ δυστυχεῖς: “So that, because things go ill with you, there must be an end of truth.” (Euripides, The Phoenician Women.)

  187. Ψυχὴν ἔχεις ἀυτεξούσιον’⁠ ⁠… οὐ γὰρ κατὰ γένεσιν ἁμαρτάνεις, οὔτε κατὰ τύχην πορνεύεις, κ.τ.λ.: “You have a soul that is absolutely free:⁠ ⁠… you were not created a sinner, nor do you commit whoredom by chance.” (Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses Ad Illuminandos.)

  188. Ὧν ἀυτὸς εἶ κύριος, τούτων τὰς ἀρχὰς μὴ ζητήσῃς ἑτέρωθεν: “Do not seek without you for the causes of the things which are entirely in your own power.” (St. Basil, Hexaemeron.)

  189. “Must God extinguish sun, moon, and stars, because some people worship them?” (Mishnah, Abodah zarah IV, 7.) Αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑλομενου αἰτία, Θεὸς ἀναίτιος: “The fault lies in him who chooses to do the thing; God is not to blame.” (Maximus Tyrius, Dissertations.)

  190. Ἡ δίψα μὲν σώματι παρασκευάζει ἡδονὴν ποτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.: “It is thirst that makes the pleasure of drinking agreeable to the body.” (Maximus Tyrius, Dissertations.) This observation might be extended a great way. If there was, e.g., no such thing as poverty, there could be no riches, or no great benefit by them; there would be scarce any arts or sciences, etc. Ἂν γὰρ ἀνέλῃς τὴν πενίαν, τοῦ βίου τὴν σύστασιν ἀνεῖλες ἅπασαν, κ.τ.λ.: “Take away poverty, and you destroy the whole state of life.” (St. Chrysostom, De Anna.)

  191. Τὰ μέρη πρὸς ἀυτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ἐκείνω̨: “The parts must be compared with the whole, if we would see whether they are agreeable and fitted thereto,” with more to this purpose. (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  192. See Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed III, 12.

  193. Πολυειδὴς ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἰατρική: “God has provided several sorts of physic.” (Simplicius.)

  194. Κακία βλάστημα τῆς ϋλης: “Evil is a bud that springs from matter.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  195. To that question⁠—Why are we not so made ὥστε μηδὲ βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν, “as to be incapable of committing sin?”⁠—St. Basil answers: Because ἀρετὴ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται: “virtue is from our own choice, and not from any necessity.” And he who blames the Deity because we are not impeccable, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἤ τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν τῆς λογικῆς προτιμᾷ, καὶ τὴν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀνόρμητον τῆς προαιρετικῆς καὶ ἐμπράκτου, “does the very same thing as he does, who prefers a creature not endowed with reason to one that is, and a creature that has not the power of moving itself, and is void of all appetites, to a free agent and one that can choose what he will do.” (Homilia Quod Deus Non Est Auctor Malorum.)

  196. Ἀθληταὶ ἀρετῆς: “Champions for virtue,” as Philo Judaeus.

  197. In Chrysostom’s style, ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν παλαίστρᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος βίου ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ῖνα μετὰ τὸ λυθῆναι τὸ θέατρον λαμπρὸν ἀναδήσασθαι δυνηθῶμεν τὸν στέφανον: “To be industrious after virtue, and to strive in this present life, as in a place where exercises are to be performed; that, when we go off the stage, we may be crowned with a crown of glory.” (Homilies on Genesis.)

  198. Εἰ σῶμά ἐστι, φύσις δὲ σώματος μεριζομένη ἐις πλείω, ἕκαστον τῶν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι (f. ἔσται) τῷ ὅλῳ: “If it be made of matter, and if it be the property of matter to be divided into a multitude of parts, every single part will not be the same as the whole,” says Plotinus, even of the soul. (Enneads.)

  199. Δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην οὐσίαν ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν: “It has been shown before that nobody can be of this nature; it must be something indivisible, and whose parts cannot be separated from each other.” (Aristotle, Metaphysics.)

  200. They, who call God מקום, “space,” do it לפי שהוא מקום הכל ואין הכל מקומו, “because He is the space in which the whole universe is contained, and not because the universe is the space in which He is contained.” (Elijah Levita, Tishbi.) Or, as Phil. Aquin. from the ancients, הקב״ה מקום של עולם ואין עולמו מקימו: “The holy and blessed Being is the space in which the universe is contained, and not the universe the space in which He is contained.” (Rashi, on Exodus 34:21.) Οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται [ὁ Θεὸς], ἀλλὰ περιέχει τὸ πᾶν: “For He (God) is not comprehended in any thing, but He comprehends all things.” (Philo Judaeus, Legum Allegoriæ.) By which ways of speaking (though there is a Kabbalistic reason assigned too) they intend chiefly to express his omnipresence and immensity. That, in Acts of the Apostles (17:28), seems to be of the same kind: Ἐν ἀυτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἐσμεν: “In him we live, and move, and have our beings.”

  201. Such things as these, how incongruous and wild soever they are, have been affirmed: that God is infinite duration, space, etc. What can be meant by that, Καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν θεὸς: “God may be properly called eternity,” in Plotinus (Enneads)?

  202. Were not they, who converse with books, accustomed to such trials, it would be shocking to find Balbus in Cicero asserting, esse mundum deum, “that the world was God;” and yet in another place, that it is quasi communis deorum, atque hominum domus, aut urbs utrorumque: “as it were the common house of the Gods and of men, or the city of both of them;” and deorum, hominumque cause factus: “was made for the sake of the Gods and of men;” in another, providentia deorum mundum, et omnes mundi partes et initio constitutas esse, et omni tempore administrari: “that the world, and all the parts of the world, were in the beginning made by the providence of the Gods, and were always governed by the same;” in another, mundum ipsum naturâ administrari: “that the world itself is governed by nature;” with other like inconsistences. (De Natura Deorum.)

  203. Ἄτοπον ἐι μία ἠ ἐμὴ [ψυχὴ] καὶ ἡ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλου· ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἐμοῦ αἰσθανομένου καὶ ἄλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι⁠ ⁠… καὶ ὅλως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν: “It is absurd that my (soul) and the soul of any other person should be one and the same; for then, it must needs be that when I perceived anything, he would perceive it also⁠ ⁠… and he, and I, and all the whole universe would be affected alike.” (Plotinus, Enneads.) Here this author is clear, though at some other times very dark.

  204. Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus? “If the soul of man were a God, how could it be ignorant of anything?” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.)

  205. The system of Spinoza is so apparently false, and full of impieties and contradictions, that more needs not be said against it, though much might be. What Velleius says in Cicero (De Natura Deorum), is not only true, Si mundus est deus⁠ ⁠… dei membra partim ardentia partim refrigerata dicenda sunt, “that if the world be God⁠ ⁠… then the members of God may be said to be some of them hot, and some of them cold;” but if there is but one substance, one nature, one being, and this being is God, then all the follies, madnesses, wickednesses that are in the world, are in God; then all things done and suffered are both done and suffered by Him; He is both cause and effect; He both wills and nills, affirms and denies, loves and hates the same things at the same time, etc. That such gross Atheism as this should ever be fashionable! Atheism: for certainly when we inquire whether there is a God, we do not inquire whether we ourselves, and all other things which are visible about us, do exist: something different from them must be intended. Therefore to say there is no God different from them, is to say there is no God at all.

  206. What Censorinus charges upon many great men (but upon some of them surely unjustly) is to me unintelligible. He says they believed semper homines fuisse, etc., “mankind always existed, etc.,” and then, Itaque et omnium, quæ in sempiterno isto mundo semper fuerunt, futuraque sunt, aiunt principium fuisse nullum; sed orbem esse quemdam generantium, nascentiumque, in quo uniuscujusque geniti initium simul et finis esse videatur: “They say that there was no beginning of all those things, which have existed in that world which was from eternity, but that there is a certain round of things generated and springing up, which round seems to be both the beginning and the end of everything that is produced.” (De Die Natali.)

  207. So what we call attraction and aversion (centripetal and centrifugal forces) seem to have been called by Empedocles: φιλία ᾗ συγκρίνεται [τὰ στοιχεῖα], καὶ νεῖκος ᾧ διακρίνεται: “a kind of friendship by which they (the elements) are united together, and a sort of discord whereby they are separated from each other.” (Diogenes Laërtius Life of Empedocles, Life of Arist., Cicero, et al.)

  208. So far is that from being true, Nequaquam⁠ ⁠… divinitus esse creatam Naturam mundi, quæ tantâ est prædita culpâ: “That the world could never becreated by a divine Being, there are so many faults in it.” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura.) Men rashly (impiously) censure what they do not understand. Like that king of Castile who fancied himself able to have contrived a better system of the world, because he knew not what the true system is, but took it to be as ascribed to him by Rabbi Isaac ibn Sid and other astronomers of those times.

  209. Since they have, or may have, great effects upon the several parts of the solar system, one may speak thus without falling into the superstition of the multitude, or meaning what is intended by that, Nunquam cœlo spectatum impune cometen: “A comet is never seen in the heavens but for some punishment”; (in Claudian, De Bello Gothico) or the like.

  210. Finitus, et infinito similis: “Finite, but very near to infinite.” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.)

  211. Ποικίλη θανματουργία: “Variety of surprising things.” (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  212. If anyone, sitting upon mount Ida, had seen the Greek army coming on in proper order (μετὰ πολλοῦ κόσμου καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιοῦσαν: “marching over the fields in rank and file”), he ought most certainly, nowithstanding what Sextus Empiricus says, to have concluded that there was some commander under whose conduct they moved. (Against the Physicists.)

  213. Τίς ὁ ἁρμόζων τὴν μάχαίραν πρὸς τὸ κολεὸν, καὶ τὸ κολεὸν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν, κ.τ.λ.: “Who was it that fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword?” (Arrian, Discourses of Epictetus.) Even such a thing as this does not come by accident.

  214. Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formæ literarum,⁠ ⁠… aliquè conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi possint, effici: quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna: “He who thinks that this is possible to be, I don’t see but he may as well think that an infinite number of alphabets,⁠ ⁠… cast anywhere upon the ground at a venture, might come up the annals of Ennius, so as anyone might read them; whereas I question whether chance is capable of producing one verse of them.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.) But alas, what are Ennius’s annals to such a work as the world is!

  215. He was πολυγραφώτατος, πάντας ὑπερβαλλόμενος πλήθει βιβλίων: “a great writer, and exceeded all others in the quantity of books.” (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Epicurus.) But that part of his physics is here meant, in which he treated of the origin of the world, or rather of infinite worlds, which makes his thought the grosser still. For infinite worlds require infinite chances infinitely repeated.

  216. Series implexa causarum: “A series of causes connected with each other.” (Seneca, De Beneficiis.)

  217. Seneca says himself that, in this series, God is prima omnium causa, ex quâ cæteræ pendent, “the first of all the causes, and upon him the rest depend.” (De Beneficiis.) Indeed, it is many times difficult to find out what the ancients meant by “fate.” Sometimes it seems to follow the motions of the heavenly bodies and their aspects. Of this kind of fate is that passage in Suetonius to be understood, where he says that Tiberius was addictus mathematicæ, persuasionisque plenus cuncta fato agi: “given to mathematics, and fully persuaded that all things were governed by fate.” (Lives of the Caesars.) Sometimes it is confounded with “fortune.” So in Lucian we find τὴν τύχην πράξουσαν τὰ μεμοιραμένα, καὶ ἃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἑκάστῳ ἐπεκλώσθη: “fortune doing the things which are determined by fate and destined to everyone from the beginning.” (The Parliament of the Gods.) And sometimes it is the same with God: as when the Stoics say, ἕν τε εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ Δία: “God, and mind, and fate, and Jupiter, are all the same.” (In Diogenes Laërtius’s Life of Zeno and the like elsewhere.)

  218. As when Strato of Lampsacus, according to Cicero, docet omnia esse effecta naturâ: “teaches that all things are the effects of nature.” (Academica.)

  219. Vis et natura justitiæ: “The force and nature of justice.” (Cicero, Academica.)

  220. Almost as if it stood for nata, or res natæ; “all things that are produced.” (So fœtura seems to be put sometimes for fœtus: “the child in the womb.”) Sunt, qui omnia naturæ nomine appellent;⁠ ⁠… corpora, et inane, quæque his accidant: “Some persons use the word ‘nature’ for everything;⁠ ⁠… bodies and space, and all the properties of these.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.)

  221. Natura, inquit, hæc mihi præstat. Non intelligis te, cùm hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid enim aliud est Natura, quàm Deus, et divina ratio, etc.: “Nature, says he, gives me these things. Do you not see, when you say this, that you only put another name for God? For what else is nature, but God, and the divine reason, etc.(Seneca, De Beneficiis.) When it is said, Necesse est mundum ipsum natura administrari, “that the world must necessarily be governed by nature” (in Cicero, De Natura Deorum), what sense are those words capable of, if by “nature” be not really meant God? For it must be something different from the world, and something able to govern it.

  222. Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios, etc.: “Some think nature to be a certain power or force without reason, producing the necessary motions in bodies, etc.” says Balbus in Cicero (De Natura Deorum). What can this vis (“power”) be: vis by itself, without the mention of any subject in which it inheres, or of any cause from whence it proceeds? A soul of the world, plastic nature, hylarchic principle, שכל פועל, “an understanding principle,” and the like, are more intelligible than that.

  223. דע כאין באת ולאן אתה הולך’ וכו: “Search out from whence you came, and whither you are going.” (Mishnah, Abot III, 1.)

  224. For I cannot think that anybody will now stand by that way of introducing men first into the world, which is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus but asserted by Lucretius (De Rerum Natura). Ubi quæque loci regio opportuna dabatur, Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti, etc.: “Where the country was proper for it, there grew wombs out of the earth, fixed to it by their roots, etc.

  225. What by Tertullian in one place is called animæ ex Adam tradux, “a soul derived from Adam,” in another is velut surculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta, “as it were, a shoot derived from the womb of Adam, that the race might be continued,” and equally unintelligible. Nor does he explain himself better, when he confesses there to be duas species seminis, corporalem et anamalem (al. corporis semen et animæ), “two sorts of seed: corporeal and animal (or a seed of the soul, and another of the body),” or more fully, semen animale ex animæ distillatione, sicut et virus illud, corporale semen, ex carnis defæcatione, “an animal seed flowing from the soul, as the bodily seed does from the body.” (De Anima.)

  226. According to the fore-cited author, the soul is derived from the father only, et genitalibus fœminæ foveis commendata, “delivered to the womb of the mother,” and all souls from that of Adam. Definimus animam, Dei flatu natam, ex una redundantem: “We, says he, define the soul to spring from the breath of God, and all souls to proceed from one;” and in another place, ex uno homine tota hæc animarum redundantia agitur: “all the souls that are, come originally from one man.” But this does not well consist with his principal argument for traduction, that children take after their parents. For besides what will here be said by and by, if there is a traduction of all men from one man, and traduction causes likeness, then every man must be like the first, and (consequently) every other. (Tertullian, De Anima.)

  227. Unde, oro te, similitudine animæ quoque parentibus de ingeniis respondemus,⁠ ⁠… si non ex animæ femine educimur? “Whence is it, I beseech you, says the same author, that we are so like our parents in the dispositions of our minds,⁠ ⁠… if we be not produced from the seed of the soul?” Then to confirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus; in illo ipso voluptatis ultimo æstu quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoque sentimus exire?: “Do we not in the act of generation perceive some part of our very souls to go out of us?” I am ashamed to transcribe more. (Tertullian, De Anima.)

  228. Therefore the said father makes the soul to be corporeal.

  229. This might seem to be favored by them who hold that all souls were created in the beginning (an opinion mentioned by Isaac Abravanel in Nahalot Abot, et al., often), did not the same authors derive the body מטפה סרוחה, “from a small seed,” as may be seen in Abot, et passim. Particularly Rabbi David Kimhi says of man, נופו נברא מטיפת הזרע אשר תהפך לדם, ומשם יגדל מעט מעט עד שישתלמו איבריו: “That his body is produced out of a small seed, which is first converted into blood, and then increases by degrees, till all the members of it are complete.”

  230. This account destroys that argument, upon which Censorinus says many of the old philosophers asserted the eternity of the world: quod negent omnino posse reperiri, avesne ante, an ova generata sint; cùm et ovum sine ave, et avis sine ovo gigni non possit: “Because they denied the possibility of finding out which is first generated, the birds or the eggs; because an egg cannot be produced without a bird, nor a bird without an egg.” (De Die Natali.) This question was once much agitated in the world, as may be seen by Macrobius and Plutarch, who calls it, τὸ ἄπορον καὶ πολλὰ πράγματα τοῖς ζητητικοῖς παρέχον⁠ ⁠… πρόβλημα: “a problem that cannot be solved, and which put the curious to great difficulties.” (Moralia.)

  231. This is as much as Epicurus had to say for his atoms, for they were only σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά, κ.τ.λ.: “imaginary bodies.” (Justin Martyr.)

  232. Οὐ γὰρ τῷ θεωρουμένῳ τὸ θεωρεῖν: “For the thing which is speculated upon, cannot speculate.” (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  233. Si nulla fuit genitalis origo terrai et cœli⁠ ⁠… Cur supra bellum Thebanum et funera Trojæ Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poctæ?: “If the earth and the heavens never had any beginning,⁠ ⁠… how comes it to pass that the poets never celebrated any other matters before the wars of Thebes and the destruction of Troy?” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura.)

  234. Πολλαὶ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γεγόνασιν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἔσονται, πυρὶ μὲν καὶ ὕδατι μέγισται: “There has been great destruction made of mankind, many times and in many places, and will be so again; the greatest of them have been by fire and water.” (Plato, Timaeus.)

  235. Τοὺς ἀγραμμάτους καὶ ἀμούσους: “Such as could not tell their letters, or distinguish one sound from another,” as Plato speaks. (Timaeus.)

  236. For what has been said only in general, and presumptively, to serve a cause, signifies nothing: no more than that testimony in Arnobius, where he seems to allow that there have been universal conflagrations. Quando mundus incensus in favillas et cineres dissolutus est? Non ante nos? “When, says he, was the world so burned as to be reduced to dust and ashes? Has it not been so formerly?” (Adversus Nationes.)

  237. Propositions V and VI.

  238. If that, in Terence, had been (not a question, as it is in The Eunuch, but) an affirmation, Ego homuncio hoc non facerem, “I, poor mortal, would not have done such a thing,” what a bitter reflection had it been upon the heathen deity?

  239. Λέγομεν ὃ μή ἐστιν’ ὃ δέ ἐστιν, οὐ λέγομεν: “We affirm what He is not, but we do not affirm what He is.” (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  240. אין דרך להשיגו אלא ממעשיו: “There is no way to know what sort of being He is, but by his works.” (Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed III, 17.)

  241. Ungoverned. (Editor’s note.)

  242. מקרני ראמים עד ביצי כנים: “From the horns of the unicorns to the feet of the lice,” as the Jews speak. (The Guide for the Perplexed.)

  243. I shall not pretend here to meddle with particular cases relating to inanimate or irrational beings, such as are mentioned in The Guide for the Perplexed (a leaf’s falling from a tree, a spider’s catching a fly, etc.) and which are there said to be במקרה גמור, “by mere accident.” Though it is hard to separate these, many times, from the cases of rational beings; as also to comprehend what מקרה גמור, “perfect accident,” is.

  244. Hermaphroditic. (Editor’s note.)

  245. Pliny in his chapter De ordine naturæ in satis, etc., “concerning the course and order of nature in the growth of corn, etc.” treats of trees in terms taken from animals. (Natural History.)

  246. Therefore if those Essenes in Josephus, who are said ἐπὶ μὲν Θεῷ καταλιπεῖν τὰ πάντα, “to leave all things to God,” excluded human endeavors, they must be much in the wrong.

  247. Ut siquis in domum aliquam, aut in gymnasium, aut in forum venerit, cùm videat omnium rerum rationem, modum, disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri judicare, sed esse aliquem intelligat, qui præsit, et cui pareatur, etc.: “In the same manner as if anyone should come into a house or place of public exercise, or into any court of justice, and see everything in exact order and according to strict discipline; such a one could not think that all those things were done without a cause, but he would immediately apprehend that there was somebody at the head, whose commands were obeyed, etc.(Cicero, De Natura Deorum.)

  248. Little things have, many times, unforeseen and great effects: et contra. The bare sight of a fig, shown in the senate-house at Rome, occasioned Carthage to be destroyed: quod non Trebia, aut Trasymenus, non Cannæ busto insignes Romani nominis perficere potuere; non castra Punica ad tertium lapidem vallata, portæque Collinæ adequitans ipse Hannibal: “Which neither the river Po, nor the lake Trasymenus, nor the city of Canna, famous for the overthrow of almost the whole Roman nation, could do; no, nor the African camp intrenched for three miles round, nor Hannibal himself who ventured to the very gates of Rome.” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.) The whole story is thus related by the same author: Cato, being very solicitous that Carthage should be utterly destroyed, produced one day in the senate-house a ripe fig, which was brought from thence, and, showing it to the senators, asked them how long they thought it was since that fig was plucked off the tree? They all agreed that it was very fresh; upon which he told them that it was plucked at Carthage but three days before; so near, says he, is the enemy to our walls. And this was the occasion of the third Punic war, in which Carthage was utterly destroyed.

  249. While everyone pushes his own designs, they must interfere, and hinder one another. Ad summum succedere honorem Certantes, iter infestum fecere viai: “By striving to get to the highest dignity, they render the way very dangerous.” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura.)

  250. Or is it not more likely, πιπτούσης οἰκοδομίας, τὸν ὑποπεσόντα ἀποθανεῖν, ὁ ποιὸς ποτ̔ ἂν ᾖ: “that when a house falls, he that it falls upon should be killed, what sort of a man soever he be (good or bad),” in Plotinus’s words (Enneads)?

  251. Something more than this we meet with in Targum Onkelos’s paraphrase, where it is said that, upon Moses’s prayer, (Exodus 9:33), מטרא דחוה נחית לא מטא על ארעא: “the rain, that was falling, did not reach to the earth.” Which same place, Rashi eplains after the same manner; [מטר] לא הגיע [ארצה] .ואף אותן שהיו באויר לא הגיעו לארץ: “The rain came not to the earth, and also that of it, which was in the air, did not fall to the ground.” (Commentary on the Torah.)

  252. In Lucian, τῶν πλεόντων ὁ μὲν βορέαν ηὔχετο ἐπιπνεῦσαι’ ὁ δὲ, νότον’ ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ᾔτει ὑετόν’ ὁ δὲ κναφεὺς, ἥλιον: “Some of the sailors pray for a north-wind, and some for a south-wind; the countryman wishes for wet weather, and the fuller for sun-shiny.” (Icaromenippus.)

  253. Some have talked to this purpose. So Rabbi Albo says of some prophets and hasidim, “holy men,” שישנו הטבע או ישתנה בעבורם: “that they can alter the course of nature, or it will be altered for them.” (Sefer ha-Ikkarim.) So Rabbi Israel Aboab, that the good or evil which happens to a man in this world, by way of reward or punishment, אין זה רק במעשה הנם והוא נס נסתר יחשוב בו הרואה שהוא של עולם: “is not only by plain miracles, but also by obscure marks; as anyone may imagine, who sees the manner of the world.” (Menorat Ha-Maor III.) So Abravanel היכולת האלהי הוא משנה הטבעים בהשגחתו וכו׳: “It is that power of God which changes nature by his providence.” And accordingly in Seder Tefillah we find this thanksgiving: מודים אנחנו⁠ ⁠… על נסיך שבכל יום עמנו: “praise thee⁠ ⁠… for thy wonders which we behold every day.”

  254. What Seneca says of the Gods (in the heathen style), may be said of the true God. Nota est illi operis sui series: omniumque illi rerum per manus suas iturarum scientia in aperto semper est; nobis ex abdito subit, etc.: “Known unto him is the whole course of his works; the knowledge, of all those things which are to pass through his hands, is clear to him but obscure to us, etc.(De Beneficiis.)

  255. Ὁ γὰρ ζωοπλάστης θεὸς ἐπίσταται τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καλῶς δημιουργήματα: “God, who formed all living creatures, understands his own works thoroughly.” (Philo Judaeus, Legum Allegoriæ.)

  256. Ipsæ nostræ voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo, ejusque præscientia continetur, etc.: “Our wills themselves may be looked upon as causes, the manner of which God certainly knows, and it is contained in his foreknowledge, etc.(St. Augustine, The City of God.)

  257. Etsi quem exitum acies habitura sit, divinare nemo potest; tamen belli exitum video, etc.: “Though nobody can tell what may happen to the army, yet I see what the event of the war will be, etc.” And after, quem ego tam video animo, quam ea, qua oculis cernimus: “I see it as plainly, in my mind, as I can see anything with my eyes.” (Cicero, Letters to Friends.)

  258. אין זה ידיעה ממין ידיעתנו: “His knowledge is not such a sort of a knowledge as ours is.” It differs not ברב ובמעט לבד אבל במין הסציאה: “only in degree, but in kind.” (Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed III, 20.)

  259. Ignari, quid queat esse, Quid nequeat: “Who are ignorant of what can be, and what cannot be,” to use Lucretius’s words more properly. (De Rerum Natura.)

  260. To attempt to comprehend the manner of God’s knowing is the same as to endeavor שנהיח אנהנו הוא: “to become what He is.” (Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed III, 21.)

  261. ידיעתה במה שיהיה לא יוציא הדבר האפשר מטבעו: “His knowledge of anything that is future does not produce the thing that is possible in nature.” (Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed III, 20.) Much might be inserted upon this subject (out of Abravanel particularly) which I shall omit.

  262. Sicut enim tu memoriâ tuâ non cogis facta esse quæ præterierunt; sic Deus præscientiâ suâ non cogit facienda quæ futura sunt: “As we do not force the things that are past to have been done, by our remembering them; so God does not force the things that are future to be done, by his foreknowing them.” (St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio.)

  263. Things come to pass καὶ κατὰ φυσικὰς ἀκολουθίας καὶ κατὰ λόγον: “according to their natural course, and according to reason;” and even τὰ σμικρότερα δεῖ συντετάχθαι καὶ συνυφάνθαι νομίζειν: “the most minute things, we ought to think, are duly regulated and connected with each other.” (Plotinus, Enneads.) That in Seneca looks something like this: Hoc dico, fulmina non mitti a Jove, sed sic omnia disposita, ut ea etiam, quæ ab illo non fiunt, tamen sine ratione non fiant: qua illius est.⁠ ⁠… Nam etsi Jupiter illa nunc non facit, fecit ut fierent: “I affirm this: that lightning does not come immediately from Jupiter himself, but everything is so ordered that even those things which are not done by Him are notwithstanding not done without reason, which reason is his.⁠ ⁠… For though Jupiter does not do these things at this time, yet He was the cause of their being done.” (Naturales Quaestiones.)

  264. This seems to be what Eusebius means, when he says that Divine providence does (among other things) τοῖς εκτὸς συμβαίνουσι τῆν δέουσαν τάξιν ἀπονέμειν: “appoint a proper course even to those things which we call accidental.” (Church History.)

  265. Τὴν γὰρ οὐδένειαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ μετρεῖν ἔμαθον: “For I have learned what a mere nothing I am,” in Philo’s words. (Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit.)

  266. The case here put may perhaps supply an answer to that which is said in Mishnah, Berakhot IX, צועק לשעבר הרי זו תפלת שוא וכו׳: “It is a vain prayer, to cry out for what is already past.”

  267. If Plato had not been born in the time of Socrates, in all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with Lactantius’s favor, he might have reason to thank God, quòd Atheniensis [natus esset], et quòd temporibus Socratis: “that He was born at Athens, and in the days of Socrates.” (Divine Institutes.) Just as Marcus Aurelius ascribes, gratefully, to the Gods τὸ γνώναι’ Αρολλώνιον, Ρούστικον, Μάξιμον: “that he was acquainted with Apollonius Maximus (his tutor), Apollonius, and Rusticus.” (Meditations.)

  268. Plato and the Stoics, in Pseudo-Plutarch, make fate to be συμπλοκὴν ἀιτιῶν τεταγμένην, ἐν συμπλοκῇ καὶ τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς· ὥστε τὰ μὲν εἱμάρθαι, τὰ δ’ ἀνειμάρθαι: “a regular connection of causes, and those things which are in our power to belong to this connection. So that some things are decreed, and some things not.” (Placita Philosophorum.)

  269. The Heathen were of this opinion, otherwise Homer could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he does, Τῷ δ’ ἂρ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη· Ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων τρέψε φρένας: “Minerva put it into their minds. But some God altered their minds” (Homer, Iliad), and the like often. Plutarch explains these passages thus: Οὐκ ἀναιροῦντα ποιεῖ [Ὄμηρος] τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα τὴν προαίρεσιν· οὐδ’ ὁρμὰς ἐνεργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγούς: “[Homer] does not make God to destroy the will of man, but only to move him to will; nor does he produce the appetites themselves in men, but only causes such imaginations as are capable of producing them.” And afterwards, the Gods are said to help men, τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν ἀρχαῖς τισι καὶ φαντασίαις καὶ ἐπινοίαις ἐγείροντες ἢ τοὐναντίον ἀποστρέφοντες καὶ ἱστάντες: “by exciting the powers and faculties of the soul by some secret principles, or imaginations, or thoughts, or, on the contrary, by diverting or stopping them.” (Life of Coriolanus.)

  270. Σφαλεὶς [ὁ μειρακίσκος] οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως, ἐμοι μὲν τὸ φάρμακον, Πτοιοδώρῳ δὲ ἀφάρμακτον [κύλικα] ἐπέδωκα, says Callidemidas, who designed the poison for Ptœodorus, in Lucian of Samosata. (Dialogues of the Dead.)

  271. When Hannibal was in sight of Rome, non ausus est obsidere: “he dared not besiege it.” Sed religione quadam abstinuit, quod diceret, capienda urbis modo non dari voluntatem, modo non dari facultatem, ut testatur et Orosius: “But forbore upon some religious scruple, because he said that sometimes he had no mind, and at other times no power, to take the city, as is related also by Orofius.” (St. Jerome, Epistles.)

  272. Non enim cuiquam in potestate est quid veniat in mentem: “For it is not in any man’s power, what shall come into his mind.” (St. Augustine, On Order.)

  273. They, who called Simonides of Ceos out from Scopas and his company, as if it were to speak with him, saved his life. The story known (Cicero, De Oratore; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria).

  274. They who believe there is nothing but what they can handle or see, οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι⁠ ⁠… πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει: “and do not allow anything that is invisible to have any real existence,” are by Plato reckoned to be void of all philosophy, ἀμύητοι, σκληροὶ, ἀντιτυποι, μάλ’ εὖ ἄμουσοι, “not so much as initiated, stupid, obstinate, and entirely illiterate.” (Plato, Theaetetus.)

  275. Ὀυχ ὁμοίως ἄνθρωπος ἀμύνεται καὶ θεός: “God does not afford assistance in the same manner as man does.” (Philo Judaeus, Life of Moses.)

  276. Si curent [Dij] homines, benè bonis sit, malè malis: quod nunc abest: “If they [the Gods] had any regard for men, things would go well with good men, and ill with bad men; but it is otherwise now.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.) The Jews, who call this case צדיק ורע לו רשע וטוב לו: “evil to the righteous, and good to the wicked,” have written many things about it, to be seen in their books: The Guide for the Perplexed, Sefer ha-Ikkarim, Menorat Ha-Maor, Nahalot Abot, etc. So have the Heathen philosophers too: Seneca, Plutarch, Plotinus, Simplicius, others. But the answers of neither are always just. God forbid that should be thought true, which is asserted by Glaucon in Plato (Republic), that the just, if they had Gyges’s ring, would do as the unjust, and ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαζόμενος, κ.τ.λ.: “that no man is just voluntarily, but is forced to be so.” Or that in Sefer Hasidim and Menorath Hammaor צדיק ורע לו צדוק בן רשע: “Evil befalls the righteous, and the unrighteous inherit good.” The reason assigned for this case, in another place, is something better: כדי שלא יאמרו אם לא היה בטובה לא היה צדיק: “Wherefore let them not say that if good does not befall such a one, then he is a wicked man.” But the way of solving it in Sefer Nishmat Hayyim by גלגול הנשמות, “a revolution of souls,” or what the Kabbalists call עיבור, “transmigration,” is worst of all (Manasseh ben Israel).

  277. Cadit et Ripheus, justissimus unus Qui fuit in Teucris, et servantissimus æqui. Dis aliter visum: “Ripheus also was slain, who was one of the most just men amongst the Trojans, and a very strict preserver of equity; but the Gods must be submitted to.” (Virgil, Aeneid.)

  278. Virtutes ipsas invertimus: “We turn even virtues into vices.” (Horace, Satires.)

  279. Οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὸ λαλεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια· καὶ μάλιστα ἐὰν τύχωσιν ὑπ’ εὐνοίας τινὸς ἢ μίσους ἑλκόμενοι, ὑφ’ ὧν καὶ φιλεῖ κλέπτεσθαι ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἡ ἀλήθεια: “There is nothing so delightful to men, as prating about things that don’t belong to them, especially if they are drawn into it by love or hatred, and they are apt to conceal truth as they do most other things.” (Gregory Nazianzen, The Second Oration.)

  280. Therefore, with Socrates in Plato, we ought not much to care what the multitude [ὁι πολλὸι] say of us, ἀλλ’ ὅ, τι ό ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων, καὶ άδίκων, ὁ εἶς, καὶ ἀυτὴ ὴ ἀλήθεια: “but what he says who can distinguish betwixt the just and the unjust, the only one who is truth itself.” (Crito.)

  281. Or, vice-versa, he may judge that to be right, which is wrong. This seemss to be pretty much the case in that enumeration of good men who suffered, in Cicero: Cur duo Scipiones, fortissimos et oprimos viros, in Hispania Pœnus oppressit? Cur Maximus extulit filium consularem? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, etc.: “How did it come to pass, that the Carthaginians overthrew the two Scipios in Spain, those brave and excellent men? How came Maximus to bury his son, when he was fit to be a consul? How came Hannibal to kill Marcellus? etc.(De Natura Deorum.) For here they are reckoned boni, “good,” only because they were fortes, “valiant;” that is, because they had been zealous and successful instruments in conquering and destroying them who happened to be so unfortunate as to be neighbors to the Romans, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to enlarge their own territories. Is this to be good? Does it deserve such a particular observation that Fabius Maximus buried a son, after he had been Consul too? How does it appear that Marcellus was a better man than Hannibal? Is it such a wonder if they, who spend their lives in slaughter, should at length be slain themselves? If the margin permitted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue: as also some upon that which follows in the same place, of others, quibus improbis optime evênit: “who, though they were very bad men, yet had very good fortune.”

  282. Vitæ postscenia celant, “that part of life which they keep secret from the world” (in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura), may be aptly applied to the wicked. Multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur: “Many are afraid of common report, but few stand in awe of their own consciences.” (Pliny the Younger, Epistles.)

  283. Neque; mala vel bona, quæ vulgus putat: multi, qui conflictari adversis videntur, beati; ac plerique; quanquam magnas per opes, miserrimi, etc.: “We are not to judge things to be good or bad, from the opinion which the vulgar have of them; for abundance of people are happy, who have many difficulties to struggle with; and a great many men are very miserable, though they be very rich.” (Tacitus, Annals.)

  284. Feliciorem tu Mecænatem putas, cui amoribus anxio, et morosæ uxoris quotidiana repudia deflenti, somnus per symphoniarum cantum, ex longinquo bene resonantium, quæritur? Mero se licet spoiat,⁠ ⁠… ; tam vigilabit in plumâ, quàm ille [Regulus] in cruce⁠ ⁠… ut dubium [non] sit, an electione fati datâ, plures Reguli nasci, quàm Mecænates velint: “Do you think Mecænas was very happy, who was always solicitious about intrigues, and complaining of the refusals of an ill-natured wife, insomuch that he could have no other sleep but what was procured by the agreeable sound of soft music at a distance. Though he dozes himself with wine,⁠ ⁠… he will be as restless in a bed of down, as [Regulus] upon a gibbet.⁠ ⁠… So that there is no doubt, but if fate would put it to men’s choice, there would more men choose to be born Regulus’s than Mecænas’s.” (Seneca, De Providentia.) Isti, quos prop felicibus aspicitis, si non qua occurrunt, sed qua latent, videritis, miseri sunt: “Those men which you look upon to be happy, if you were to see how different they are in private from what they are in public, you would think miserable.” (Tacitus, Annals.)

  285. Archimedes, having found the way of solving a problem (examinandi, an corona aurea prorsus esset: “viz. whether a crown was made of pure gold or no”) ran in an ecstasy out of the bath, crying Εὕρηκα: “I have found out a solution;” but who ever heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the enjoyment of a woman, ran out thus, crying out Βέβρωκα or Πεφίληκα: “I have glutted myself; I have enjoyed her”? (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  286. Fatis contraria fata rependens: “Balancing the loss determined by one fate, with the prospect of good determined by another.” (Virgil, Aeneid.) See what Pliny writes of Agrippa, the other great favorite and minister of Augustus, whom he reckons to be the only instance of felicity among them who were called Agrippæ. Is quoque adversa pedum valetudine, misera juventa, exercito ævo inter arma mortesque,⁠ ⁠… infelici terris stirpe omni,⁠ ⁠… præterea brevitate ævi,⁠ ⁠… in tormentis adulteriorum conjugis, socerique prægravi servitio, luisse augurium præposteri natalis existimatur: “He also, by a disease in his feet, by a miserable young time, having spent his years among arms and death,⁠ ⁠… all his relations miserable upon earth,⁠ ⁠… besides, his life very short,⁠ ⁠… it was the general opinion, that what his unnatural birth foreboded was fulfilled in the torments he endured by his wife’s adulteries, and the cruel bondage of his father-in-law.” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.)

  287. Ὀφθαλμῶν μὲν ἄμερσε, δίδου δ’ ἡδεῖαν ἀοιδήν: “The loss of his (Homer’s) eyes was compensated by the gift of sweet harmony.” (Homer, Odyssey.)

  288. Zeno reckoned he made a good voyage, when he was shipwrecked. (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Zeno.)

  289. If a good man labors under poverty, sickness, or the like, εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι: “it must end in something that is good, either in his lifetime or after death,” for how can he be neglected of God, who studies according to his poor abilities to be like Him? (Plato, Republic.)

  290. Who blames a drama, because all the persons are not heroes? (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  291. העולם נידון אחר רובו: “We must judge of the world, according to what it is as to the greatest part.” (Abravanel, and what follows.)

  292. Μέρος μὲν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται, κ.τ.λ.: “The part is made for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part.” (Plato, Laws.)

  293. Divine providence and the immortality of the soul must stand and fall together. Θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον: “If you take away the one, the other will follow.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  294. Τοῦτο ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ὄιεσθαι εἶναι Θεον· ἢ ὄντα μὴ προνοεῖν· ἢ προνοοῦντα μἠ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον: “It is the same thing to think there is no God; or if there be one, that he does not govern the world; or if he does govern it, he is not a good and just governor.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  295. Sure nobody ever did, in reality, pretend to do this. According to Diogenes Laërtius, the Egyptians set up ἀγάλματα, “some ornaments,” in their temples, τῷ μὴ εἰδέναι τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μορφήν: for that very reason, because they did not know his shape; or, how to represent Him. Their images seem to have been symbols, or hieroglyphics, expressing something of their sense or opinion concerning Him (Lives of Eminent Philosophers). For, as Maimonides observes, no man ever did or ever will worship an idol made of metal, stone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth (The Guide for the Perplexed I, 36.)

  296. Non est dubium, quin religio nulla sit, ubicunque simulachrum est: “Without doubt, there can be no true religion where there are any images.” (Lactantius, Divine Institutes.)

  297. Ὡς γὰρ ἔργον σώματος τὸ σωματικῶς τι ἐπιτελέσαι, οὕτω καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ταῖς ἐννοίαις τὰς ἀρεσκούσας φαντασίας τελησιουργῆσαι ὡς θέλει, διὸ καὶ τὰς ἐννοίᾳ ἁμαρτίας μὴ ὡ; φαντασίας ἁπλῶς, ἁλλ’ ὡς ἔργα ἐν ψυχῇ γινόμενα δίκαιον κρίνεσθαι: “For as, when anything is done by the body, it is done grossly, so, when anything is done by the soul, it is done according to its own will, and by such representations as are agreeable to its thoughts; wherefore, it is but reasonable to think that sins in our thoughts are not mere imaginations only, but works really done in the soul.” (St. Basil, De Vera Integritate Virginitatis.)

  298. Θεοπρεπῶς ἅπαντα νοοῦντες: “To think nothing but what is worthy of God.” (St. Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis.)

  299. We use them (and speak as the Jews everywhere inculcate, כלשון בני אדם: “according to the language of men”) only ἀπορίαι οἰκείας προσηγορίας⁠ ⁠… τὰ ὀνόματα παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀγαπώμεναί μεταφέροντες: “for want of proper words⁠ ⁠… we convert our favorite words into metaphors.” (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  300. Mollissima corda Humano generi dare se natura fatetur, Quæ lachrymas dedit, hæc nostri pars optima sensûs⁠ ⁠… separat hoc nos à grege mutorum, etc.: “Nature confesses that she has given to mankind hearts that are very soft (and easy to be affected). She has given them tears, which are the best part of our senses⁠ ⁠… for these distinguish us from brute creatures.” (Juvenal, Satires.)

  301. The ratio of G to M + q is different from that of G to M − q: and yet G remains unaltered.

  302. Πῶς ἂν⁠ ⁠… δοίη τῷ πρὸς τὰς όρμὰς αὐτεξουσίῳ μὴ αἰτοῦντι ὁ διδόναι πεφυκὼς θεός: “Why should God, who is in his own nature beneficent, give anything to a being whose appetites are in his own power, if he does not ask it?” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  303. Τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον: “Something, greater and better than praise, belongs to that which is perfectly good.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Therefore ὁ Θεὸς καὶ τἀγαθὸν: “God and perfect goodness” are above praise. Οἱ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔπαινοῦντες γελοῖοι ἐισιν ἀυτοὺς ἐξισοῦντες: “They who praise the Gods make themselves ridiculous, for that is to equal them with ourselves.” (Andronicus of Rhodes [from a commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics sometimes attributed to Andronicus —⁠Editor].)

  304. Cleon, only a songster [ἀιδὸς], had a statue at Thebes, kept as sacred, when Pindar himself had none. See the story in Athenæus. (Deipnosophistae.)

  305. What Seneca says, of Alexander, is true of many another hero: pro virtute erat felix temeritas: “that his successful rashness was esteemed virtue.” (De Beneficiis.)

  306. Tumes alto Druforum sanguine, tanquam Feceris ipse aliquid, etc.: “You puff yourself up because you are of the noble blood of the Drusi, as if you had done some (great) thing yourself.” (Juvenal, Satires.)

  307. Gloria quantalibet quid erit, si gloria tantum est? “What signifies the highest degree of glory, if it be only mere glory?” (Juvenal, Satires.)

  308. היום כאן ומחר בקבר היום חי ומחר רימה: “Today here, and tomorrow in the grave; now a man, and then a worm.” (Judah ben Samuel, Sefer Hasidim.)

  309. Κτῆμα σφαλερώτατον: “A very uncertain possession.” (Philo Judaeus, On Abraham.)

  310. Even the great pyramid in Egypt, though it still remains, has not been able to preserve the true name of its builder, which is lost; one may justly wonder how.

  311. Τά ὀνόματα τῶν πάλαι πολυυμνήτων νῦν τρόπον τινὰ γλωσσήματά ἐστι: “The names of those, who in former times were very much celebrated, are now some way or other become quite obsolete.” (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations.)

  312. Μικρὸν ἡ μηκίστη ὑστεροφημία, καὶ ἀυτὴ δὲ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνθρωπαρίων τάχιστα τεθνηξομένων, καὶ οὐκ εἰδότων οὐδὲ ἑαυτούς, οὔτιγε τὸν πρόπαλαι τεθνηκότα: “The longest fame amongst posterity is but short, by reason of the quick succession by poor mortals dying, who know neither themselves, nor any that died some time ago.” (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations.)

  313. Expende Hannibalem: quot libras in duce summo Invenies? “Weigh Hannibal in the scales, and see how many pounds there remain of that great commander.” (Juvenal, Satires.)

  314. Μέχρι τοῦδε ὁι ἔπαινοι ἀνεκτοί ἐισιν, εἰς ὅσον ἂν ὁ ἐπαινούμενος γνωρίζῃ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων προσὸν ἑαυτῷ· τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον, κ.τ.λ.: “Praises may be borne, so long as the person praised knows that all the things which are said belong to him, but all that is beyond this is nothing to the purpose.” (Lucian, Pro Imaginibus.)

  315. Μακαρίσασ ἀυτὸν [Ἀχιλλέα] ὅτι καὶ ζῶν φίλου πιστοῦ, καὶ τελευτήσας μεγάλου κήρυκος ἔτυχεν: “He esteemed him [Achilles] happy, because he had a faithful friend while living, and one that celebrated him highly after he was dead.” (Plutarch, Life of Alexander.)

  316. As Psaphon was celebrated by the birds, singing Μέγας θεὸς ψάφων: “Psaphon is a great God.” (Maximus Tyrius, Dissertations.)

  317. Honoribus aucti⁠ ⁠… cùm diis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostræ laudi assumptum arbitramur: “When honors are heaped upon us⁠ ⁠… and we return thanks to the Gods, we do not then take any of the merit to ourselves.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.) Ὅ τι ἂν ἀγαθὸν πράττῃς ἐις θεὸν ἀνάπεμπε: “When you do any good thing, ascribe it to God.” (A saying of Bias in Diogenes Laërtius’s Life of Bias.)

  318. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα κατ αξίαν ποτὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι,⁠ ⁠… ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνενεγκεῖν εὐχαριστίαν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη·: “For though we cannot do the thing as it ought to be done⁠ ⁠… yet it is but just and fit that we offer up our thanksgiving, so far as is in our power.” (Johannes Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis.)

  319. כל עובדי פסל: את פסיליהם היו עובדים: “all they who serve images, are worshippers of images,” and similar passages (e.g. 2 Kings 17:41, Psalms 97:7). Deuteronomy 12:2 mention is made of the places, אשר עבדו שם הגוים וכו׳ “where the nations served their images, etc.” in the Chaldee paraphrase it is said פלחו, “worshipped them” (Targum Onkelos); and in the Septuagint it is said ἐλάτρευσαν, “worshipped them” (in the ecclesiastical sense) and the same in the vulgar Latin.

  320. עבדו אב סלך בבל: “Serve the king of Babylon.” (Jeremiah 27:17.)

  321. Plato applies the word “serve” even to the laws themselves, in that phrase, viz. δουλεύειν τοῖς νόμοις: “to serve the laws.” (Laws.)

  322. Ἐκείνῳ⁠ ⁠… οὐδὲν ἔξω φιλοδεσπότου γνώμης παρέξουσι: “We give no more to Him, than to one whom we freely acknowledge to have the dominion over us.” (Philo Judaeus, The Worse Attacks the Better.)

  323. משכיל יבין: “The wise will understand.”

  324. Care must be taken how we pray, lest we should ask what may be hurtful to us. Οὐχοῦν δοκεῖ πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσῃ τις αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακὰ, δοκῶν δ’ ἀγαθά: “for there seems to be need of great prudence, lest a man, by not rightly understanding himself, should ask for such things as he imagines to be good for him, but which are indeed great evils.” (Plato, Alcibiades.) Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles, etc.: “the Gods who are ready (to grant men’s petitions) have overthrown whole houses, at the request of the owners, etc.” is a Poet’s observation (Juvenal, Satires). The author of Sefer Hasidim adds that we should not pray for that שאי אפשר לעשות, or שאין נעשה כפי הפי הפבע, or שאיגו ראוי, or שיעשה הקב״ה נס בשנוי עולם: “which is not possible to be done, or which cannot be done according to the course of nature, or which is not fit to be done, or that the holy Being (God) should work a miracle and alter the world.” (Judah ben Samuel.)

  325. עיגי למטה לבי למעלה: “With my eyes downward, and my heart lifted up.” (Yevamot.)

  326. התפלה⁠ ⁠… ענף מסתעף מן ההשגחה: “Prayer⁠ ⁠… is a branch of providence shading us.” (Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim IV, 1.) בהשגחה יאמין שהתפלה מועיל לו וכו׳ “He that believes in providence, must believe that prayer is profitable to him.” (Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim.)

  327. Like those Ἀκοιμητὰι, “wakeful people,” at Constantinople, particularly, who continued divine service night and day without intermission. Or the Messalians, perhaps; (מצלין, Ἐυχίται: “praying people”) who placed (or pretended to place) all religion in prayer, μόνῃ σχολάζειν τῇ προσευχῇ προσποιούμενοι: “and so managed themselves, as never to be at leisure for anything else but prayer.” (Cyril of Alexandria, Epistola ad Calosyrium.)

  328. כל תפלה שאינה בכוונה אינה תפלה: “If a prayer is not performed with earnestness, it is no prayer.” (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Tefillah, IV, 15.) התפלה תלויה בלב: “A prayer suspended in the mind.” (Sefer Hasidim and the like everywhere.)

  329. This in general is true: notwithstanding which, I do not deny but there may be occasions when οὐδὲν κωλύει τόπος, οὐδὲ ἐμποδίζει καιρὸς, ἀλλὰ κᾂν γόνατα μὴ κλίνῃς,⁠ ⁠… διάνοιαν δὲ μόνον ἐπιδείξῃ θερμὴν, τὸ πᾶν ἀπήρτισας τῆς εὐχῆς· Ἔξεστι καὶ γυναῖκα ἠλακάτην κατέχουσαν καὶ ἱστουργοῦσαν ἀναβλέψαι εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ καλέσαι μετὰ θερμότητος τὸν Θεόν· ἔξεστι καὶ ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλοντα καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν βαδίζοντα εὐχὰς ποιεῖσθαι ἐκτενεῖς, κ.τ.λ.: “the place is no hindrance, nor the time any interruption⁠ ⁠… let him show a fervent affection of mind, for this is the perfection of prayer; and a woman, even while she is spinning or weaving, may in her thoughts look up to heaven and call upon God with fervency; and a man as he is going to market, and walking by himself, may pray very intentively.” (St. Chrysostom, De Anna.)

  330. Ὁ μὲν λόγος ἑρμηνὲυς διανοίας πρὸς ἀνθρώτσες· ή δὲ διάνοια γίνεται τῷ λόγῳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν: “Words are the interpreters of our thoughts to men, and we also make known our thoughts to God by words.” (Philo Judaeus, On the Migration of Abraham.)

  331. Cogitation itself, according to Plato, is a kind of speech of the mind. For he calls τὸ διάνοεῖσθαι (cogitation) “or thinking,” λόγον, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται, περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ: “the language by which the soul explains itself to itself, when it considers anything.” (Theaetetus.) And so Plotinus, Ὀ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ: “the vocal words are an imitation of those of the soul.” (Enneads.)

  332. Multa sunt verba, quæ, quasi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, quæ formari similitudine nulla possunt: “There are many words (particles) which are like small joints, to connect the several sentences, which cannot be exhibited by any images.” (Cicero, De Oratore.)

  333. תפלה בלא כונה כגוף בלא נשמה: “A prayer, without the intention of the mind, is like a body without a soul.” (Isaac Abravanel, Nahalot Abot.)

  334. Second Alcibiades. The words of the Poet in Plato are these: “O Jupiter, our king, give us those things that are good for us, whether we ask for them or no; and command those things that are hurtful to be kept from us, though we pray for them.”

  335. דבור אדם חוא בכונה וכו׳: “When a man speaks distinctly, it is always with intenseness.” (Isaac Abravanel.) That in Sefer Haredim, quoted out of סמ״ק Sefer Mizwot Katan, “the lesser book of precepts,” explains this thus: ידקדק בכל מלה ומלה כאלו מונה זהובים: “He will consider every word exactly, as if he was looking over his debts.” (Eliezer Azkari.)

  336. … Ut eos [deos,] semper pura⁠ ⁠… mente et voce veneremur: “… That we may always worship them [the Gods, in the style of the Heathens] with a pure⁠ ⁠… mind, and with pure words.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.) Ὧ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὑπὸ σοῦ, Δέσποτα κρείττονες γεγόναμεν, τούτῳ τὴν σὴν εὐλογεῖν μεγαλειότητα πρἑπει: “That as thou, O Lord, hast made us better than other creatures, so it becomes us the more to praise thy greatness,” says Solomon in his prayer (in Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews).

  337. This we find often among the Dinim (“orders”) of the Jews. הברכות כולן צריך שישמיע לאזנו מה שהוא אומר: “It is necessary, in all our prayers, that we so speak as to be heard by ourselves.” (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Berakhot I, 7.) And Rabbi Eliezer Azkari, having cited this passage, adds הסכימו רוב הפוסקים שאם לא השמיע לאזניו לא יצא וכו׳: “In general the judges agree in this, that if he does not hear his own self, he is guilty (of a crime).” (Sefer Haredim.) Maimonides, in another place, expresses himself thus: לא יתפלל בלבו [לבד] אלא מחתך הדברים בשפתיו ומשמיע לאזניו בלחש: “A man should not [only] pray in his mind, but pronounce the words distinctly with his lips, and whisper so as to hear himself” (Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Tefillah V, 9; that word לבד, “only,” I inserted from Joseph Caro’s Shulhan Aruk). The same occurs in Or Hadash, and other places.

  338. המתפלל⁠ ⁠… יחשיב כאילו שכינה כנגדו וכו׳: “He that prays⁠ ⁠… should think about it as much as if the divine presence could appear to him.” (Joseph Caro, Orah Hayyim.)

  339. Ἐν τῷ εἴσω οἷον νεῷ: “In a private retirement, as in a temple.” (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  340. St. Chrysostom says some are so unmindful of what they are about, that they know not so much as what they say themselves. Ἐἰσέρχονται πολλὸι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ,⁠ ⁠… καὶ ἐξέρχονται, καὶ οὐκ οἴδασι τί εἶπον· τὰ χείλη κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ οὐκ ἀκούει: “A great many come to church,⁠ ⁠… and go home again, without so much as knowing what they have said. Their lips moved, but their words were not heard.” (De Chananaea.)

  341. The very Heathens thought that the Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. Bias, happening to be with some such, in the same ship, when a great storm arose and they (being now frighted) began to invoke their deities, cries out, Σιγᾶτε, μὴ ἄισθωνται ὑμᾶς ἐνθάδε πλέοντας: “Hold your tongues, they’ll take no notice of us while we sail here.” (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Bias.)

  342. Caius Cestius, in Tacitus, says principes quidem instar deorum esse: sed neque a diis nisi justas supplicum preces audiri: “Princes indeed are like Gods, but the Gods themselves will not hear the prayers of the supplicant, unless they be just.” (Annals.)

  343. Sometimes πλέον ήμισυ παντός: “half is better than the whole”; that is, as Plato paraphrases those words of Hesiod, Τὸ ήμισυ τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστὶ πλέον, ὁπόταν ᾖ τὸ μὲν ὁλον λαμβάνειν ζημιῶδες, κ.τ.λ.: “Many times half is better than the whole, and when it is so, to receive the whole is an injury to us.” (Laws.)

  344. Quid quod iste calculi candore laudatus dies originem mali habuit? Quam multos accepta afflixere imperia? quam multos bona perdidere, et ultimis mersere suppliciis? “What if that day, which came up lucky, should be the beginning of evil? How many, in great power, have been ruined by it? How many has prosperity destroyed, and subjected them to the greatest punishments?” (Pliny the Elder, Natural History.)

  345. Religion deorum cultu pio continetur: “Religion consists in a devout worshipping of the Gods.” Qui omnia, quæ ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent, et tanquam religerent, sunt dicti religiosi, etc.: “They are called religious persons, because they are continually revolving, and repeating over and over again the things that belong to the worship of the Gods.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.)

  346. Particularly with respect to customary swearing, which, besides the ill consequences it has in making oaths cheap, etc., is a great instance of disregard and irreverence. For they, who use themselves to it, do, at least, make the tremendous name of God to serve for an expletive only; and commonly to rude, passionate, or debauched discourse (λόγων ἀναπλήρωμα ποιούμενοι τὸ ἁγιώτατον καὶ θεῖον ὄνομα: “making use of the most holy name of God, only to fill up the sentence with” —⁠Philo Judaeus, Life of Moses).

  347. Οὐδὲν οὕτως ἡμέτερόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς: “so much our own, as we ourselves are.” (Xenophon, Cyropaedia.)

  348. And therefore the produce of a man’s labor is often still called his “labor.” So יבזו זרים יגיעו: “strangers devour his labor,” and יגיע כפיך תאכל: “thou shalt eat the labor of thine hands;” in Psalms (109:11, 128:2) and other places. … Iliadumque labor vestes: “… Garments which were the labor of the Trojan women.” (Virgil, Aeneid.)

  349. If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the case. He may commute them for money, because they are his.

  350. Tanquam Sparti illi poetarum, sic se invicem jugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus restet: “Like those Spartans mentioned by the Poets, who cut one another’s throats, so that not one of them all remained,” as Lactantius says in another case. (Divine Institutes.)

  351. Ἀνθρωπόμορφον θηρίον: “A wild beast in the shape of a man.” (Philo Judaeus.)

  352. Nec enim æquus judex aliam de suâ, aliam de alienâ causâ, sententiam fert: “A fair judge will not give a different sentence in his own cause, from that which he gives in the cause of another.” (Seneca, De Ira.)

  353. Ἀεὶ ταυτὰ περί γε τῶν ἀυτῶν γίνωσκε: “We must always understand the same things relating to the same things.” (Isocrates, Oratio ad Nicoclem.)

  354. אל תדון חברך עד שתגיע למקומו: “You must not judge your companion, till you have put yourself in his place.” (Mishnah, Abot II, 5.) Eo loco nos constituamus, quo ille est, cui irascimur: “We ought to put ourselves in the place of him we are angry with.” (Seneca, De Ira.)

  355. He was a mere flatterer, who told Cyrus, Βασιλεὺς μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς σὺ φύσει πεφυκέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ σμήνει φυόμενος τῶν μελιττῶν ἡγεμών: “You seem to me to be born a king as much by nature, as he who is born in the hive is the king of the bees.” (Xenophon, Cyropaedia.)

  356. Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quàm omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus.⁠ ⁠… Quæcunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet: “There is no one thing more like or equal to another, than we all are among ourselves.⁠ ⁠… Whatever definition we give of a man, the same will hold good of us all.” (Cicero, De Legibus.)

  357. When the Romans, in Livy, asked the Galls, Quodnam id jus esset, agrum à possessoribus petere, aut minari arma: “Where is the justice of demanding the lands of the owners, or else threatening them with the sword;” they answered, se in armis jus ferre, et omnia fortium virorum esse: “that their swords were their law, and that valiant men had a right to everything.” (History of Rome.) Like barbarians indeed!

  358. Josephus, when he says νόμον γε μὴν ὡρίσθαι, καὶ παρὰ θηρσὶν ἰσχυρότατον, καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἴκειν τοῖς δυνατωτέροις: “that it is an established law, and it is the strongest amongst both beasts and amongst men, viz.: to submit to them that have the most power,” can only mean that necessity, or perhaps prudence, obliges to do this; not any law in the stricter sense of that word. (The Jewish War.)

  359. Societatis [inter homines] arctissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam, hominem homini detrahere, sui commodi causa, quàm omnia incommoda subire, etc.: “The strongest bond of society, among men, is to think that it is more contrary to nature for one man to take away that which belongs to another, to advantage himself, than it is to undergo all the inconveniences that can be, etc.(Cicero, De Officiis.)

  360. All this is supposed to be in a state of nature and the absence of human laws.

  361. For ἐι ὁ ἀδικῶν κακῶς, ὁ ἀντιποιῶν κακῶς οὐδὲν ἧττον ποιεῖ κακῶς, κἂν ἀμύνηται: “if he who does an act of injustice does an ill thing, he that returns the injustice does a thing equally ill, though it be by way of retaliation.” (Maximus Tyrius, Dissertations.)

  362. Nam propriæ telluris herum natura neque illum, Nec me, nec quenquam statuit: “For nature did not make him, nor me, nor anyone else, the owner of any particular piece of land.” (Horace, Satires.)

  363. Τὰς κτήσεις, καὶ τὰς ἰδίας καὶ τὰς κοινὰς, ἢν ἐπινένηται πολὺς χρόνος, κυρίας καὶ πατρῷας ἅπαντες εἶναι νομίζουσιν: “They think that possessions, whether private or public, after they have continued for a long time, are secure, and belong to the family.” (Isocrates, Archidamus.)

  364. To this may be reduced that title to things which Cicero mentions as conferred by some law (lege); and even those which accrue conditione: “by covenant,” or forte: “by lot.” For I suppose the government to have a right of giving them thus.

  365. Which must not give way to the opinions of fitness, etc. The master was in the right, who corrected Cyrus for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not τοῦ ἁρμόττοντος κριτὴς: “a judge of the fitness,” but of the property (Xenophon, Cyropaedia). Omnium, quæ in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto præstabilius, quàm planè intelligi nos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed naturâ constitutum esse just: “Of all the things that learned men dispute about, there is none better than this: that we should be thoroughly convinced that we were born to do what is right, and that right is not made by opinion but by nature.” (Cicero, De Legibus.)

  366. There is another way of acquiring a title mentioned: which is, by the right of war, as it is called. Sunt privata nulla naturâ: sed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt; aut victoriâ, ut qui bello potiti sunt, etc.: “Nothing belongs to particular persons by nature: but either by long possession, as when men, a long while since, came into lands which had no owners; or else by victory, as they who enjoy them from war, etc.(Cicero, De Officiis.) And so, in Xenophon, it is said to be an eternal law among men that if a city be taken in war, the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror’s; and they may possess them as their own, not ἀλλότρια: “as belonging to others.” But sure this wants limitations.

  367. Allodium, “Freehold.”

  368. Πολλάκις ἐγέλασα διαθήκας ἀναγινώσκων λεγούσας ὁ δεῖνα μὲν ἐχέτω τὴν δεσποτείαν τῶν ἀγρῶν, ἢ τῆς οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ χρῆσιν ἄλλος· Πάντες γὰρ τὴν χρῆσιν ἔχομεν, τὴν δεσποτείαν δὲ οὐδείς⁠ ⁠… καὶ ἑκόντες, καὶ ἄκοντες ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ παραχωρήσομεν ἑτέροις, τὴν χρῆσιν καρπωσάμενοι μόνον: “I have oftentimes laughed when I read any of those wills in which it is said, ‘let such or such a one be the real owner of the lands or houses, and let another person have the use of them,’ for the use is all that belongs to any of us; we are not the real owners.⁠ ⁠… After death they go to others, whether we will or no, when we have enjoyed the use only.” (St. Chrysostom, On Wealth and Poverty.) Τούτων μὲν φύσει οὐδενός έσμεν κύριοι, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ διαδοχῇ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀόριστον παραλαμβάνοντες, ὀλιγοχρόνιοι δεσπόται νομιζόμεθα κἀπειδὰν ἡ προθεσμία παρέλθῃ τηνικαῦτα παραλαβὼν ἄλλος ἀπολαύει τοῦ ὀνόματος: “We are not by nature the real owners of any of these things, but are invested by law or by succession with the use of them for an uncertain time, and are therefore called temporary tenants; and when the time prescribed is past, then they go to another, and he enjoys the same title.” (Lucian, Letter to Nigrinus.)

  369. Qui te pascit ager, tuus est: “The field that maintains you is your field, etc.(Horace, alluding to this truth, Epistles.) Περί παντὸς: “As to the matter of injuries,” says Plato, ἓν εἰρήσθω τοιόνδε δέ τι νόμιμον βιαίων πέρι· τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν·: “there is only some such general law as this for every man, viz.: that no man should plunder, or by violence take anything that belongs to another,” and then proceeds, μηδ’ αὖ χρῆσθαι μηδενὶ τῶν τοῦ πέλας, ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ τὸν κεκτημένον, κ.τ.λ.: “nor make any use of anything that comes in their way, without the leave of the owner.” (Laws.) In Plutarch the thing is carried farther, where it is said that a man passing by another man’s door μὴ βλέπειν ἔισω, κ.τ.λ.: “ought not to look in” (De Curiositate.); according to a saying of Xenocrates, μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ τοὺς πόδας ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι: “there is no difference between looking in and going into another man’s house.” (quoted in De Curiositate.)

  370. Furtum fit,⁠ ⁠… cum quis alienam rem invito domino contrectat: “It is real theft⁠ ⁠… to meddle with anything that belongs to another against his will.” (Justinian, Institutes.)

  371. On the contrary נעשה דין⁠—נעשה אמת: “We shall make justice, we shall make truth.” A saying of ריב״ל, Rabbi Joshua ben Levi. And Cicero more than once uses the word verum, “true” for justum, “just,” and veritas, “truth” for bonitas, “goodness” or probitas, “probity.”

  372. Account τὸ σὸν μόνον σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλότριον: “that only your own which really is so, and look upon that as another’s which really is so.” (Epictetus’s words, Enchiridion.) Justitiæ primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus injuria; deinde, ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis: “The first property of justice is that no man should do any hurt to another, unless provoked by some injury; after this, he is to make use of those things that are common, in common with others, and use the things that belong to himself as his own.” (Cicero, De Officiis.) This is to use things as being what they are.

  373. Blepsias ὁ δανειστὴς, “the usurer,” in Lucian, dies of hunger (λιμῷ ἄθλιος ἐλέγετο ἀπεσκληκέναι: “the miserable wretch is reported to have pined away till he died.” —⁠Dialogues of the Dead). Ridiculous enough.

  374. Or only πρὸς τὸ ἀριθμεῖν: “to be perpetually telling it over,” as Anacharsis said of some Greeks. (Athenæus, Deipnosophistae.)

  375. As that man, in Athenæus’s Deipnosophistae, endeavored literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, before he died he swallowed as much of it as he could (καταπιόντα οὐκ ὀλίγους χρυσοῦς ἀποθανεῖν: “he swallowed a great many pieces of gold and then died”).

  376. Of such it is, that Diogenes used to say, Ὁμοίους τοὺς φιλαργύρους τοῖς ὐδρωπικοῖς, κ.τ.λ.: “That covetous men were like men that had the dropsy.” (Stobaeus, On Injustice.) The Mamshilim, that is, “the writers of proverbs,” mentioned in Nahalot Abot, compare them לצמא שישתה מהמים המלוחים כי כל עוד שישתה יוסיף צמא: “to thirsty people drinking saltwater: the more they drink, the drier they are.” (Isaac Abravanel.)

  377. Properly called “humanity,” because nothing of it appears in brutes. בהמה אינה מקפדתו חוששת בצער חברתה: “for brutes have no concern or uneasiness at their companions being in pain.” (Judah ben Samuel, Sefer Hasidim.)

  378. When Seneca says, Clementiam⁠ ⁠… omnes boni præstabunt, misericordiam autem vitabunt, “all good men should show mildness, but avoid showing pity,” he seems only to quibble (De Clementia). He has many other weak things upon this subject. That (sentence) succurret [sapiens] alienis lachrymis, non accedet, “a wise man will relieve a person in tears, but not cry himself,” owns one use of tears: they obtain succor even from a Stoic. (Ibid.)

  379. Ἀγαθοὶ ἀριδάκρυες ἄνδρες: “Good men are very apt to shed tears.” They who, of all writers, undertake to imitate nature most, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how Homer represents Ulysses: Odyssey ε. 151⁠–⁠2⁠–⁠7⁠–⁠8.) The tears of men are in truth very different from the cries and ejulations of children. They are silent streams, and flow from other causes: commonly some tender, or perhaps philosophical, reflection. It is easy to see how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be fashionable. But for all that, it is certain the glandulæ lacrymales, “the glands we use when we cry,” are not made for nothing.

  380. Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas.

  381. A generous nature pities even an enemy in distress. Ἐποικτείρω δέ νιν δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ: “I always pity a man in misery, although he be my enemy.” (Sophocles, Ajax.)

  382. Est hominum naturæ, quam sequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas: “Cruelty is the most contrary that can be to human nature, which we ought to follow.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  383. Δεινὸν μὲν ὀ κλέπτης, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτω ὡς ὀ μοιχός: “A thief is a horrid creature, but not so bad as an adulterer.” (Johannes Chrysostom, Ad Populum Antiochenum.)

  384. One of the Subsessores alienorum matrimoniorum: “them that lie in wait for other men’s wives,” as they are called in Valerius Maximus. (Facta et dicta memorabilia.)

  385. Palam apparet, adhuc ætate Divi Hieronymi adulterium capite solere puniri: nunc magnatum lusus est: “It is very manifest that, in the time of St. Jerome, adultery was punished with death: but now it is the sport of great men.” (Erasmus, scholiast on St. Jerome.)

  386. For hence follows impunity, etc. משרבו מנאפים פסקו מים המרים: “From the overflowing of it, the adulterous derive bitter waters.” (Mishnah, Sotah IX, 9.)

  387. Is, qui nullius non uxorem concupiscit,⁠ ⁠… idem uxorem suam aspici non vult: et fidea acerrimus exactor, est perfidus: et mendacia persequitur, ipse perjurus: “He who desires every other man’s wife⁠ ⁠… will not have his own looked upon, and is very strict with other men to keep their word, but breaks his own; prosecutes others for lying and is perjured himself.” (Seneca, De Ira.)

  388. אשתו, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυνᾶικα: “His own wife.”

  389. What a monster in nature must he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to act against all these, (to use Seneca’s words again, from De Ira) satis justam causam putat amandi, quod aliena est [uxor]? “Who thinks it a sufficient reason to be in love with her, because she is another man’s wife.”

  390. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἔνεστιν εἰπεῖν, ὡς τὸ σῶμα μόνον διαφθείρεται τῆς μοιχευομένης γυναικὸς, ἀλλ’ εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἡ ψυχῆ πρὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς ἀλλοτρίωσιν ἐθίζεται, διδασκομένη πάντα τρόπον ἀποστρέφεσθαι, καὶ μισεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ ἧττον ἀν ἦν δεινὸν, ἐι τὸ μῖσος ἐπεδείκνυτο ἐμφανὲς, κ.τ.λ.: “For we may not only affirm that the body of an adulterous woman is not all that is corrupted; but if we would speak the truth, that her mind is more habitually alienated (from her husband) than her body; for she is taught to have an utter aversion and hatred to him, and it is no wonder if she shows her hatred in public.” (Philo Judaeus, De Decalogo.)

  391. Marriage is κοινωνία παντὸς τοῦ βίου,⁠ ⁠… ὀικειοτέρα καὶ μείζων τῶν ἄλλων [κοινωνιῶν]: “the partaking equally of everything in life⁠ ⁠… more freely and familiarly, than in any other [society].” (Isocrates, Nicocles.)

  392. Ἁπαλὸν ζῶον: “The soft creature,” St. Basil. (Homilia dicta in Lacisis.)

  393. Ἔπεισας, ἐξέθωψας: “over-persuaded and enticed,” says the penitent woman in Sophocles (according to Plutarch, Moralia).

  394. Ψυχρὸν παραγκάλισμα⁠ ⁠… Γυνὴ κακὴ ξύνευνος: “A cold embrace⁠ ⁠… to have a lewd woman for a wife.” (Sophocles, Antigone.)

  395. Quid enim salvi est mulieri, amissa pudicitia? “What else can be safe, when the woman has lost her modesty?” (Livy, History of Rome.)

  396. Οἱ μηδὲν ἠδικηκότες ἄθλιοι παῖδες μηδ’ ετέρῳ γένει προσνεμηθῆναι δυνάμενοι, μή τε τῷ τοῦ γήμαντος, μή τε τῷ τοῦ μοιχοῦ: “The miserable children, who have done nobody any injury, will not be owned by any relations, either of the married person or of the adulterer.” (Philo Judaeus, De Decalogo.)

  397. Such as Aristippus uses to Diogenes, in Athenæus: Ἆρά γε μή τι σοι ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι Διογενὲς ὀικίαν ὀικεῖν, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον ᾤκησαν ἄλλοι; οὐ γάρ ἔφη. Τί δὲ ναῦν, ἐν ᾗ πολλοὶ πεπλεύκασιν; οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔφη. Οὕτως⁠ ⁠…: “Do you see any absurdity, Diogenes, in living in a house that another person has lived in before? No, says he; or in sailing in a ship where a great many have sailed? No, nor in that neither, says he. No more is there in⁠ ⁠…” (Deipnosophistae.) Senseless stuff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman in Proverbs 30:18⁠–⁠20 better: where דרך גבר בעלמה: “the way of a man with a maid,” is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of a serpent upon a rock, and of a ship in the sea, שלא יעשה בה רושם יוכר אחר שעה: “which leave no track to be seen after them;” and therefore she מקנחת פיה של מטה: “wipes her mouth,” and then thinks that אחר זה תוכל לא פעלתי און: “she may say afterwards, ‘What have I done amiss?’ ” (see Kab we-Naki.)

  398. Nemo malus felix: minimè corruptor, etc.: “No bad man can be happy; to be sure no debauchee can, etc.(Juvenal, Satires.)

  399. Ἀναπόδραστος γὰρ ὁ θεῖος νόμος: “There is no escaping the divine law.” (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  400. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν παραντίκα κρύψῃ, ὕστερον ὀφθήσῃ: “For, if you are hid for the present, you will be found out afterwards.” (Isocrates, Demonicus.) Μαρτυρήσουσιν⁠ ⁠… ἡ κλίνη καὶ ὁ λύχνος ὁ Μεγαπένθους: “The bed, the lamp, will bear testimony, O Megapenthus.” (Lucian, Cataplus.)

  401. Ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀλαζονέστατον: “Pleasure is the aptest of anything to boast.” (Plato, Philebus.)

  402. Quid non sentit amor? “What is it that love can’t see?” (Ovid, Metamorphoses.)

  403. Ἀγαθὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθέλειν: “To be good is not only not to do an injury, but not so much as to desire to do one.” A gnome, “saying,” of Democrates. (Ethica.)

  404. אבק לשון הרע: “The dust of an ill tongue.” (Bava Batra.)

  405. המלבין פני חבירו ברבים אין לו חלק לעה״ב: “He that puts his companion to shame in public, shall have no portion in the next life.” (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Deot VI, 8, and similar passages.) For, according to the Jewish doctors, he who does this breaks the sixth commandment. (Isaac Abravanel.)

  406. See how chaste the Romans were once. Quo matronale decus verecundiæ munimento tutius esset, in jus vocanti matronam corpus ejus attingere non permiserunt, ut inviolata manûs alienæ tactu stola relinqueretur: “That the decent modesty of a matron might the more securely be preserved, if any man sued her, he was not allowed so much as to touch her, that her garment might remain undefiled by the hands of any stranger.” (Valerius Maximus, De Matrimoniorum Ritu, et Necessitudinum Officiis.) And it is told of Publius Mænius, that tristi exemplo præcepit [filiæ fuæ], ut non solum virginitatem illibatam, sed etiam oscula ad virum sincera perferret: “He gave it in charge to his daughter, with a severe threat, that she should carry to her husband not only her virginity untouched, but her kisses chaste.” (Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia.)

  407. Quanto autem præstantior est animus corpore, tanto sceleratiùs corrumpitur: “By how much the mind is more excellent than the body, by so much is the corrupting of it a greater wickedness.” (St. Augustine, De Mendacio.)

  408. Meddlers. (Editor’s note.)

  409. Οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ λοιμοὶ οἱ τὸ ἴδιον κακὸν ἐπὶ πάντας ἄγειν φιλονεικοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.: “These are the pestilent fellows, who labor to persuade everybody to be guilty of the same crimes with themselves.” (St. Basil, Homily on Psalm 1.)

  410. Omnes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt: “For everybody hates a man that forgets the kindnesses that have been done to him.” (Cicero, De Officiis.) And the same may be said of the unfaithful, perjured, etc.

  411. Quid ergo, anima⁠ ⁠… nullane habet alimenta propria? an ejus esca scientia vobis videtur? “What then, is there no proper nourishment for the mind? does not knowledge seem to be the food of it?” (St. Augustine, De Beata Vita.)

  412. Alter in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur: “They destroy one another in the shortest way that they can.” (Seneca, De Ira.)

  413. Aristotle says a good man would be neither ἄφιλος, “without a friend,” nor πολύφιλος, “have a great number of friends.” (Nicomachean Ethics.) This is just. Therefore Seneca seems to go a little too far, when he writes, Omnes amicos habere operosum esse, satis esse inimicos non habere: “It requires great pains to make all men our friends, it is sufficient to have no enemies.” (Epistles.)

  414. Ζῶον συναγελαστικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος: “Man is a sociable creature.” (St. Basil, Homily on Psalm 14.)

  415. Man is, in Gregory Nazianzen’s words, τὸ πολυτροπώτατον τῶν ζώων, καὶ ποικιλώτατον: “a creature who loves to turn his thoughts to variety of things, and to employ himself in different ways.” (The Second Oration.)

  416. Πᾶς ἐστι νόμος⁠ ⁠… πόλεως συνθήκη κοινή: “Every law⁠ ⁠… is the general compact of the city.” (Demosthenes, Against Aristogeiton.)

  417. Νόμος ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἕυρεσις: “The law is the finding out and specifying that which really is.” (Stobaeus on Plato’s Minos.)

  418. Δίκαιον φύσει, ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει: “Justice is founded in nature, is unalterable, and is equally in force everywhere; in the same manner as the fire burns here and in Persia.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  419. Even the Heathens believed that above all human κηρύγματα: “edicts” there were ἄγραπτα κᾀσφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα: “unwritten and unalterable laws of the Gods,” which mortals ought not to transgress: οὐ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κᾀχθες ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ πότε ζῇ τᾶυτα: “because these are in force, not only for a day or two, but forever.” (Sophocles, Oedipus Rex.) Nec si regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra⁠ ⁠… legem sempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ⁠ ⁠… attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, et ad rectè faciendum impellens, et à delicto avocans: quæ non cum denique incipit lex esse, cùm scripta est, sed tum cùm orta est. Orta autem simul est cum mente divina: “Wherefore if, in the reign of Tarquin, there were no written laws at Rome against whoredom, yet nevertheless Sextus Tarquinius acted contrary to an eternal law when he ravishd Lucretia; for there is such a thing as reason, which proceeds from the nature of things, and which urges us to do that which is right, and forbids us to commit any crimes; which (reason) does not then begin to be a law when it is written down, but was from the beginning; that is, it began when the divine mind began.” (Cicero, De Legibus.)

  420. Si tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis atque jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciunt, ut, quæ mala perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis, ac salutaribus? aut cùr, cum jus ex injuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo? “If the opinions or commands of weak and foolish men are of so great force as to overturn the nature of things by their majority; why do they not establish it by a law, that those things which are evil and pernicious shall become good and advantageous? And why cannot the same law make the things that are good evil, as well as make an injury a lawful thing?” (Cicero, De Legibus.)

  421. In person, or by proxy.

  422. Plato says when any man has seen our form of government, etc., and remains under it, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ὴμῖν: “that then we say, such a one does indeed agree with us.” (Crito.)

  423. Illud stultissimum, existimare omnia justa esse, quæ scita sint in populorum institutis, aut legibus.⁠ ⁠… Si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum, jurà constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari: jus, adulterare: jus, testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur: “That’s very foolish indeed, to imagine that all those things are just which are establishd by the decrees and laws of the people.⁠ ⁠… If right were made by the ordinances of the people, by the decrees of princes, or by the sentences of judges, it would be right to rob on the highway; it would be right to commit adultery; it would be right to forge wills; supposing all these were allowed by the majority and by the decrees of the populacy.” (Cicero, De Legibus.)

  424. Manicheans of old, and some moderns.

  425. Like those particularly of Julius Caesar, of whom it is reported that anamadversâ apud Herculis templum magni Alexandri imagine, ingemuit; quasi pertæsus ignaviam suam, quod nihil dum à se memorabile actum esset in ætate quâ jam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset: “upon viewing the statue of Alexader the Great in the temple of Hercules, he gave a sigh, as it were, to reproach his own sluggishness that he had done no memorable thing, at an age when Alexander had conquered the whole world.” (Suetonius, Lives of the Caesars.)

  426. Some go to war ὣσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων: “in order to hunt down and worry men.” (Plutarch, Life of Alexander.) Not out of necessity, and in order to peace; which is the true end of war, Πολεοῦμεν, ἵνα εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν: “We go to war, that we may procure peace.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Ita bellum suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud quàm pax quæsita videatur: “War should be undertaken in such a manner that nothing else but peace may be seen to be aimed at by it.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  427. Οὶ ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον, κ.τ.λ.: “Men do not marry for the sake of having children only, but for all the other purposes of life.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  428. Ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν: “It is natural for a man to love a woman; for man is as much made for the society of a woman, as for the society of each other.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Ὡς γὰρ ἡ μαγνῆτις λίθος⁠ ⁠… πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὸν σίδηρον ἕλκει· οὕτω τὸ τοῦ θήλεος σῶμα⁠ ⁠… τὸ τοῦ ἄῤῥενος σῶμα πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ἕλκει: “For as the lodestone draws iron, so the woman attracts the man to unite with her.” (St. Basil.)

  429. That sure is a hard law in Plato, which enjoins ἀπέχεσθαι ἀρούρας θηλείας πάσης, ἐν ᾗ μὴ βούλοιο ἄν σοι φύεσθαι τὸ σπαρέν: “men to have no familiarity with a woman, without wishing for the success of it.” (Laws.) That mentioned in Sefer Haredim says otherwise; מ״ע לק״ם אדם עונתו ואף כשאשתו מעוברה וכו׳: “It is an affirmative precept, that a man should act the part of a husband, though his wife is incapable of having any children.” (Eliezer Azkari.) Many opinions are taken up upon slight reasons. When Ocellus Lucianus says, Ἀυτὰς τὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ τὰ ὄργανα, καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὰς πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ὑπὸ θεοῦ δεδομένας ἀνθρώποις, οὐχ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα δεδόσθαι συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διαμονῆς τοῦ γένους: “that the powers, the organs, and the desire of procreation, were given men by God, not for the sake of pleasure, but for the perpetual continuation of mankind,” how does he know that they were not given for both these ends, in a regular way (On the Nature of the Whole)? And so when Clement of Alexandria shows his zeal against τὰς ἀκάρπους σπορὰς, τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἐγκύους όμιλίαν: “such familiarities as produce no effect, meddling with pregnant women,” etc., adding, ψιλὴ γὰρ ἡδονὴ, κᾂν ἐν γάμῳ παραληφθῇ, παράνομός ἐςι, κ.τ.λ.: “that such mean pleasure is unlawful, even in married persons” (Paedagogus), he does this because ὁ Μωσῆς ἀπάγει τῶν ἐγκύων τοὺς ἄνδρας: “Moses forbids a man coming near a pregnant woman,” and then cites a text to prove this which is nothing to the purpose, nor I believe anywhere to be found: Οὐκ ἔδεσαι τὸν λαγὼν, οὐδὲ τὴν ὕαιναν: “Thou shalt not eat a hare or a hyaena” (Quem interpretem secutus sit Clemens nescio: “What commentator Clement followed, I know not.” —⁠Gentian Hervetus). Certainly the Jews understand their lawgiver otherwise. See how that עונה, “conjugal due,” mentioned in the law is explained by Maimonides in Mishneh Torah (Hilkot Ishut XIV). Nor are the suffrages of Christians wanting, Deus, cum cæteras animantes, suscepto fœtu, maribus repugnare voluisset, solam omnium mulierem patientem viri fecit;⁠ ⁠… ne feminis repugnantibus, libido cogeret viros aliud appetere, etc.: “When God made all other female animals, so as to refuse the males when they are pregnant, he made women only capable of men;⁠ ⁠… lest, upon their refusal, men’s violent passions should force them to go after others, etc.,” that is, that the man and wife might be kept inseparably together. (Lactantius, Divine Institutes.)

  430. Καὶ τὸ χοήσιμον εἷναι δοκεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν τάυτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ: “There seems to be both profit and pleasure in this sort of friendship.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) כשאיש ואשה נוהגים כראוי שכינה ביניהם: “When the man and the wife behave themselves towards each other as they ought, they are then most intimately united.” (Reshit Hokmah.)

  431. Ἔρως⁠ ⁠… καθάπερ ἑνὸς ζώου διττὰ τμήματα⁠ ⁠… εἰς ταυτὸν ἁρμόττεται: “Love⁠ ⁠… is like two parts of the same living creature⁠ ⁠… united into one.” (Philo Judaeus, On the Creation.)

  432. True love is to be found in marriage, or nowhere. Πόρνη γὰρ φιλεῖν οὐκ ἐπίσταται, ἀλλ’ ἐπιβουλέυει μόνον: “For there is no real love in whoring; nothing but ensnaring one another.” (St. Chrysostom, Ad Populum Antiochenum.) ערותה מגולה והלב מכוסה: “They discover their nakedness, but hide their real sentiments,” a homely but true saying of a Jewish commentator (Levi ben Gershom).

  433. Quod facere turpe non est modò occultè; id dicere obscœnum est: “That which has no evil in it when it is done in private, may be obscene when spoke publicly.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  434. Ἐὰν γὰρ ἦ κοσμία καὶ ἐπιεικὴς, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας παραμυθίαν παρέξει τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι πολλὴν τῆς ἑαυτῆς χρείαν ἐπιδείξεται, κ.τ.λ.: “For, if she be neat and good-natured, she will not only in general be a comfort to her husband, but will be very useful to him in every particular.” (St. Chrysostom, Homily on Genesis 16.)

  435. Διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς, καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια: “Their business is different, there is one sort of employment for the man, and another for the woman; so that they are assistant to each other, by joining their forces together.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  436. See the conversation between Ischomachus and his wife in Xenophon. (Oeconomicus.)

  437. Though Plato (like most of the old Greeks and Romans) among many very fine things has now and then some that are weak, and even absurd; yet I cannot think that by his community of women he meant anything like that which is said in Athenæus to have been practiced παρὰ Τυῤῥηνοῖς ἐκτότως τρυφήσασιν: “among the Tyrrhenians, who were exceedingly debauched” (Deipnosophistae), or that his thought could be so gross as Lactantius represents it: Scilicet ut ad eandem mulierem multi viri, tanquam canes, confluerent: “namely, that several men, like so many dogs, should run after one woman.” (Divine Institutes.) For thus, property being taken out of the world, a great part of virtue is extinguished, and all industry and improvements are at an end. And besides that, many of the most substantial comforts and innocent delights of this life are destroyed at once. Si omnes omnium fuerint et mariti, et patres, et uxores, et liberi, quæ ista confusio generis humani est?⁠ ⁠… Quis aut vir mulierem, aut mulier virum diligit, nisi habitaverint semper unà? nisi devota mens, et servata invicem fides individuam fecerit caritatem, etc.: “If all were the husbands and fathers, and wives and children, of all, what a confusion would there be among mankind?⁠ ⁠… for how can the man love the woman, and the woman the man, unless they live always together? unless their minds be devoted to each, and their fidelity mutual, which will make their affections inseparable, etc.(Lactantius, Divine Institutes.) However it must be confessed that Plato has advanced more than was consistent with his own gravity, or with nature. The best excuse to be made for him, that I know of, is that in Athenæus, Ἔοικεν ὁ Πλάτων μὴ τοῖς οὖσιν ἀνθρώποις γράψαι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ διαπλαττομένοις: “That Plato seems to have made his laws not for such as men now are, but for men of his own imagination” (Deipnosophistae): or perhaps to say, that he was so intent upon strengthening and defending his commonwealth, that he forgot, if men must live after his manner, there would be little in it worth defending. After all, his meaning to me is not perfectly clear.

  438. Everyone knows how marriages were made among the Romans, confarreatione, “by offering up of burnt cakes,” coemptione, “by the man and his wife, as it were, buying one another, by giving and taking a piece of money,” usu, “or by use, when the woman had lived with the man a whole year:” of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies: and the legitimæ tabellæ, “writings appointed by law,” or at least consent of friends (which could not be given without some solemnity) preceded all, auspicia, “omens,” were usually taken, public notaries and witnesses assisted, etc. Among the Greeks, men and women were espoused by mutual promises of fidelity: besides which there were witnesses, and dotal writings (προικῷα); at the wedding, sacrifices to Diana and other deities, and the γαμήλιοι ἐυχαὶ, “nuptial prayers;” and after that, perhaps the being shut up together, eating the κυδώνιον, “quince, together,” a formal λύσις ζώνης, “untying of the bride’s girdle,” etc. The קדושין, “nuptials,” of the Jews have been performed בכסף, “by money,” or בשטר, “by writings of contract,” or בביאה, “by going into the house:” the ceremonies accompanying which may be seen particularly in Shulhan Aruk with the additions of Rabbi Moses Isserles (Eben Ha-Ezer). And (to pass by other nations) the form of solemnization of matrimony, and the manner in which persons married give their troth each to other among us, are extant in our public offices: where they may be seen by such as seem to have forgot what they are.

  439. Connubio stabili: “By a lasting marriage.” (Virgil, Aeneid.)

  440. והיו לבשר אחד דכך דרכה לאתייחדא דכר ונוקבא. בקירוב בשר⁠ ⁠… דלא יהא דבר חוצץ וכו׳: “And they became one flesh, for it is the custom for men and women to come together,⁠ ⁠… and that they be no more divided.” (Elijah ben Moses de Vidas, Reshit Hokmah.)

  441. Αὕτη χρημάτων κοινωνία προσήκει μάλιστα τοῖς γαμοῦσιν, εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν πάντα καταχεαμένοις καὶ ἀναμίξασι, μὴ τὸ μέρος ἴδιον, καὶ τὸ μέρος ἀλλότριου, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἀλλότριον: “It belongs chiefly to married persons to mix their fortunes together, so as to have but one common stock; and not for them to think that part of it belongs particularly to one and part to the other, but the whole is their own jointly.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  442. Σύνδεσμος τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι: “Children seem to be the bond (of matrimony).” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  443. In respect of which, that in Plutarch particularly is true, Ἡ φύσις μάγνυσι διὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμᾶς, ἵν’ ἐξ ἑκατέρων μέρος λαβοῦσα, καὶ τυγχέασα, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδῶ τὸ γενόμενον: “Nature, by means of our bodies, so intermixes us, that what is produced becomes common to both, being a part of each, when united together.” (Advice to Bride and Groom.)

  444. Socrates ab adolescentulo quodam consultus, uxorem duceret, an se omni matrimonio abstineret, respondit, Utrum eorum fecisset, acturum pœnitentiam. Hîc te, inquit, solitudo, hîc orbitas, hîc generis interitus, hîc hæres alienus excipiet: illic perpetua solicitudo, contextus querelarum,⁠ ⁠… incertus liberorum eventus: “Socrates being consulted by a young man, whether he should take a wife or abstain wholly from matrimony, answered that which of them so ever he did, he would repent of it. On the one hand, says he, solitariness, want of children, the death of relations, want of an heir, will attend you; on the other hand (you will find) perpetual anxiety, uninterrupted complaints,⁠ ⁠… and the uncertain event of children.” (Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia.)

  445. Χρόνῳ συνηθείας ἐντεκούσης πάθος αἰσθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φίλειν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾷν ἐπιτεινόμενον: “When, by living a long time together, their mutual affection is eslablished, we find that, which was at first passion, is by reason become true friendship and love.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  446. It is visible that polygamy, pellicate [keeping a mistress], etc. must be included here. They are not only inconsistent with our forms, and the very letter of the marriage contract, but with the essence of marriage, which lies in such a union and love as can only be between two. Aristotle does not allow there can be even perfect friendship between more than two: much less therefore, perfect love: Πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον, κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα: “It is impossible to be a friend to a great many, I mean, to be in perfect friendship with them, as it is impossible to have a love for a great many at the same time.” (Nicomachean Ethics.) Ἔστι γὰρ φίλος ἅλλος ἀυτός: “For a friend is a second self.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  447. Fœcunda culpæ sæcula nuptias Primàm inquinavere, et genus, et domos. Hôc fonte derivata clades In patriam, populumque fluxit: “The ages that were fruitful in vice first defiled marriages, corrupted relations and families. From this fountain flowed that destruction which overwhelmed the country and its inhabitants.” (Horace, Odes.)

  448. Κρατεῖν δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς γυναικός οὐχ ὡς δεσπότην κτήματος, ἀλλʼ ὡς ψυχὴν σώματος, συμπαθοῦντα καὶ συμπεθυκότα τῇ ἐυνόιᾳ: “The husband ought to have a power over the wife, not such as a man has over his goods, but such as the soul has over the body, sympathizing and becoming one in benevolence.” (Plutarch, Advice to Bride and Groom.) (A sentence which deserves to be written in letters of gold.) Ὅπου σὺ Γάϊος, ἐγὼ Γαἵα·⁠ ⁠… ὅπου σὺ κύριος καὶ οἰκοδεσπότης, καὶ ἐγὼ κυρία καὶ οἰκοδέσποινα: “Where you are the man Gaias, I am the woman Gaia; where you are master and governor, I am mistress and governess.” (Also in Plutarch, Roman Questions.)

  449. Κατὰ φύσιν οἱ ἄῤῥενες οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ζώοις ἄρχουι: “Nature has appointed the males to govern, not only among mankind, but among all other living creatures.” (Plato, according to Diogenes Laërtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers.)

  450. Πολυπλέθρους δέ σοι γυίας Λέίψω. Πατρὸς γὰρ ταῦτ’ ἐδεξάμην πάρα: “I shall leave you a very good estate. For I had such a one from my father.” (Euripides, Alcestis.) Parentes vos alendo nepotum nutriendorum debito (si quis est pudor) alligaverunt: “Your parents, in maintaining you, made it a debt upon you (if you have any sense of shame) to maintain your children.” (Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia.)

  451. Incertus quò fata ferant, ubi sistere detur: “it is uncertain which way fate will carry me, or where I shall settle,” in the poet’s language. (Virgil, Aeneid.)

  452. See that moving description of the Ἦμαρ ὀρφανικὸν: “an orphan” in Homer’s Iliad.

  453. I could never think of that Arabic saying without pity, “The barber [אלחגאם] learns to shave upon the head of an orphan.”

  454. For certainly, when it can be, Hoc patrium est, potius consuefacere filium sua sponte recte facere, quàm alieno metu: “It is the duty of a father to accustom his son to do right from his own good will, rather than from the fear of others.” (Terence, The Brothers.)

  455. Πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον ἀπειθοῦντες γονεῦσι, πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὺτοὶ τοῖς θείοις νόμοις οὐ πέιθονται: “We should refuse obedience to parents, only in such things as are contrary to the laws of God.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  456. The barbarity of the thing at length put a stop to the custom of exposing children: but it had been practised by the Persians, Greeks, etc. Romulus’s law only restrained it, but did not abolish it. For it enjoined his citizens only, ἅπασαν ἄρρενα γενεὰν ἐκτρέφειν, καὶ θυγατέρων τὰς πρωτογόνους· ἀποκτιννύναι δὲ μηδὲν τῶν γεννωμένων νεώτερον τριετοῦς, πλὴν εἴ τι γένοιτο παιδίον ἀνάπηρον, κ.τ.λ.: “to bring up all the males, and the firstborn of the daughters; and not to destroy any of them after they were three years old, unless they were maimed.” (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities.) And besides, ἅπασαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἔδωκεν ἐξουσίαν πατρὶ καθ’ υἱοῦ, καὶ παρὰ πάντα τὸν τοῦ βίου χρόνον, κ.τ.λ.: “the father had absolute power over the son given him, and that during his whole life.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  457. Ῥωμαίοις οὐθὲν ἴδιόν ἐστι κτῆμα ζὡντων ἔτι τῶν πατέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν παίδων ὅ, τι βούλονται διατιθέναι τοῖς πατράσιν άποδέδοται: “Among the Romans, children had nothing of their own, while their fathers were alive; but the goods and the bodies of the children were entirely at the disposal of the fathers, to do what they would with them.” (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities.) These are instances of such laws as should not be, by proposition IV, section VII.

  458. Roma patrem patriæ Ciceronem libera dixit: “When Rome had liberty to speak, she called Cicero the father of his country.” (Juvenal, Satires.)

  459. Ὡς λογικῶν ἡμῶν ἄρξον: “That should govern us as rational creatures.” (Arrian, Discourses of Epictetus.)

  460. שללתן שותפין ביצירתם: “All the three had a share in the formation of them.” (Eliezer Azkari, Sefer Haredim.)

  461. Utinam oculos in pectora possent Inserere, et patrias intus deprendere curas: “I wish they could look into their breasts, and see what the inward cares of parents are.” (Ovid, Metamorphoses.)

  462. I confess in Seneca’s words, minimum esse beneficium patris matrisque concubitum, nisi accesserint alia, quæ prosequerentur hoc initium muneris, et aliis oficiis hoc ratum facerent: “that parents merely begetting of their children is the smallest kindness, if there were nothing else which followed this first office, and confirmed it by other duties.” (De Beneficiis.)

  463. Τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ τῶν ἡδέων καθ’ αὑτό· φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ζωή·: “To feel that we are alive is a real pleasure of itself; for life is naturally a good thing.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) The sense of life (of being alive) seems to be something more than what Seneca calls muscarum ac vermium bonum: “the good of flies and worms.” (De Beneficiis.)

  464. Οἱ πάλαιοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων νόμοι, κ.τ.λ.⁠ ⁠… οἱ δὲ ἔτι παλαιότεροι τοσοῦτο τοὺς γονέας ἐσέφθησαν, ὡς καὶ θεοὺς αὀτοὺς ὁρμῆσκι: “The ancient laws of the Romans,⁠ ⁠… and they that are older yet, paid so much reverence to parents as to oblige us to call them Gods.” (Simplicius, Commentary on the Enchiridion.)

  465. Meo judicio pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum: “In my opinion, piety is the foundation of all virtues.” (Cicero, Oration for Plancius.) The same author reckons, among those things that are laudable, parentem vereri ut deum (neque enim multo secus parens liberis): “to reverence a parent as a God (for the relation of a parent to his children is pretty much the same).” (Ibid.) Οὐδ’ αὖ πάλιν μείζων ἐπίδειξις ἀθέου γέγονε τῆς περὶ γονεῖς ὀλιγωρίας καὶ πλημμελείας: “There is no greater demonstration of an atheist, than is shown in the contemning or abusing parents.” (Plutarch, Concerning Brotherly Love.)

  466. Πάντες⁠ ⁠… λέγουσι καὶ ᾄδουσιν, ὡς γονεῦσι τιμὴν μετὰ θεοὺς πρώτην καὶ μεγίστην ἥ τε φύσις, ὅ, τε τὴν φύσιν σῴζων νόμος ἀπέδωκε: “All writers in prose or poetry affirm that nature, and the laws that are agreeable to nature, command the first and greatest reverence to be paid to parents next to the Gods.” (Plutarch, Concerning Brotherly Love.) Γονέων τιμὴν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς θεὸν δευτέραν ἔταξεν [Μω̈υσῆς]: “[Moses] commanded that honor should be paid to parents next to God.” (Josephus, Against Apion.) We indeed usually divide the two tables of Moses’s law so that the fifth commandment (Honor thy father and thy mother) falls in the second, but the Jews themselves divide them otherwise, ὡς εἶναι τῆς μὲν μιᾶς γραφῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα⁠ ⁠… τοῦ παντὸς, τὸ δὲ στέλος γονεῖς, κ.τ.λ.: “so that the first table begins with (the duty to) the God and father⁠ ⁠… of all, and ends with (the duty to) parents.” (Philo Judaeus, De Decalogo.) Agreeably to this, Josephus says that οἱ δέκα λόγοι: “the ten commandments” were written upon two tables, ἀνὰ πέντε μὲν εἰς ἑκατέραν [πλάκα]: “five upon each [table].” (Antiquities of the Jews.) Abravanel reckons the fifth commandment the last of the first table, and says their Hhakamim: “wise men” do so; and in the offices of that nation these commandments are mentioned as written על הלוחות חמשה חמשה: “five upon each table.” (Commentary on the Torah.)

  467. Prima igitur et optima rerum natura pietatis est magistra, etc.: “The nature of things, which is the first and best rule of all, teaches us what piety is, etc.(Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia.)

  468. Ὁ χρόνος, τἄλλα πάντ’ ἀφαιρῶν, τῷ γήρᾳ προστίθησι τὴν ἐπιστήμην: “Time, which takes away everything else from us, adds knowledge to old age.” (Plutarch, The Education of Children.)

  469. שאל אביך ויגדך: “ask thy father, and he will show thee.” (Deuteronomy 32:7.)

  470. Δόξειε δ’ ἂν τροφῆς γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ’ ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι⁠ ⁠… καὶ τιμὴν δὲ καθάπερ θεοῖς: “We ought, in the first place, to supply the necessities of our parents, as a debt due to them who are the authors of our being⁠ ⁠… and to reference them as Gods.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Among the ancients θρεπτήρια, “the rewards of education,” and τροφεῖα, “maintenance of parents,” were reckoned due. And he, who does not requite to his parents הטובה שגמלוהו, “the good which they have bestowed on him,” is called κατ’ ἐξοχην, רשע: “in an eminent sense wicked.” (Eliezer Azkari, Sefer Haredim.)

  471. Τοιοῦτος γινου περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς, οἴους ἂν ἔυξαιο περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι τοὺς σαυτοῦ παῖδας: “Do you behave yourself, to your parents, as you would wish your children to behave themselves towards you.” (Isocrates.)

  472. That epithet pius (pius Aeneas) shines in Virgil’s Aeneid.

  473. Posita est inter parentes ac liberos honesta contentio, dederint majora, an receperint: “There is a very laudable contest betwixt parents and children, viz.: whether they have given or received most.” (Seneca, De Beneficiis.)

  474. That is, methinks, a moving description in St. Basil (Περὶ πλεονεξ) a conflict which a poor man had within himself, when he had no other way left to preserve life but by selling one of his children. (Homilia in illud Lucæ, destruam horrea mea.)

  475. Prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis, etc.: “The strongest alliance is in marriage itself, the next in children, etc.(Cicero, De Officiis.)

  476. Mulier conjuncta viro concessit in unum: “After the man and woman are joined together, they become one.” (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura.) כחד גופא חשיבי: “They are looked upon as one body,” (according to Rabbi Eliezer Azkari and others).

  477. Ἡ συγγενικὴ [φιλία] φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, καὶ ἠρτῆσθαι πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα, ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα· τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ’ ἐκείνων τι ὄντα⁠ ⁠… Ἀδελφοὶ δ’ ἀλλήλους [φιλοῦσι] τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι⁠ ⁠… Ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς⁠ ⁠… τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι· γίνονται δ’ οἳ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἳ δ’ ἀλλοτριώτεροι, κ.τ.λ.: “There are a great many sorts of friendship among relations, all of them depending upon the parents. For parents have a tender affection for their children because they are part of themselves; and so have the children for the parents, because they are derived from them.⁠ ⁠… Brothers also (love) one another, because they are born of the same parents⁠ ⁠… cousins also and other relations,⁠ ⁠… because they proceed from the same parents also.⁠ ⁠… And there are some nearer related, and some further off.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  478. Quàm copiosæ suavitatis illa recordatio est? In eodem domicilio, antequam nascerer, habitavi: in iisdem incunabulis infantiæ tempora peregi: eosdem appellavi parentes, etc.: “How very pleasant is the remembrance of these things? I dwelt in the same dwelling (with such a one) before I was born; I passed my infancy in the same cradle; I called the same persons my parents, etc.(Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia.)

  479. There is no name for any descendent who is more than trinepos: “three degrees removed from us.”

  480. It becomes ἀμυδρά: “very obscure.” (Andronicus of Rhodes.)

  481. Man and Wife are supposed to be one, and therefore have no place here, any more than a man and his self. Otherwise considered distinctly, the one of them ought always to be the first care of the other.

  482. Μηδὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἶσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον: “We must not treat a friend equally with a relation.” (Hesiod, Works and Days.)

  483. For many I acknowledge there are, who seem to be without reflection, and almost thought. Τίς ἀγνοεῖ τὴν οἰκέιαν φύσιν; πολλόι· τάχα δὲ πάντες πλὴν ὀλίγων: “Who is there that does not understand what he himself is? A great many truly; nay, all but a very few.” (St. Chrysostom, Homily on Acts of the Apostles.)

  484. Nec se quæsiverit extra: “Let him not seek for himself out of himself.” (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  485. Illud γνῶθι σεαυτὸν noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solùm esse dictum, verùm etiam ut bona nostra norimus: “Do not imagine that that (precept) ‘understand yourself thoroughly,’ was said only to lessen men’s pride, but further that they might know all the good things which belong to them.” (Cicero, in his letters to his brother Quintus.)

  486. Non sentire mala sua non est hominis: et non ferre non est viri: “Not to be sensible of the evils we lie under is not to be a man, and not to be able to bear them is to want the courage of a man” (Seneca, who condescends here, in De Consolatione ad Polybium, to be something like other men). As also when he says, Alia sunt, quæ sapientem feriunt, etiamsi non pervertunt; ut dolor capitis, etc. Hæt non nego sentire sapientem, etc.: “There are some things which strongly affect a wise man, though they don’t quite overpower him, as the headache, etc.; I do not deny but that a wise man feels such things,” etc. (De Constantia Sapientis.)

  487. Qui se ipse norit, aliquid sentiet se babere divinum, etc.: “He that understands what sort of a being he himself is, will perceive that he has something that is divine in him.” (Cicero, De Legibus.)

  488. טבע החומר ויצר הרע: “nature which is backward, and a will corrupted,” are (in Jewish language, see Berakhot) שאור בעיסה: “the leaven in the lump.”

  489. Ἀμήχανον εἶναι ἄνθρωπόν τινα ἀναμάρτητον: “It is next to impossible for a man to be free from all sin.” (Johannes Chrysostom, De Lazaro.)

  490. The author of Sefer Haredim reckons eight, the right use of which comprehends all practical religion: the heart, the eye, the mouth, nose, ear, hand, foot, and ראש הגויה: “the principal member.” The duties respecting these are the subject of that (not bad) book.

  491. Cùm tria sint hæc, esse, vivere, intelligere: et lapis est, et pecus vivit, nec tamen lapidem puto vivere, aut pecus intelligere: qui autem intelligit, eum et esse et vivere certissimum est. Quare non dubito id excellentius judicare, cui omnia tria insunt, quàm id cui duo vel unum desit: “Since there are these three things: to exist, to live, and to have understanding; and a stone exists, beasts live, for I cannot think that a stone lives, or a beast has understanding; it is most certain, that the being which has understanding, both exists and lives. Wherefore I don’t at all scruple to declare him, that has in him all these three, to be a superior being to him who wants one or two of them.” (St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio.) Thus reason sets man above the other visible orders of beings, etc.

  492. Præsto est domina omnium et regina ratio⁠ ⁠… Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi, quæ obedire debet, id videndum est viro: “Reason, the governor and ruler of all things, is ready⁠ ⁠… ; every man therefore is to see that she governs that part of the soul which ought to be obedient to her.” (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations.)

  493. Abjecto homine in sylvestre animal transire: “To cast off the man, and become a wild creature.” (Seneca, De Clementia.) Ἐν τῷ λογικῷ τίνων χωριζόμεθα; τῶν θηρίων⁠ ⁠… Ὅρα οὖν μή τί πως ὡς θηρίον ποιήσῃς: “Whom are we distinguished from by our reason?⁠ ⁠… from the beasts; take care then that you do not imitate the beasts in anything.” (Arrian, Discourses of Epictetus.) Pertinet ad omnem officii quæstionem semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque belluis antecedat: “In all inquiries concerning our duty we ought always to have this uppermost, viz.: how much the nature of man is superior to that of cattle or any other beasts.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  494. Πρὸς τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἀλογίαν ἐκπεσών: “To sink into as little reason as a beast has.” (Johannes Chrysostom, Homily on Genesis 6.)

  495. A thing too often done. Quæ enim libido, quæ avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto, aut sine⁠ ⁠… ratione perficitur? “For what sensual pleasure, what avaricious thing is undertaken, without first advising about it; or completed⁠ ⁠… without making use of reason?” (Cotta, in Cicero, De Natura Deorum.)

  496. Something like him, who in Chrysostom’s words, διὰ τῶν οἰάκων καταδύει τὸ σκάφος: “made use of the rudder to sink the ship.” (Commentary on the Psalms.)

  497. This makes Cotta say, Satius fuit nullam omnino nobis à diis immortalibus datam esse rationem, quàm tanta cum pernicie datam: “That it had been better that the immortal Gods had never given us any reason at all, than to have given it us in so destructive a manner,” with other bitter things. Though an answer to this may be given in the words which follow afterward: A deo tantùm rationem habemus, si modò habemus: bonam autem rationem, aut non bonam, à nobis: “The reason which we have (the faculty) is given us by God, but whether it be good or bad, that is from ourselves.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.)

  498. This certainly excludes all that talk which familiarizes vice, takes off those restraints which men have from nature or a modest education, and is so utterly destructive of virtue that Aristotle banishes it out of the commonwealth. Ὅλως μὲν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν· ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀισχρῶν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς: “A lawgiver ought above all things entirely to banish all filthy discourse out of a city, for men easily go from saying filthy things to doing them.” (Politics.)

  499. True, manly reason, which is a very different thing from that superstitious preciseness which carries things too far. As e.g. when the Jews, not contented to condemn דבור נבלה, “obscene discourse,” or נבלות הפה, “filthy talk,” and everywhere to express גודל האסור, “the heinousness of the thing forbidden,” go so far as to comprehend under it אפי׳שיחה קלה שאדם סשיח עם אשתו, “that trifling discourse which passes betwixt a man and his wife;” and to add מוציא מלה לבטלה כמוציא זרע עבטלה וכו׳, “that bringing forth an idle word is like bringing forth idle seed.” There are other sayings of this kind to be seen, many of them, among those which Rabbi Elijah ben Moses de Vidas has collected: as that particularly, כז ענין ראות צריך שלא להיציאו לבטלה וכו׳, “that a man should not make an idle use of his eyes.” What Ælian reports of Anaxagoras and others, belongs to this place: that they never laughed (Various Histories), with many other unnecessary austerities which might be added.

  500. אם אין אני לי מי לי: “If I don’t take care of myself, who will take care of me.” (Mishnah, Abot I, 14.)

  501. Προσδεῖται τούτων [τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν] ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος· κύριαι δ’ εἰσὶν αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας·: “These [external goods] are necessary to the life of man, but virtuous actions are necessary to his happiness.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) They, who treated the body and things pertaining to it as merely ἀλλότρια, “things that did not belong to them;” distinguishing between τὰ ἡμέτερα, “such things as are our own,” and τὰ τοῦ σώματος, “such as belong to the body;” making the latter to be οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, “nothing to us,” and leaving the body as it were to itself (ἀυτὸ [σωμάτιον] μεριμνάτω,⁠ ⁠… εἴ τι πάσχει: “to be solicitous for itself,⁠ ⁠… if it suffers anything.” —⁠Marcus Aurelius, Meditations): they, I say, might enjoy their own philosophy, but they would scarce gain many proselytes nowadays, or ever persuade people that the pains they feel are not theirs or anything to them. Nor indeed do I much credit many stories that are told of some old philosophers: as that of Anaxarchus, when he was put to a most cruel death by Nicocreon (viz. pounded in a mortar) οὐ φροντίσαντα τῆς τιμωρίας, ἐιπεῖν⁠ ⁠… Πτίσσε τὸν Ἀναξάρχου θύλακον, Ἀνάξαρχον δὲ οὐ πτίσσεις: “not valuing the punishment, cried out;⁠ ⁠… You may beat the bag of Anaxarchus, but you cannot strike Anaxarchus himself.” (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Anaxarchus.) See Epictitus, Arrian, Simplicius, Marcus Aurelius, Diogenes Laërtius, and others.

  502. Ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa; quo nihil potest esse stultius.⁠ ⁠… In tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est: “Nothing can be more foolish than to run ourselves into dangers without any reason.⁠ ⁠… He is a mad man that wishes for a storm when the weather is good.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  503. Levius fit patientia, Quicquid corrigere est nefas: “What cannot be quite cured, is made easier by patience.” (Horace, Odes.)

  504. Μελέτη θανάτου: “a meditation upon death,” was a great man’s definition of philosophy. (Plato, Phaedo.)

  505. Ἡ ὀργἠ⁠ ⁠… ὑπνηλὸν ἡμῶν διεγέιρει: “Anger⁠ ⁠… is to excite the drowsy.” (Johannes Chrysostom.)

  506. When the Stoics say that a wise man may relieve one who wants his help, without pitying him, I own indeed he may, but I very much doubt whether he would. If he had not some compassion, and in some measure felt the ails or wants of the other, I scarce know how he should come to take him for an object of his charity.

  507. Ὁ μὲν ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ ὁις δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται: “He is to be commended, who is angry with those persons that he ought to be angry with, and for such things as he ought to be angry for, and in such a manner, and in the proper time, and only for so long, as he ought.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) To be angry under these conditions is a different thing from rage, and those transports which perhaps scarce comply with any one of them: such as that of Alexander, who, because his ἐρώμενος, “beloved friend,” died, commanded the Ἀσκληπεῖα, “temples of Æsculapius,” to be all burnt. (Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander.)

  508. There is, according to Cicero, Civile odium, quo omnes improbos odimus: “a public hatred, by which we hate all wicked persons in general.” (Pro Milone.)

  509. Φοβούμεθα δηλονότι τὰ φοβερά⁠ ⁠… φοβούμεθα οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά· οἷον ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον⁠ ⁠… ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ καλόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ, αἰσχρόν, κ.τ.λ.: “We are afraid, indeed, of such things as are really dreadful;⁠ ⁠… and therefore we are afraid of all real evils, such as disgrace, poverty, diseases, want of friends, and death⁠ ⁠… It is right to be afraid of some things, and wicked not to be afraid of them.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) When one called Xenophanes coward, because he would not play at dice with him, ὁμολογεῖ πάνυ δειλὸς εἶναι πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἄτολμος: “he owned that he was a coward, and had no courage with regard to things that are wicked.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  510. A wise man is not ἀπαθὴς, “entirely without passions,” but μετριοπαθής, “has them in a moderate degree.” (Aristotle, in Diogenes Laërtius.)

  511. Δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου⁠ ⁠… τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων, τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον· τὸ δ’ ἧττον: “He who aims at a medium should depart from that (extreme) which is most contrary;⁠ ⁠… for one of the two extremes has more of vice in it than the other.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) In the same chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which I cannot but set down here: Σκοπεῖν δεῖ πρὸς ἃ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν⁠ ⁠… εἰς τοὐναντίον δ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν·⁠ ⁠… ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν: “We ought to consider what (vices) we are most inclined to,⁠ ⁠… and to bend ourselves to the contrary;⁠ ⁠… as they do, who endeavor to make crooked sticks straight.” And after, Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν: “In everything, we should take great care as to the pleasure of it; for we are very apt to have our judgment corrupted by pleasure.”

  512. Ἀγεσιλάῳ μέχρι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὁ ἔρως, ἐντᾶυθα ἔστη ἐπὶ θύραις τῆς ψυχῆς: “When love was got to the eyes of Agesilaus, it stood then at the door of his mind.” (Maximus Tyrius, De Eodem Amore.) To appoint things, as the Jewish doctors have done, to be סייג לתורה, “a fence for the law,” or כדי להרחיק את האדם מן העבירה, “to remove men as far as can be from sin,” would be right, if they were judiciously chosen, and not so very particular and trifling (Mishnah, Abot I, 1). Some of their cautions are certainly just, as that לא יסתכל אדם באשת איש ובשאר עריות פן ינקש גם: “A man should not trifle with another man’s wife, nor with nakedness, lest he be ensnared by them.” (Mishnah Berakhot I, 1.)

  513. What should a man do to live? ימית עצמו: “Should he destroy himself?” (Mishnah, Tamid.)

  514. No monkery, no superstitious or fantastical mortifications, are here recommended.

  515. חסיד עושה טובה לפנים משורח הרין: “the merciful man does good according to the best of his judgment,” (which words I understand in the sense that Rashi seems to put upon them, in his commentary on Genesis 44:10).

  516. Πῇ παρέβην; τι δ’ ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη: “have I transgressed? and what have I done? wherein have I failed in what was my duty?” (Pythagoreorum Aureum Carmen.)

  517. Τίς γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦ βίου παρ παρελθὼν ἄπτωτος ἔμεινε; τίς δ’ οὐχ ὑπεσκελίσθη; εὐδαίμων ὁ μὴ πολλάκις.: “For who has gone through the circuit of life and kept his legs? nay, who is there that has not fallen quite down? He is a happy man, if he has not done so a great many times.” (Philo Judaeus, De Somniis.)

  518. Quem pœnitet peccasse, penè est innocens: “He that repents of his crime is almost innocent.” (Seneca, Agamemnon.)

  519. Even a Jew says, [תשובה] שקולה כנגד כל הקרבנות: “that repentance may be weighed against any sacrifice.” (Judah ben Samuel, Sefer Hasidim.)

  520. Ἐλοιδόρησας; ἐυλόγησον· ἐπλεονέκτησας; ἀπόδος· ἐμεθύσθης; νήστενσον: “Have you spoke evil of any man? speak well of him for the future. Have you overreached any man? make him satisfaction. Have you been drunk? then fast.” (St. Basil, Homilae super Psalmos.)

  521. Ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγιστον κτῆμα: “For philosophy is really the best of all possessions.” (Justin Martyr, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo.)

  522. And perhaps as if our own minds were not what they are. For πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει: “all men have naturally a thirst after knowledge.” (Aristotle, Metaphysics.)

  523. Aristotle, being asked “what he got by philosophy,” answered, Τὸ ἀνεπιτάκτως ποιεῖν ἅ τινες διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων φόβον ποιοῦσιν: “To do that without being commanded, which other people do out of fear of the laws.” And another time, “how the learned differed from the unlearned,” said Ὅσῳ οἱ ζῶντες τῶν τηθνηκότων· τὴν παιδέιαν ἔλεγεν ἐν μὲν ἐυτυχίαις εἶναι κόσμον, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καταφυγήν: “As much as the living do from the dead. Learning, he said, was an ornament to men when they were in prosperity, and a refuge for them to flee to when they were in adversity.” (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Aristotle.)

  524. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ, ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον, τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται καθάπερ δι’ ὀργάνων, κ.τ.λ.: “It is impossible, at least it is very difficult, for a man to do much good if he want the necessaries of life; for many things are done as it were by instruments.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  525. Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris himines passime bestiarum modo vagabantur, etc.: “For there was a time when men wandered about the fields, just as the beasts do now, etc.(Cicero, De Inventione.)

  526. The effect which Xenocrates’s lecture had upon Polemo is remarkable: unius orationis saluberrima medicina sanatus, ex infami ganeone maximus philosophus evasit: “He was restored by the most wholesome physic of one oration, and from an infamous debauchee became a very great philosopher.” (Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia.)

  527. Like them, who submit to their Hhakamim, “wise men,” אפילו יאמרו על ימין שהוא שמאל וכו׳: “though they should affirm a man’s right hand to be his left.” (In Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim.) Many more instances might easily be given.

  528. Not only we. Τῆς ῥινὸς ἕλκεσθαι: “To lead a man by the nose,” was used in the same sense by the Greeks.

  529. Nihil magis præstandum est, quàm ne, pecorum ritu, sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundem est, sed qua itur: “We ought to take the greatest care, not like cattle to follow the crowd that go before, and so go where others go, and not where we should go.” (Seneca, De Vita Beata.) Something may perhaps be expected in this place concerning vogue and fashion, which seem to be public declarations of some general opinion; showing how far they ought to sway with us. I think: so far as to keep us from being contemned, derided, or marked, where that may lawfully and conveniently be done; especially in respect of trifling and little matters. But further, a wise man will scarce mind them. That is a good sentence in Demophilus, Ποίει ἃ κρίνεις εἶναι καλὰ, κᾄν ποιῶν μέλλῃς ἀδοξησειν· φᾶυλος γὰρ κριτὴς καλοῦ πράγματος ὄχλος: “Do those things that you yourself judge to be right, though men may have an ill opinion of you for so doing; for the multitude are very ill judges of what is right.” (Carmen Aureum.)

  530. Ipsa virtus brevissimè recta ratio dici potest: “Virtue may briefly be called right reason.” (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations.) Quæ non aliud est quàm recta ratio: “It is nothing else but right reason.” (Seneca, Epistles.)

  531. Idem esse dicebat Socrates veritatem et virtutem: “Socrates said that virtue and truth were the same thing.” (Seneca, Epistles.)

  532. Viz. That a man cannot practice reason without practicing them.

  533. Τά τ’ ἐόντα, τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ’ ἐόντα: “The things that are, the things that will be, and the things that have been.” (Homer, Iliad.)

  534. That saying of Timotheus to Plato, with whom he had supped the night before in the Academy, should be remembered: Ὑμεῖς εὖ δειπνεῖτε⁠ ⁠… εἰς τὴν ὑστερᾶιαν⁠ ⁠… ἡμέραν: “This supper will be of great use to us tomorrow (from the conversation we have had).” (In Athenæus, Deipnosophistae.)

  535. Corpus onustum Hesternis vitiis animum quoque prægravat unà, etc.: “A body overcharged with yesterday’s vices is a load upon the mind also, etc.(Horace, Satires.)

  536. Quibus in solo vivendi causa palato est: “Who live only to please their palates.” (Juvenal, Satires.) Sic prandete commilitones tanquam apud inferos cœnaturi: “Come, fellow-soldiers, let us dine today in such a manner as if we expected to sup amongst the dead,” (Leonidas, according to Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia) may be turned to a general memento, no man knowing how near his death may be.

  537. Τί εἶδες;⁠ ⁠… καλήν; Ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα: “What is it you look upon?⁠ ⁠… a beautiful woman. Observe the rule (of right).” (Arrian, Discourses of Epictetus.)

  538. Venerem incertam rapientes, more ferarum: “Laying hold of any women they meet, like beasts.” (Horace, Satires.)

  539. In which words are comprehended naturally (Τὸ μὴ τὰς παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὰς διώκειν: “not to pursue pleasures in an unnatural way”).

  540. Not as Crates and Hipparchia (of whom see Diogenes Laërtius, Sextus Empiricus, et al.), and indeed the Cynics in general are said to have done: quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit: “who used to lie with their wives in public.” (Lactantius, De Falsa Sapientia.) Of whom, therefore, Cicero says with good reason, Cynicorum ratio [al. natio] tota est ejicienda. Est enim inimica verecundiæ, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum: “The method [some copies have it, ‘the nation’] of the Cynics ought entirely to be rejected; for they are enemies to modesty, without which nothing can be right, nothing virtuous.” (De Officiis.) אל אשתו יבא [איש] בצנעא: “A man should go in unto his wife in private.” (Judah ben Samuel, Sefer Hasidim.) That in Herodotus, Ἅμα κιθῶνι ἑκδυομένῳ συνεεδυεται τὴν ἀιδὼ γυνὴν: “that a woman should put off her modesty with her clothes,” ought not to be true (Histories). Verecundiâ naturali habent provifum lupanaria ipsa secretum: “Even public stews have a private place provided, out of natural modesty.” (St. Augustine, City of God.)

  541. Εις τὸ τῆς τύχης ἀτεκμαρτον ἀφορῶσα: “Providing for contingencies that we cannot so much as guess at.” (Philo Judaeus, De Humanitate.)

  542. Simonides was wont to say, Βουλοιμην ἂν ἀποθανὼν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς μᾶλλον άπολιπεῖν, ἢ ζᾶν δεῖσθαι τῶν φίλων: “I had rather leave something to my enemies when I die, than want friends while I am alive.” (Joannes Stobaeus, On Injustice.)

  543. Non intelligunt homines quàm magnum vectigal sit parsimonia: “Men don’t understand how great a revenue sparingness is.” (Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum.)

  544. Like them, who ἐν τῇ νεότητι τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐφόδια, προκαταναλίσκουσιν: “in their youth, devoured the provision that should have supported them in their old age,” as in Athenæus. (Deipnosophistae.)

  545. Ea liberalitate utamur, quæ prosit amicis, noceat nemini: “We should use such liberality as may be of advantage to our friends, but not to the hurt of anybody else.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  546. Non est incommodum, quale quodque⁠ ⁠… sit, ex aliis judicare: ut si quid dedeceat in aliis, vitemus et ipsi. Fit enim nescio quo modo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, quàm in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur: “It is by no means an ill way of judging of anything, by seeing how it looks in others; so that if anything is unbecoming them, we may avoid it ourselves. For I don’t know how it is, but we are apt to see faults in others more than in ourselves.” (Cicero, De Officiis.)

  547. Οἷον, ἐν δέιπνῳ προπίνει τις ἄδηνἔχοντι; μὴ δυσωπηθῇς, μηδὲ προσβιάσῃ σεαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ κατάθου τὸ ποτήριον, κ.τ.λ.: “As if, at an entertainment, anyone drinks to another that has drank enough, he ought not to be out of countenance, nor force himself, but refuse the cup.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  548. Even Epicurus himself ἀχώριστον φησὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνην: “says that it is virtue, only, that is necessarily attended with pleasure;” and διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν ἁιρεῖσθαι: “that we ought to choose virtue for the sake of such pleasure.” (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Epicurus.)

  549. Isocrates gives one reason for this, where he compares vicious pleasures with virtue. Ἐκεῖ μὲν πρῶτον ἡοθέντες, ὕστερον ἐλυπήθημεν· ἐντᾶυθα δὲ μετὰ τὰς λύπας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχομεν: “In the one case, we have the pleasure first and the uneasiness afterwards; in the other case (that of virtue) we have the uneasiness first, and the pleasure afterwards.” (Discourse to Demonicus.)

  550. Whereas virtue is ἐφόδιον πρὸς γῆρας: “like provision which will maintain us till we are old.” (Bias, in Basil’s On Greek Literature.)

  551. For who can bear such rants as that, Epicurus ait, sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, Dulce est, et ad me nihil pertinet? “Epicurus says that if a wise man were burnt alive in Phalaris’s bull, he would cry out, ‘How agreeable a thing is this, and it does not affect me at all’ ” (Seneca, Epistles)? Cicero reports the same.

  552. It is in the power of very few to act like him, qui dum varices exsecandas præberet, legere librum perseveravit: “who continued reading in a book while they were cutting swellings out of his legs,” or him, qui non desiit ridere, dum ob hoc ipsum irati tortores omnia instrumenta crudelitatis experirentur: “who continued laughing, though his tormentors, who were enraged at him for it, tried all their instruments of cruelty upon that very account.” (Seneca, Epistles.)

  553. Ει μάλα καρτερός ἐσσι, θεός που σοὶ τόγ’ ἔδωκεν: “If you are a very valiant man, yet it is the gift of God that you are so.” (Homer, Iliad.)

  554. Propter virtutem jure laudamur, et in virtute recte gloriamur. Quod non contingeret, si id donum à Deo, non à nobis haberemus: “We are justly commended upon the account of our virtue, and it is right in us to boast of our virtue; which it would not be, if it were the gift of God, and we had it not from ourselves.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.)

  555. As that word is used here. For when it is used as in that in Lucian, Ἀρετὴ μὲν σώματος ἰσχὺς: “virtue is the strength of the body,” and the like passages, it has another meaning. (The Cynic.)

  556. Καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε Νῆα: “Guide the ship on the outside of the smoke and waves.” (Homer, Odyssey.)

  557. Εἰσὶ δ’ οἳ καὶ ἐν ὀικίᾳ διατρίβοντες, τῶν σωμάτων αὐτοῖς ἢ μακραῖς νόσοις ἢ ἐπιπόνῳ γήρᾳ κατεσκελετευμένων⁠ ⁠… τὴν ἀληθῆ διαπονοῦσιν ἀνδρίαν, ἀσκηταὶ σοφίας ὄντες: “There are some that live retired in their own houses, who have their bodies reduced to mere skeletons, either by wasting diseases or laborious old age;⁠ ⁠… they, who labor for true courage, are such as exercise themselves in true wisdom.” (Philo Judaeus, De Virtutibus.) Non in viribus corporis et lacertis tantummodo fortitudinis gloria est, sed magis in virtute animi.⁠ ⁠… Jure ea fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, iram continet, nullis illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur, non adversis perturbatur, non extollitur secundis, etc.: “The true excellency of courage does not consist so much in the strength of the body and arms, as in the virtue of the mind;⁠ ⁠… that is truly called courage when a man subdues himself, keeps under his passions, is not weakened or drawn aside by any temptations, is not depressed in adversity nor puffed up in prosperity, etc.(St. Ambrose, De Officiis Ministrorum.)

  558. Qui se ipse norit, primùm aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, etc.: “He that understands what sort of a being he himself is, will find that he has something divine in him, etc.(Cicero, De Legibus.)

  559. Εἰ μήτε ἔξωθεν κινεῖται [τὸ σῶμα] ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα, μήτε φυσικῶς ὡς τὸ πῦρ, δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κινεῖται, κ.τ.λ.: “If [the body] be not moved by something external, as things inanimate are; or if it has not a natural motion, as fire has; it is manifest that it must then be moved by the soul.” (Gregory Thaumaturgus, Ad Tatianum de anima per capita disputatio.)

  560. Which is, ὡς ἐιπεῖν, οἶκός ὲστι τῶν ἀισθήσεων: “as it were, the seat of sensation.” (Artemidorus Daldianus, Oneirocritica.)

  561. Ὅπου ὁ βασιλεὺς, ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁι δορυφόροι· δορυφόροι δὲ ἀἰσθήσεις τοῦ νοῦ, περὶ κεφαλὴν οὖσαι: “Where the king is, there are his guards also; now the senses are the guards of the mind, and these are about the head.” (Philo Judaeus, Legum Allegoriarum.)

  562. Τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἄλογά ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν ὁρμὴ γένηται, σείσαντος ὥσπερ ἡνίας τοῦ λογισμοῦ, πάντα τέτακται καὶ συνῆκται καὶ ὑπακούει: “The members of the body are not endowed with reason, but as soon as any appetites arise, the reason directs them as a bridle, and all things are regulated, adjusted, and submit to it.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  563. Nos ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, quæ videmus: neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed⁠ ⁠… viæ quasi quædam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares à sede animi perforatæ. Itaque sæpe aut cogitatione aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris et oculis et auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facilè intelligi possit, animum et videre, et audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi fenestræ sunt animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat, et adsit: “We do not now see objects with our eyes; for there is no perception in the body,⁠ ⁠… but there are particular passages which go from the seat of the soul to the eyes, the ears, and the nose. Wherefore when we are very thoughtful, or when we are hindered by any violent disease, we neither see nor hear, though our eyes and ears be open and sound; whence we may easily apprehend, that it is the soul that sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as it were, the windows of the soul, and which it cannot make use of unless it be present and attends to it.” (Cicero, Epistles.)

  564. Or even detracto corpore multo: “if a great part of the body were pulled off,” as Lucretius speaks. (De Rerum Natura.)

  565. Πολλάκις καὶ τῶν χειρῶν καὶ τῶν ποδῶν ἐκκεκομμένων, ὁλόκληρος ἐκείνη [ἡ ψυχὴ] μένει: “Very often when the hands and legs are cut off, yet the soul remains entire.” (Johannes Chrysostom, De incomprehensibili dei natura.)

  566. Therefore Aristotle says, if an old man had a young man’s eye βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος. Ὥστε τὸ γῆρας, οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχήν πεπονθέναι τι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ καθάπερ ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις, κ.τ.λ.: “He would see like a young man. So that, in old age, the soul is not affected; but is in the same state, as when a man is in drink, or in any distemper.” (De Anima.)

  567. Hierocles (with others) accounts the soul to be the true man. Σὺ γὰρ εἶ ἡ ψυχή· τὸ δὲ σῶμα σόν: “It is the soul that is you, and the body that is yours.” (Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  568. So Plato uses the word Ἁυτὸς, “Self,” for the whole of the man; by which the soul, as one part of it, is called κτῆμα, “a possession.”

  569. Φάινεται ἐν ἀυτοῖς καὶ ἀλλό τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ: “It is evident that there is something else in us, beside reason, which wars against and contradicts reason.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.)

  570. Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human soul, seems to be much such another question as that in one of Seneca’s epistles, An justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia, ceteræque virtutes, animalia sint: “Whether justice, or fortitude, or prudence, and the rest of the virtues, be living creatures.” (Epistle to Lucilius.)

  571. Νοῦν οὐδὲν σῶμα γεννᾷ· τῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἀνόητα νοῦν γεννήσοι: “Nobody can produce a mind, for how can understanding come out of that which has no understanding.” (Sallustius, On the Gods and the Cosmos.)

  572. That the soul is the principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (though it wants no testimony) often said by the ancients. Φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι, καὶ μάλιστα, καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν: “Some affirm that the soul is the chief and the First mover.” (Aristotle, De Anima.) Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἔνδοθε, κινοῦν τὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀυτοκίνητον: “It is the soul that moves the body from within, and is a self-moving being.” (Simplicius.) Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως: “The principle of motion.” (Plotinus, Enneads.)

  573. Ἡ ψυχὴ περίεισι πᾶσαν γῆν, ἐη γῆς ἐπ’ οὕρανον, κ.τ.λ.: “The soul can take a view over the whole earth, and ascend from thence into heaven.” (Maximus Tyrius, Dissertations.)

  574. What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the soul is that in Lucretius (De Rerum Natura)? Ubi propellere membra, Conripere ex somno corpus, etc. videtur (Quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus, Nec tactum porro sine corpore); nonne fatendum est Corporeâ naturâ animum constare, animamque? “For do we not see that the mind moves the several members, wakes the body out of sleep, etc. (none of which can be done without touching it, and there can be no such thing as touching, without matter) must not we own then, that the soul and mind are material?” If nothing can move the body but another body, what moves this? The body might as well move itself, as be moved by one that does.

  575. Τάχιστον νοῦς· διὰ παντὸς γὰρ τρέχει: “The soul is very quick, for it runs everywhere.” (Thales, in Diogenes Laërtius’s Life of Thales.)

  576. Diogenes, though he could see the table and the pot, could not by his eyes see Plato’s τραπεβότης, και κυαθότης: “tableity or potteity;” that is, he could not see what it was that constituted them a table or a pot. (Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Diogenes.)

  577. Plato, and οἱ σοφοὶ, “the wise men,” (more generally) say that the soul indeed perceives objects of sense by the mediation of the body, but there are νοητὰ, “intellectual things,” which it does καθ’ ἁυτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, “meditate upon by itself.” (in Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Plato.)

  578. Such a soul must be indeed as Gregory Thaumaturgus has it, σῶμα ἔμψυχον. Ἄτοπον δὲ ψυχῆς ψυχὴν λέγειν: “an animated body. For it is absurd to speak of the soul of a soul.”

  579. This is worse than ψυχὴ ψυχῆς, “the soul of a soul,” in Maximus Tyrius and the place just before cited. The author of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding [John Locke] has himself exploded it, or what is very like it. “To ask,” says he, “whether the will has freedom, is to ask whether one power has another power, one ability another ability; a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute or need an answer. For who is it that sees not, that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers themselves?” There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another passage somewhere in the same book as much (or more) to my purpose, but at present I cannot find it.

  580. If the soul is only an accident (or attribute) of the body, how comes this accident to have (or be the support of) other accidents, contrary ones too? As when we say, נפש חכמה ונפש סכלה וכו׳: “a wise soul, or a foolish soul.” (Emunoth ve-Deoth.)

  581. Ἕτερον δη τότε χρώμενον καὶ ᾧ χρῆται: “For that which uses, and that which is used, are two different things.” (Plato, Alcibiades.)

  582. Or, “if to a thinking substance can be superadded the modification of solidity.” Which way of speaking, though I do not remember to have met with it anywhere, nor does it seem to differ much from the other, yet would please me better.

  583. “It is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirit, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive; those Beings, that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both.” (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.)

  584. This is Socrates’s argument in Plato. The soul is altogether ἀδιάλυτος, “indissolvible,” and therefore ἀνώλεθρος, “cannot be destroyed.” (Phaedo.) Which Cicero interprets thus: nec discerpi, nec distrahi potest; nec interire igitur: “it can neither be divided nor separated into parts, and consequently cannot be destroyed.” (Tusculan Disputations.)

  585. Lucretius seems to be aware of this. Jam triplex animi est natura reperta: Nec tamen hæc sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum, etc. Quarta quoque his igitur quædam natura necesse est Atribuatur: ea est omnino nominis expers: “The soul is found to be made up of three parts, nor are all these sufficient to produce understanding, etc. It is necessary therefore that some other particular fourth nature should be added to these: and this we have no name at all for.” (De Rerum Natura.)

  586. If Lucan, by sensus, “sense,” means all manner of apprehension and knowledge, there is no room for that disjunction: Aut nihil est sensûs animis à morte relictum, Aut mors ipsa nihil: “Either there remains no sense at all in the soul after death, or death itself is nothing.” (Pharsalia.) For if the former part be true, the other will follow.

  587. Velut è diutino carcere emissus [animus]: “[The soul] is, as it were, let out of a prison, in which it has been a long while.” (Seneca, De Consolatione ad Polybium.)

  588. Those kinds of animals which do not speak, do not reason: but those which do the one, do the other. Therefore, הי מדבר, “a living,” (or Arabic נאטק, “a speaking animal”) is a rational animal: and λόγος signifies both “speech” and “reason,” as going together.

  589. Θυρίδες γὰρ ὄντως τῆς ψυχῆς ἁι ἀισθήσεις: “The senses are the windows of the soul.” (Basil, De Virginitate.)

  590. Ἄσαρκος καὶ ἀσώματος ἐν τῷ τοῦ παντὸς θεάτρῳ διημερεύουσα: “When it shall dwell upon the stage of the universe, without flesh and without a body.” (Philo Judaeus, De Gigantibus.)

  591. So Hierocles distinguishes τὸ ἀυγοειδὲς ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὁ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα: “our glorious body, and the thin vehicle of the soul,” from that which he calls τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν σῶμα, “our mortal body,” and to which the former communicates life. Τῶ ἀυγοειδεῖ ἡμῶν σῶματι προσέφυ σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν: “The mortal and the glorious body adhere to, and grow up with, each other.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.) This fine body he calls also ψυχικὸν σῶμα, “a living body,” and πνευματικὸν ὄχημα, “a spiritual vehicle.” In Nishmat Hayyim, there is much concerning that “fine body” in which the soul is clothed, and from which it is never to be separated, according to an old tradition. Menasseh Ben Israel gives the sum of it in such words as these: יש גוף דק עד מאד בו מתלבש הנשמה טרם ביאה לעולם: “There is a very thin, fine body, with which the soul is clothed before it comes into the world,” and afterward, הנשמות המה בבריאתם הראשונה נקשרות עם גשמים דקים רוחניים מהטבע השמימי בלתי מושגים לחוש הראות. והנשמות לא יתפרדו מאותם הגשמים הדקים הרוחניים כל ימי עולם אם קודם בואם לגוף ואם בהיותם עמו וגם אחרר הפרדם ממנו: “These souls, at their first creation, were joined with some thin, spiritual, and celestial bodies, which cannot be perceived by our eyes. Neither can these thin, spiritual bodies be separated from those souls so long as the world lasts, neither before they came into this (gross) body, nor while they remain in it, nor after they are separated from it.” Saadya long before him joins to the soul עצם דק, “a thin substance,” which he says is דק [יותר זך] מן חגלגלים: “thinner than the ether in the skies,” etc.

  592. Cùm corpora quotidie nostra fluant, et aut crescant aut descrescant, ergo tot erimus homines, quot quotidie commutamur? qut alius fui, cùm decem annorum essem; alius, cùm triginta; alius cùm quinquaginta, alius, cùm jam toto cano capite sum? “Because our bodies are continually altering, and either increasing or diminishing, shall we therefore be as many different men, as we undergo perpetual changes? Or was I one person when I was ten years old, another when I was thirty, another when I was fifty, and another now I am grey-headed.” (St. Jerome, Epistles.) So it must be, if our souls are nothing different from our bodies.

  593. I would say the egoity remains, that is, that by which I am the same as I was; Cicero has his Lentulitas, “Lentulity,” and Appietas, “Appiety,” that is, that by which Lentulus remained Lentulus and Appius remained Appius in the same form, though not just the like sense. (Letters to Friends.)

  594. That passage in Sefer ha-Ikkarim imports much the same thing that has been said here: הוא מבואר שהדבר שמציאותו טוב ראוי שימצא והדבר שמציאותו רע אין ראוי שימצא ומה שמציאותו מעורב מן הטוב והרע אם הטוב הוא הגובר ראוי שימצא ואם הרע הוא הגובר אין ראוי שימצא: “This is manifest, that that thing whose existence is good, ought to exist; and that thing whose existence is evil, ought not to exist; and if the existence of anything is made up of a mixture of good and evil, if the good prevail, it ought to exist, and if the evil prevail, it ought not to exist.”

  595. C. Caesar⁠ ⁠… Senatores et Equites⁠ ⁠… cecidit, torsit, non quæstionis, sed animi causâ. Deinde quosdam ex illis⁠ ⁠… ad lucernam decollabat.⁠ ⁠… Torserat per omnia, quæ in rerum natura tristissima sunt, fidiculis, etc.: “Gaius Caesar⁠ ⁠… the Senators and the Knights⁠ ⁠… killed and put to the rack (a great many), not in order to find out the truth, but for their own pleasure only. Afterwards, he cut off the heads of some⁠ ⁠… by candlelight⁠ ⁠… tormented others, by all the most cruel tortures that could be thought of in nature; stretched them with cords, etc.(Seneca, De Ira.) Homo, sacra res, jam per lusum et jocum occiditur: “A man, who is a divine creature, is slain out of sport and jest.” (Ibid.)

  596. Slaves were reckoned among beasts of old: Οὔτε γὰρ γυνὴ ὴέφυκας, οὔτ ἐν ἀνδράσι σύγ εἶ: “For you are not really a woman, nor are you to be reckoned of human race.” (Euripides, Orestes.) And sometimes as mere instruments and tools: Ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον· τὸ δ’ ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος: “For a slave is a living instrument, and an instrument is a lifeless slave.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.) Their sad condition I will set down in Plato’s words: Οὐκ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ’ ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀνδραπόδου τινὸς, ᾧ κρεῖττόν τεθνάναι ἐστιν ἢ ζῆν· ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος, μὴ οἷός ἐστιν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὗ ἂν κήδηται: “To be injured is not the suffering of a man but of a slave, to whom death is better than life: who, if he be unjustly treated and abused, is wholly unable to help himself, and nobody else has any concern for him.” (Gorgias.)

  597. Those ἄῤῥητοι καὶ ἄπιστοι δυστυχίαι, “unspeakable and incredible calamities,” which the τελῶναι, “collectors of the taxes,” had brought upon the cities of Asia, are too many to be transcribed: but some account of them is to be seen in Plutarch’s Life of Lucullus which may serve for one instance out of thousands. It may be reckoned madness, indeed, maximas virtutes, quasi gravissima delicta, punire: “to punish the greatest virtues as if they were the greatest crimes,” as Valerius Maximus says, speaking of Phocion’s case (Facta et dicta memorabilia): but such madness has been very common, and men have suffered even for their virtue. Ochus cruelly put to death, Ocham sororem⁠ ⁠… , et patruum cum centum ampliùs filiis ac nepotibus⁠ ⁠… , nulla injuria lacessitus, sed quòd in his maximam apud Persas probitatis et fortitudinis laudem consistere videbat: “his sister Ocha⁠ ⁠… , and his uncle with a hundred of his sons and grandsons⁠ ⁠… , without being provoked by any injury, but only because he saw that they were in great reputation amongst the Persians for probity and valor.” (Ibid.) And Seneca, having recommended the example of Græcinus Julius (Julius Græcinus, according to Tacitus, the father of Julius Agricola), adds quem C. Caesar occidit ob hoc unum, quòd melior vir erat, quàm esse quemquam tyranno expediret: “whom Gaius Caesar killed for this reason only: because he was a better man than it was expedient for a tyrant that any man should be.” (De Beneficiis.)

  598. Οἱ ἀδίκοις διαβολαῖς περιπεσόντας, καὶ διὰ θυμὸν εἰς φυλακὰς παραδεδομένοι, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτοὶ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ μετὰ πάσης συγγενείας: “Some fell, either by false accusations, or they were arbitrarily delivered up to prison, sometimes themselves only, and sometimes all their relations with them.” (Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica.)

  599. Mentioned by Cicero with Phalaris. He was tyrant of Cassandria, and is represented (out of Polyænus, Stratagems in War) as φονικώτατος καὶ ὠμότατος πάντων, ὅσοι παρ’ Ἕλλησιν ἢ παρὰ βαρβάροις ἐτυράννησαν: “the bloodiest and most cruel of all the tyrants that ever reigned in Greece, or amongst the Barbarians.” Yet Ælian says, Ἐκ τοῦ οἴνου ὑπαναφλεγόμεεος καὶ ὁπεξαπτόμενος, ἐγίνετο φονικώτερος, κ.τ.λ.: “That, when he was heated and inflamed with wine, then he was still more bloody.” (Varia Historia.)

  600. It is said of Sylla’s peace, after Marius’s party were broken, Pax cum bello de crudelitate certavit, et vicit: “That the peace rivalled the war in cruelty, and overcame it.” (St. Augustine, The City of God.)

  601. Qui ita evisceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deessent, implorans cœlo justitiam, torvùm renidens fundato pectore mansit immobilis, etc.: “Whose bowels were torn out, in such a manner that they wanted members to torment; he called upon heaven for justice, and looking sternly with a calm countenance, he continued unmoved by his firm resolution, etc.(Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae.) In the reign of Constantius.

  602. Mœrebantque docti quidam, quòd apud Atlanteos nati non essent, ubi memorantur somnia non videri: “Some learned men were very sorry that they were not born amongst the Atlantes, of whom it is reported that they never dream.” (Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae.)

  603. See Plutarch in The Life of Artaxerxes.

  604. Ob noxam unius omnis propinquitas perit: “All the whole neighborhood perished for the fault of one single person.” (Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae.)

  605. Scaphism (Editor’s note.)

  606. Dies deficiet, si velim numerare, quibus bonis malè evenerit: nec minùs, si commemorem, quibus improbis optimè: “The day would not hold out, if I should undertake to enumerate all the good men whom evil befell; nor would it, if I should reckon up all the wicked men that have fared best of all.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum.) This is justly said; though I account his instances not the most apposite.

  607. Yet, according to Aristotle, he cannot be happy for all that. His opinion Diogenes Laërtius represents thus: τὴν ἀρετὴν μὴ εἶναι αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν· προσδεῖσθαι γὰρ τῶν τε περὶ σῶμα καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν⁠ ⁠… τὴν μέν τοι κακίαν αὐτάρκη πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν, κᾂν ὅτι μάλιστα παρῇ αὐτῇ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ σῶμα: “Virtue is not alone sufficient to produce happiness, because external good things and things relating to the body are also necessary⁠ ⁠… but vice is of itself sufficient to produce misery, and especially if external good things and the things relating to the body are joined with it.” (Life of Aristotle.)

  608. Et vacet annales nostrorum audire laborum: “And it may be of use to hear a catalogue of our misfortunes.” (Virgil, Aeneid.) For, as Seneca says, Nulli contigit impunè nasci: “No man is born free of them.” (De Consolatione ad Marciam.)

  609. Ὅιηπερ φύλλων γενεὴ, τοιήδε καὶ ἀνδρῶν⁠ ⁠… ἡ μὲν φύει, ἡ δ’ ἀπολήγει: “The life of man is like the leaves of trees;⁠ ⁠… some spring forth, and others wither.” (Homer, Iliad.) This is true not only of single men, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may say the same concerning many of them, that Florus says of Veii: Laborat annalium fides, ut Veios fuisse credamus: “The credit of history is not quite sufficient to convince us that there ever was any such city as Veii.” (Epitome Rerum Romanarum.)

  610. Labor voluptasque; dissimillima naturâ, societate quadam inter se naturali sunt juncta: “Pain and pleasure, though in the nature of things the most unlike each other, yet are united by some natural bond.” (Livy, Ab Urbe Condita Libri.)

  611. Sensible of this, Socrates used to say, δεῖν τὰς ἡδονὰς, μὴ παρ’ ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἡμῶν θηρᾶσθαι: “We ought to seek pleasures from ourselves, and not from others.” (Joannes Stobaeus, On Education.)

  612. Senex, et levissimis quoque; curis impar: “I am an old man, and unequal to the smallest cares:” as Seneca, of himself, in Tacitus. (Annals.)

  613. Rogus aspiciendus amatæ Conjugis, etc.: “You must see the funeral pile of your beloved Wife.” (Juvenal, Satires.)

  614. Σμίκρα παλαὶα σώματ’ ἐυνάζει ῥοπή: “A small matter will push an old man into his grave.” (Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus.)

  615. Πάντες ἐτμὶν ἐν ὁδῷ⁠ ⁠… ἰδες ἐπὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ φυτὸν ἢ πόαν ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ὅ, τι ἂν τύχῃ τῶν ἀξίων θεάματος· μικρὸν ἐτέρφθης; εἶτα παρέδραμες· πάλιν ἐνέτυχες λίθοις καὶ φάραγξι καὶ κρημνοῖς καὶ σκοπέλοις, ἤ που καὶ θηρίοις, κ.τ.λ.: “We are all upon a road.⁠ ⁠… When you see upon the road plants, and herbs, and water, and whatever else happens to be worth seeing there, are you not a little delighted with it? Then you go on, and meet with stones, and valleys, and precipices, and rocks, and sometimes with wild beasts. Life is very like this.” (Basil, Homilae super Psalmos.)

  616. Non mehercule quisquam accepisset [vitiam], nisi daretur insciis: “Truly nobody would accept of [life], if it was not given them when they did not know it.” (Seneca, De Consolatione ad Marciam.)

  617. Paulisper te crede subduci in montis ardui verticem celsiorem; speculare inde rerum infra te jacentium facies; et oculis in diversa porrectis, fluctuantis munti turbines intuere. Jam seculi et ipse miseraberis, etc.: “Imagine yourself to be removed to the top of some very high mountain, and see how the things that are below you look; and turning your eyes every way, behold the trouble of a stormy world. And then you will take pity on the inhabitants, etc.(St. Cyprian, Ad Donatum.)

  618. העולם הזה דומה לפרוזדור בפני: “This world is only like a porch to the world to come.” (Mishnah, Abot IV, 21.)

  619. O si possis in illa sublimi specula constitutus oculos tuos inserere secretis, revludere cubiculorum obductas fores, et ad conscientiam luminum penetralia occulta reserare, etc.: “O that, when you are placed upon the top of that high tower, you could cast your eyes into the secret places, and unbar the doors of bedchambers, and lay open their secret recesses to the discovery of the light, etc.(St. Cyprian, Ad Donatum.)

  620. By any means, proper or improper. (Editor’s note.)

  621. Besides, there being no satiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportunities when our faculties shall be exalted, etc. Τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ θέας τοῦ ὄντος οὐδεὶς ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἐρώντων ἐνέπλησεν ἑαυτὸν ἱκανῶς, κ.τ.λ.: “They who are desirous of truth, and of seeing things as they really are, can never be fully satisfied here.” (Plutarch, Moralia.)

  622. In Tusculan Disputations. (“Pherecydes the Syrian is the first on record who said that the souls of men were immortal.”)

  623. “Nature silently asserts the truth of the immortality of the soul,” “there is, I know not how, deeply rooted in the minds of men the premonition of a future state,” and “the consent of all nations induces us to believe that our souls survive.” (Editor’s note.)

  624. Methinks those philosophers make but an odd appearance in story, who, looking big and fastuous, at the same time professed that their own souls were not superior to those of gnats, etc. ὁι τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνεσπακότες μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν διαφέρειν ἀπεφήναντο ἐμπίδος τε καὶ ἐυλῆς, καὶ μύιας,⁠ ⁠… καὶ συὸς ψυΧῆς⁠ ⁠… τὴν σφῶν ἀυτῶν φιλοσοφωτάτων ψυχὴν: “These men, who are so swelled with pride, affirm that, as to the substance, there is no difference betwixt the soul of a philosopher, and that of a gnat, or a worm, or a fly,⁠ ⁠… or the soul of a hog.” (As Eusebius, Demonstratio Evangelica.)

  625. Alexander, after death, might be in the same state with his muletier (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations), but sure not with his mule.

  626. Brevis est hic fructus homullis: “this is the short-lived pleasure of frail man.” (De Rerum Natura), may be justly said for all Lucretius.

  627. Ὁ κόσμος σκηνὴ, ὁ βιος πάροδός ἦλθες, εἶδες, ἀπῆλθες: “This world is a stage, life is the play; we come on, look about us, and go off again.” (Democritus, Fragments.)

  628. את צנועים חכמה: “Wisdom is in modest men.” (Proverbs 11:2.)

  629. Hic pietatis honos? “Is this reward of piety?” (Virgil, Aeneid.)

  630. Feræ pericula, quæ vident, fugiunt: cum effugere, secura sunt, etc.: “Wild beasts, when they see any dangers, avoid them; and, after they have avoided them, they look no further, etc.(Seneca, Epistles.)

  631. לא יצטערו בהיוום משערים שסופם למות כאדם וכו׳: “They are not uneasy, as men are, while they are alive, imagining that the end of them is to die.” (Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim.)

  632. Sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio, cùm⁠ ⁠… semper agitetur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat; ne finem quidem habiturum esse motus, quia nunquam se ipse sit relicturus: “I do verily believe, it is my real opinion, that because⁠ ⁠… the soul is always in action, and has not any (external) cause of its motion, because it moves itself, therefore neither will it ever have any end of its motion, because it will never desert itself.” (Cicero, Cato Maior de Senectute.) That in Gregory Thaumaturgus is like this thought of Cicero: Ἡ ψυχη, ἀυτοκίνητος ουσα, οὐδέποτε τοῦ εἶναι διαλείπει· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ ἀυτοκινήτῳ τὸ ἀεὶ κινητὸν εἶναι· Τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κινητὸν ἄπαυστόν ἔστι, κ.τ.λ.: “The soul, because it is able to move itself, can never cease to be; for it is a necessary consequence of self-motion to be always in motion, and what is always in motion cannot cease to move.” (Ad Tatianum de anima per capita disputatio.) But that in St. Augustine comes something nearer to my meaning: Est animus vita quædam, unde omne quod animatum est vivit⁠ ⁠… Non ergo potest animus mori. Nam si carere poterit vita, non animus sed animatum aliquid est: “The soul is a sort of life, whence it follows that everything which has a soul is alive;⁠ ⁠… wherefore the soul cannot die, for, if it could be without life, it would not be a soul but something with a soul.” (De Immortalitate Animæ.)

  633. “Self-taught.” (Editor’s note.)

  634. The transmigration of souls has been much talked of, but ea sententia,⁠ ⁠… quoniam ridicula et mimo dignior quàm scholâ, ne refelli quidem feriò debet; quod qui facit, videtur vereri, ne quis id credat: “that opinion⁠ ⁠… is so ridiculous, that it is fitter for the stage than the schools, and therefore ought not seriously to be confuted; and he who attempts it, seems to be afraid that nobody should believe it.” So Lactantius (Divine Institutes). Indeed, who can but laugh when he reads in Lucian of Homer’s having been a camel in Bactria, etc. (Gallus.)

  635. Χωρεῖν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον: “For, of necessity, like things must go to each other.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  636. Ex humili atque depresso in eum emicabit locum, quisquis ille est, qui solutas vinculis animas beato recipit sinu: “It will mount up, from this low mean place into that, whatever it be, which receives those souls that are freed from their imprisonment into its happy bosom.” (Seneca, De Consolatione ad Polybium.) Ἡ τῆς θνητῆς προσπαθειας άπιβολὴ, καὶ ὴ τῶν ἀρετῶν, οἷον πτερῶν τινων, ἔκφυσις πρὸς τὸν τῶν καλῶν καθαρὸν τόπον, ἐις τὴν θείαν ἐυζωἷαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει: “The putting off these human affections, and putting on virtues as so many wings, will carry us to that pure region of virtue where we shall live a divine life.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  637. Depositâ sarcinâ, levior volavit ad cœlum: “Having laid down our burden, we shall fly the lighter to heaven.” (St. Jerome, Epistles.)

  638. The Jews, who generally say that by the practice of religion the soul acquires perfection and life eternal, lay such a stress upon habits of piety, that Rabbi Albo makes the effect of giving 1,000 zuzin, “pence” in charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one zuz, “penny,” and repeating it 1,000 times, התמדת עשיית פעל אחד בעצמו יקנה מדרגה יותר גדולה מעשיית הפעל ההוא פעם אהת: “The continuing to repeat the doing of a thing will procure a higher degree (of reward) than the doing the whole at once.” (Sefer ha-Ikkarim.)

  639. כל עושה מצות הבורא יתברך ימצא שכל טוב⁠ ⁠… והגמול הנמשך אחר השכל האמיתי הוא השארת הנפש אחר כלות הגוף והדבקו בשכל הפועל והיותו קים לעד: “He that does the commandment of the Creator shall be blessed; he shall find good understanding⁠ ⁠… and that reward which follows good understanding, is that the soul shall continue after the body is consumed, and shall be united to the understanding of its Maker, and be established to eternity.” (Is. Levi.)

  640. Τόπους προσήκοντας τῇ ἀρετῇ: “Places fitted for virtue.” (Plato, Epinomis.)

  641. With an equal or impartial regard to every man’s deserts: equitably.

  642. “Spiritual body.” (Editor’s note.)

  643. Ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν Ἀυτόματοι ἀγαθὸι: “Good men, when left to their own liberty, go to those entertainments where good men are.” (Plato, Symposium.)

  644. Οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς or οἱ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι: “they who rightly philosophize,” or, “they who are truly philosophers,” in Plato’s style. (Phaedo.)

  645. Τελευτήσαντας ἀυτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὑτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσι, κακὸι κακοῖς συνόντες: “That place, in which there are no evils, will not receive them (the wicked) but they shall be with one another, and continue forever to lead the same sort of life that they led here.” (Plato, Theaetetus.)

  646. Εἰ πλέον τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων κολάβεται [ὁ δίκαιος], προθήκη δικαιοσύνης ἀυτῷ λογίβεται: “If [a good man] be punished [here] beyond what his sins deserve, all that is above what he justly deserves shall be accounted for to him.” (Johannes Chrysostom.)

  647. Sure those arguments in Lucretius can convince nobody, Nunc quoniam, quassatis undique vasis, Diffluere humorem, et laticem discedere cernis⁠ ⁠… Crede animam quoque diffundi, etc.: “For we see that as soon as the vessel is broken in pieces, the liquor runs all about; so the soul likewise will be dissipated, etc.” And Præterea gigni pariter cum corpore et unà Crescere sentimus, pariterque senescere mentem, etc. Quare animum quoque dissolvi fateare necesse est; Quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi: “Further we see that the soul and the body are produced together, and increase and grow old together also, etc. Wherefore we cannot but own that the soul must be dissolved, for the contagion of the disease reaches to it.” (De Rerum Natura.) Nor those in Pliny (Naturalis Historia 6. 55): if there really are any at all. For to plead the antegenitale experimentum (“argument drawn from what we were before we were born”), is to beg the question, which may be put thus: Whether we shall after death be more conscious of our existence than we were before we were born. And if Dicæarchus’s Lesbiaci were extant, I believe we should find nothing stranger in them. The truth seems to be Οὐ βούλεται ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν ἁυτοῦ ψυχήν: “That a wicked man does not desire that his soul should be immortal,” but he comforts himself with this thought, that ἡ μετὰ θάνατον οὐδένεια ἑαυτοῦ: “the being nothing after death” will prevent future sufferings. This is εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι καταφυγή: “to have recourse to nonexistence.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  648. Nor that the soul still exists ἔρημον καταλιποῦσα ζωῆς τὸν ἡμέτερον οἶκον: “having left the house, in which it lived, desolate.” (Philo Judaeus, De cherubim.) Domus ab habitatore deserta dilabitur:⁠ ⁠… et corpus, relictum ab anima, defluit: “A house that is forsaken by the inhabitants becomes ruinous:⁠ ⁠… and a body, after it is forsaken by the soul, decays.” (Lactantius, Divine Institutes.)

  649. Μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν [ἀρετὴν], καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ’ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι, Ῥηιδίη δ’ ἤπειτα πέλει: “The way to virtue is long and steep, and very rugged at first; but, after you are come at the top, it then becomes easy.” (Hesiod, Works and Days.)

  650. Cœlo præfertur Adonis: “Adonis is preferred to heaven.” (Ovid, Metamorphoses.)

  651. Ὁ ἀρετῇ διαπρέπων καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀμεταμελήτους καρποῦται: “He who excels in virtue, reaps pleasures that can never be repented of.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  652. If the soul was mortal, yet the virtuous man τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελειότητα ἀπολαμβάνων, τὸ ὀικεῖον καρπούμενος ἀγαθὸν, εὐδαίμων ὄντως ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κ.τ.λ.: “becomes as perfect as he can be, reaps his own proper good, being truly blessed and happy: and the body also, etc.(Simplicius, Commentary on the Enchiridion.)

  653. Ὥστε μὴ μόνον τῷ καλῷ περιεῖναι τὸν σπουδαῖον τοῦ φάυλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀυτῇ τῇ ἡδονῇ νικᾷν, δἰ ἣν μόνην δοκεῖ εἰς κακίαν ὁ φᾶυλος ὑπάγεσθαι: “So that a good man excels a bad man not only in goodness, but he exceeds him in pleasure also, by which alone the bad man was led to be wicked.” (Hierocles, Commentary on the Carmen Aureum.)

  654. Οἱ γὰρ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλεονεκτοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐλπίσι γε σπουδαίαις ὑπερέχουσιν: “If the righteous do not excel the wicked in anything else, yet they do in their expectations of happiness.” (Isocrates, Demonicus.)

  655. Τρόπος γὰρ Θεοῦ θεραπείας ὗτος ὁσιώτατος [ἀσκεῖν ἀρετήν]: “For [to practice virtue] is the most sacred manner of worshipping God.” (Josephus, Against Apion.)

  656. Some more were added in the second impression.

  657. Nothing more was intended at first.

  658. However, “W. B.” in Notes and Queries (#61, 27 February 1875) writes: “Though obliged to grope in the dark, through not having the works of Maimonides at hand, I venture to dissent from the interpretation given by Dr. Clarke⁠ ⁠… Instead of supposing, as he seems to have done, that the right-hand group of letters are the initials of the word Mi cha el, which compose the name Michael and signify ‘Who [is] like God?’ I take them to represent Mah cha emeth, substituting emeth for el, and to mean ‘What [is] like truth?’ In the left-hand group I take the first two characters (from right to left) to be an abbreviation for the personal pronoun othah⁠ ⁠… and the remaining letter to represent the verb lachad, to seize, lay hold of. The two mysterious Hebrew words would thus mean, ‘What is like truth? On her fix thy hold’⁠ ⁠…” (Editor’s note.)