The New State - Endnotes

Endnotes

See William McDougall, Social Psychology. ↩
Probably by no means a group, but tending in some instances in that direction, as in the discussion or conference dinners now so common. ↩
The old definition of the word social has been a tremendous drag on politics. Social policies are not policies for the good of the people but policies created by the people, etc. etc. We read in the work of a continental sociologist, “When a social will is born in the brain of a man,” but a social will never is born in the brain of a man. ↩
This is essentially the process by which sovereignty is created. Therefore chapters II⁠–⁠VI on The Group Process are the basis of the conception of sovereignty given in part III and of the relation of that conception to the politics of reconstruction. ↩
This is the heart of the latest ethical teaching based on the most progressive psychology: between two apparently conflicting courses of action, a and b, a is not to be followed and b suppressed, nor b followed and a suppressed, nor must a compromise between the two be sought, but the process must always be one of integration. Our progress is measured by our ability to proceed from integration to integration. ↩
This statement may be misunderstood unless there is borne in mind at the same time: (1) the necessity for the keenest individual thinking as the basis of group thinking, and (2) that every man should maintain his point of view until it has found its place in the group thought, that is, until he has been neither overruled nor absorbed but integrated. ↩
We must not of course confuse the type of unifying spoken of here (an integration), which is a psychological process, with the “reconciliation of opposites,” which is a logical process. ↩
I am sometimes told that mine is a counsel of perfection only to be realized in the millennium, but we cannot take even the first step until we have chosen our path. ↩
The break in the English Cabinet in 1915, which led to the coalition Cabinet, came when both Kitchener and Churchill tried to substitute individual for group action. ↩
Free speech is not an “individual” right; society needs every man’s difference. ↩
It has been overemphasized in two ways: first, many of the writers on imitation ignore the fact that the other law of association, that of interpenetrating, is also in operation in our social life, as well as the fact that it has always been the fundamental law of existence; secondly, they speak as if it were necessary for human beings to be under the law of imitation, not that it is merely a stage in our development. ↩
This is the alpha and omega of philosophical teaching: Heraclitus said, “Nature desires eagerly opposites and out of them it completes its harmony, not out of similars.” And James, twenty-four hundred years later, has given his testimony that the process of life is to “compenetrate.” ↩
Also the group-units of early societies are studied to the exclusion of group-units within modern complex society. ↩
Even some of our most advanced thinking, which repudiates the like-minded theory and takes pains to prove that imitation is not an instinct, nevertheless falls into some of the errors implicit in the imitation theory. ↩
When we come in part III to consider the group process in relation to certain political methods now being proposed, we shall find that part of the present disagreement of opinion is verbal. I therefore give here a list of words which can be used to describe the genuine social process and a list which gives exactly the wrong idea of it. Good words: integrate, interpenetrate, interpermeate, compenetrate, compound, harmonize, correlate, coordinate, interweave, reciprocally relate or adapt or adjust, etc. Bad words: fuse, melt, amalgamate, assimilate, weld, dissolve, absorb, reconcile (if used in Hegelian sense), etc. ↩
This does not, however, put us with those biologists who make conscience a “gregarious instinct” and⁠—would seem to be willing to keep it there. This is the insidious herd fallacy which crops up constantly in every kind of place. We may today partake largely of the nature of the herd, our conscience may be to some extent a herd conscience, but such is not the end of man for it is not the true nature of man⁠—man does not find his expression in the herd. ↩
To a misunderstanding of this point are due some of the fallacies of the political pluralists (see chapter XXXII). ↩
See here. ↩
This view of purpose is not necessarily antagonistic to the “interest” school of sociology, but we may perhaps look forward to a new and deeper analysis of self-interest. And the view here put forward is not incompatible with the “objective” theory of association (see chapter XXIX) nor with the teleological school of jurisprudence (see chapter XV), it merely emphasizes another point of view⁠—a point of view which tends to synthesize the “subjective” and “objective” theories of law. But those jurists who say that a group is governed by its purpose and leave the matter there are making a thing-in-itself of the purpose; we are governed by the purpose, yes, but we are all the time evolving the purpose. Modern jurists wish a dynamic theory of law⁠—only such a conception of purpose as is revealed by group psychology will give value to a teleological school of jurisprudence. ↩
In a relation even of two I am not faithful to the other person but to my conception of the relation in the whole. Loyalty is always to the group idea not to the group-personnel. This must change our idea of patriotism. ↩
See chapter XV, “From Contract to Community.” ↩
This is the principle of the vote in a democracy (see chapter XXI). This must not, however, be confused with the old Hegelianism (see chapter XXIX on “Sovereignty”). ↩
In art this is what impressionism has meant. In the era before impressionism art was in a static phase, that is, artists were working at fixed relations. The “balance” of modern artists does not suggest fixedness, but relation subject directly to the laws of the whole. ↩
I speak of it as later because the biological analogy was different from the organism of medieval doctrine. ↩
See chapter XXX, “Political Pluralism and Functionalism.” ↩
See here. ↩
See chapter XXI. I have been told that the distinction between the organic and the psychic theory of society is merely academic. But no one should frame amendments on the initiative and referendum without this distinction; no one without it can judge wisely the various schemes now being proposed for occupational representation⁠—something every one of us will have soon to do. ↩
It must be remembered, however, that these welfare arrangements are often accompanied by truly social motives, and experiments looking towards a more democratic organization of industries. ↩
A good example of the crowd fallacy is the syndicalist theory that the vote should be taken in a meeting of strikers not by ballot but by acclamation or show of hands. The idea is that in an open meeting enthusiasm passes from one to another and that, therefore, you can thus get the collective will which you could not get by every man voting one by one. ↩
It is unfortunate to be obliged to treat this important point with such brevity. ↩
The expressions “mutual aid” and “animal cooperation” have, however, a slightly misleading connotation; mutual adaptation, coordinated activities, come nearer the truth. It is confusing to take the words and phrases we use of men in the conscious stage and transfer them to the world of animals in the unconscious stage. ↩
It is because of this profound truth that we must always respect conservatism. ↩
The claim of the individual to a larger share in government and to a share in the control of industry will be taken up in later chapters. ↩
Ce que Nait is the title of a volume of poems by Arcos, and that which is being born through all the activity of our common life is God. It is of the “naissance” and “croissance” of God that Arcos loves to sing. ↩
I have said that we gain creative power through the group. Those who feel enthralled by material conditions, and to whom it seems an irony to be told that they are “creators,” will demand something more specific. Concrete methods of group organization are given in part III. ↩
It is interesting to notice that Miss Lathrop’s whole conception of the Children’s Bureau is that it is to fit children into the life of the community. ↩
See Appendix. ↩
The new farm industrial system which is to replace Sing Sing is founded largely on the community idea. ↩
France, Norway, Switzerland. In Norway it is said that more then three-quarters of the cases which come before the conciliation courts are settled without lawsuits. ↩
Experiences in Cooperative Competition, by W. V. Spaulding. ↩
The great value of Robert Valentine’s work consisted in his recognition of this fact. ↩
I am speaking in general. It is true that the history of cases settled by arbitration reveals many in which the “umpire” has insisted that negotiations continue until the real coincident interest of both sides should be discovered. ↩
It has long been known in England and America but recently it has been spreading rapidly. ↩
Recently abandoned. ↩
The three firms which have carried co-management furthest are the Printz-Biederman Co. of Cleveland, the Wm. Filene’s Sons Co. of Boston and the U.S. Cartridge Co. of Lowell. See Report of Committee on Vocational Guidance, Fourth Annual Convention of National Association of Corporation Schools, by Henry C. Metcalf. ↩
We have a number of minor instances of the recognition of the group principle in industry. An interesting example is the shop piecework in the Cadbury works, where the wages are calculated on the output of a whole workroom, and thus everyone in the room has to suffer for the laziness of one. (See Experiments in Industrial Organization, by Edward Cadbury.) ↩
I have not spoken of the cooperative buying and selling movement because by the name alone it is obvious how well it illustrates my point, and also because it is so well known to everyone.

Another evidence of the spreading of the community idea is the wide acceptance of the right of the community to value created by the community. ↩
Columbia Law Review 8, 610. ↩
Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence, p. 20. The influence of sociology on law has here been very marked. For further discussion of a teleological jurisprudence, see chapter XXIX. ↩
Duguit, L’État, Le Droit Objectif et La Loi Positive, 398⁠–⁠409, from Jellinek, System der subjektiren öffentlichen Rechte, 193. ↩
The whole legal history of associations and the development of association law throws much light on the growth of the community idea. ↩
Also, I recognize, because his “droit objectif” based on social solidarity tends to sweep away contract. It is interesting to notice that contract is being attacked from more than one point of view. The bearing of all this on politics will be seen later, especially in chapter XXIX, “Political Pluralism and Sovereignty.” ↩
Quoted by Roscoe Pound in Columbia Law Review 8, 616. ↩
Statutes limiting the hours of labor were held unconstitutional, railway corporations were held not to be required to furnish discharged employees with a cause for dismissal, etc. ↩
Harlan, J., in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623. Taken from Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, Yale Law Journal, 18, 468. ↩
“The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrine,” Harvard Law Review 27, 195⁠–⁠234. ↩
“Statutes⁠ ⁠… have taken many features of the subject out of the domain of agreement and the tendency of judicial decision has been in effect to attach rights and liabilities to the relation of insurer and insured and thus to remove insurance from the category of contract.” ↩
The old idea of “contributory negligence” is seen in the following decision: “We must remember that the injury complained of is due to the negligence of a fellow workman, for which the master is responsible neither in law nor morals.” Durkin v. Coal Co. 171, Pa. St. 193, 205. Quoted by Roscoe Pound in Yale Law Journal, 18, 467. ↩
This is the “new natural law” of which Mr. Pound speaks as “the revival of the idealist interpretation which is the enduring possession of philosophical jurisprudence.” Formerly, we are told, “equity imposed moral limitations. The law today is beginning to impose social limitations.” Harvard Law Review 27, 227. ↩
“The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes,” by Felix Frankfurter, Harvard Law Review 29, 683⁠–⁠702. ↩
Quoted by Roscoe Pound in Harvard Law Review 25, 505. ↩
It has been proposed that we should have trained business men on the benches of our supreme courts as well as lawyers. I should think it would be better for our lawyers to be so conversant with social facts that this need not be necessary. ↩
See chapter XXIX for the theory of “objective rights” now held by many as the basis of the new state. ↩
This is a hoary quarrel. From the beginning of our government it was seen that the equal rights doctrine was a sword which could cut both ways. Both Federalists and Republicans believed in equal rights: the Federalists, therefore, wanted to protect individuals with a strong government; the Republicans wanted a weak government so that individuals could be let alone in the exercise of their equal rights. ↩
This view of democracy was well satirized by someone, I think Lord Morley, who said, “I do not care who does the voting as long as I do the counting.” ↩
Proportional representation is interesting to the view put forward in this book because it is a method to bring out all the differences. ↩
Arcos, Romains and Vildrac are the chief of these. Romains, who has written La Vie Unanime, is the most interesting for our present purpose, for his togetherness is so plainly that of the herd:

… “quelle joie
De fondre dans ton corps [le ville] immense
où l’on a chaud!”

Here is our old friend, the wild ox, in the mask of the most civilized (perhaps) portion of our most civilised (perhaps) nation. Again

“Nous sommes indistincts: chacun de nous est mort;
Et la vie unanime est notre sépulture.”

↩
Other results of the increased reading of newspapers and magazines are that large questions are driving out trivial interests (I find this very marked in the country), and the enormous amount of publicity now given everything finds a channel to the public through the press. The reports of commissions, like the Industrial Relations Commission, the surveys, like the Pittsburgh Survey, the reports of foundations, like the Russell Sage, the reports of the rapidly increasing bureaus of research, like the New York Municipal Bureau, all find their way to us through the columns of our daily or weekly or monthly. Therefore we have more material on which to found individual thinking. ↩
Also the development of the relation of individualistic theories to the rise and decline of the doctrines regarding the national state. ↩
I do not wish, however, to minimize the truly democratic nature of our local institutions. ↩
While it is true that there were undemocratic elements in the mental equipment and psychological bent of our forefathers, and it is these which I have emphasized because from them came our immediate development, it is equally true that there were also sound democratic elements to which we can trace our present ideas of democracy. Such tracing even in briefest form there is not space for here. ↩
It became at once evident that a government whose chief function was to see that individual rights, property rights, state rights, were not invaded, was hardly adequate to unite our colonies with all their separatist instincts, or to meet the needs of a rapidly developing continent. Our national government at once adopted a constructive policy. Guided by Hamilton it assumed constructive powers authority for which could be found in the constitution only by a most liberal construction of its terms. When Jefferson, an antinationalist, acquired Louisiana in 1803, it seemed plain that no such restricted national government as was at first conceived could possibly work. ↩
These English writers to whom our debt is so large are not responsible for this, but their misinterpreters. ↩
With the executive and legislative limited in their powers, the decisions of the courts gradually came, especially as they developed constructive powers, to be a body of law which guided the American people. ↩
For ways of doing this see part III. ↩
We used to think frequent elections democratic. Now we know that they mean simply an increase of party influence and a decrease of official responsibility. ↩
See chapter XXX, “Political Pluralism and Functionalism.” ↩
Laissez-faire was popular when there were great numbers of individual producers. When the large-scale business system made wage-earners of these, there was the beginning of the breakdown of laissez-faire. ↩
Besides the more obvious one of “universal suffrage.” ↩
This movement to form societies based on our occupations is of course, although usually unconscious, part of the whole syndicalist movement, and as such has real advantages which will be taken up later. ↩
Since April, 1917, with the rapidly extending use of the schoolhouse as a centre for war services, these numbers have probably greatly increased. ↩
See Appendix, “The Training for the New Democracy.” ↩
That it is also in many instances leading the way to real community organization makes it one of the most valuable movements of our time. ↩
Public opinion in a true democracy is a potential will. Therefore for practical purposes they are identical and I use them synonymously. ↩
Our federal system of checks and balances thwarted the will of the people. The party system thwarted the will of the people. Our state governments were never designed to get at the will of the people. ↩
The war has shown us that our national agricultural program can best be done on a cooperative neighborhood basis: through the establishment of community agricultural conferences, community labor, seed and implement exchanges, community canning centres, community markets, etc. ↩
I do not mean to imply that I think it is easy to learn how to identify ourselves with our city, especially for those who live in large cities. The men of a small town know that if they have a new town-hall they will have to pay for it. In a large city men ask for a ward building because they will not have to pay for it, they think. It is all this which neighborhood organization and the integration of neighborhoods, of which I shall speak later, must remedy. ↩
The plan of Mr. and Mrs. Wilbur Phillips for community organization and for the connection with it of expert service is too comprehensive to describe here, but based as it is on their actual experience, and planning as it does for the training of whole neighborhoods and the arousing of them to responsibility and action, it should be studied by everyone, for such plans are, I believe, the best signs we have that democracy is yet possible for America. ↩
How much we are all indebted to the settlements as the pioneer neighborhood movement I do not stop to consider here. ↩
This point will be taken up in chapter XXXIII. ↩
Or perhaps the Senate might represent the occupational group (see chapter XXXIII). Or perhaps the experts mentioned above might be representatives from occupational groups. ↩
In North Carolina the recently organized State Bureau of Community Service⁠—made up of the administrators of the Department of Agriculture, the Board of Health, the Normal and Industrial College and the Farmers’ Union, with the State Superintendent of Public Instruction as its central executive⁠—is making its immediate work the development of local community organization which shall be directly articulated with a unified state organization. ↩
The Community Council, however, is not to duplicate other organizations but first to coordinate all existing agencies before planning new activities. ↩
And spontaneously many towns and villages turned to the schoolhouse as the natural centre of its war services. ↩
For the moment I ignore the occupational group to be considered later. ↩
I have taken this account from the official report. I have been told by New York people that these commissions have shown few signs of life. This does not, however, seem to me to detract from the value of the plan as a suggestion, or as indication of what is seen to be advisable if not yet wholly practicable. The New York charter provides for Local Improvement Boards as connecting links with the central government, but these I am told have shown no life whatever. ↩
Léon Duguit, Graham Wallis, Arthur Christensen, Norman Angell, etc. ↩
The fatal flaw of guild socialism is this separation of economics and politics. First, the interests of citizenship and guild-membership are not distinct; secondly, in any proper system of occupational representation everyone should be included⁠—vocational representation should not be trade representation; third, as long as you call the affairs of the guilds “material,” and say that the politics of the state should be purified of financial interests, you burn every bridge which might make a unity of financial interests and sound state policy. Guild socialism, however, because it is a carefully worked out plan for the control of industry by those who take part in it, is one of the most well worth considering of the proposals at present before us. ↩
See G. D. H. Cole, The World of Labor, for the relation of trade unionism to guild socialism. ↩
See especially Churches in the Modern State and Studies in Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius. ↩
See also Mr. Laski’s articles: “The Personality of Associations,” Harvard Law Review 29, 404⁠–⁠426, and “Early History of the Corporation in England,” Harvard Law Review 30, 561⁠–⁠588. This is the kind of work which is breaking the way for a new conception of politics. ↩
It must be understood that all I say does not apply to all the pluralists. For the sake of brevity I consider them as a school although they differ widely. Moreover, for convenience I am using the word pluralist roughly and in a sense inaccurately to include all those who are advocating a multiple group organization as the basis of a new state. Most of these agree in making the group rather than the individual the unit of politics, in their support of group “rights,” the “consent” of the group, the “balance” of groups, and in their belief that “rights” should be based on function. But syndicalists and guild socialists are not strictly pluralists since they build up a system based on the occupational group; yet the name is not wholly inapplicable, for, since the guild socialists base their state on balancing groups, that state cannot be called a unified state. It is too early yet to speak of this school with entire accuracy, and in fact there is no “school.” ↩
From this was taken, Gierke tells us, modern German “fellowship.” ↩
And the individual was certainly as prominent in medieval theory as the community of individuals, a fact which the vigorous corporate life of the Middle Ages may lead us to forget. ↩
See writings of Ramiro de Maeztu in New Age and his book mentioned above. ↩
See Traité de Droit Constitutionnel and Études de Droit Public: I, L’État, Le Droit Objectif et La Loi Positive; II, L’État, Les Gouvernants and Les Agents.

As in French droit may be either law or a right, Duguit, in order to distinguish between these meanings, follows the German distinction of objektives Recht and subjektives Recht, and speaks of le droit objectif and le droit subjectif, thus meaning by le droit objectif merely law. But because he at the same time writes of power as resting on function in contradistinction to the classical theory of the abstract “rights” of man, rights apart from law and only declared by law, political writers sometimes speak of Duguit’s “objective” theory of law, as opposed to a “subjective” theory of law, when jurists would tell us that law is objective, and that subjective right is always merely a right, my right. This matter of terminology must be made much clearer than it is at present. ↩
Although how far Duguit had in mind merely the solidarity of French and Roman law has been questioned. ↩
I have just read in a work on sociology, “Men surrender their individual wills to the collective will.” No, the true social process is not when they surrender but when they contribute their wills to the collective will. See chapters II⁠–⁠VI, “The Group Process.” ↩
See here. ↩
De Maeztu tells us, “Rights do not arise from personality. This idea is mystic and unnecessary. Rights arise primarily from the relation of the associated with the thing which associates them.⁠ ⁠…” Authority, Liberty, and Function, p. 250.

Mr. Barker substitutes purpose for personality and will as the unifying bond of associations, and says that we thus get rid of “murder in the air” when it is a question of the “competition of ideas, not of real collective personalities.” (See “The Discredited State,” in The Political Quarterly, February, 1915.) This seems a curiously anthropomorphic, so to speak, idea of personality for a twentieth-century writer. The article is, however, an interesting and valuable one.

See also Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, I, 472. ↩
See Underlying Principles of Legislation. ↩
The teleological school of sociology is interesting just here. While it marked a long advance on older theories, the true place of selection of ends is today more clearly seen. We were told: “Men have wants, therefore they come together to seek means to satisfy those wants.” When do men “come together”? When were they ever separated? But it is not necessary to push this further. ↩
I have tried not to jump the track from legal right to ethical right but occasionally one can speak of them together, if it is understood that one is not thereby merging them. ↩
The old consent theory assumes that some make the laws and others obey them. In the true democracy we shall obey the laws we have ourselves made. To find the methods by which we can be approaching the true democracy is now our task; we can never rest satisfied with “consent.” ↩
Although I do not agree with the form individualism takes in his doctrine. ↩
Some of the pluralists are concerned, I recognize, with the fact rather than the right of sovereignty. ↩
The trouble with the pluralists is that their emphasis is not on the fact that the group creates its own personality, but on the fact that the state does not create it. When they change this emphasis, their thinking will be unchained, I believe, and leap ahead to the constructive work which we eagerly await and expect from them. ↩
It is also necessary to an understanding of the new international law. See chapter XXXV, “The World State.” ↩
No one has yet given us a satisfactory account of the history of the notion of sovereignty: just how and in what degree it has been affected by history, by philosophy, by jurisprudence, etc., and how all these have interacted. We have not only to disentangle many strands to trace each to its source, but we have, moreover, just not to disentangle them, but to understand the constant interweaving of all. To watch the interplay of legal theory and political philosophy from the Middle Ages down to the present day is one of the most interesting parts of our reading, but perhaps nowhere is it more fruitful than in the idea of sovereignty. We see the corporation long ignored and the idea of legal partnership influencing the development of the social contract theory, which in its turn reacted on legal theory. We find the juristic conception of group personality, clearly seen as early as Althusius (1557⁠–⁠1638), and revived and expanded by Gierke, influencing the whole German school of “group sociologists.” But today are not many of us agreed that however interesting such historical tracing, our present notion of sovereignty must rest on what we learn from group psychology? ↩
The French syndicalists avowedly do not want democracy because it “mixes the classes,” because, as they say, interests and aims mingle in one great mass in which all true significance is lost. ↩
See here. ↩
This is the basis of Duguit’s international law⁠—the place of a state in an international league is to be determined directly by services rendered. ↩
Quoted by Duguit. ↩
It must be remembered, however, that while in the Civil War we definitely gave up the compact theory held by us since the Mayflower compact, yet we did not adopt the organism theory. The federal state we have tried and are trying to work out in America is based on the principles of psychic unity described in chapter X. The giving up of the “consent” theory does not bring us necessarily to the organic theory of society. ↩
Duguit says that the United States confers the rights of a state on a territory. No, it recognizes that which already exists. ↩
“The word ‘and’ trails along after every sentence. Something always escapes.⁠ ⁠… The pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom.” A Pluralistic Universe, 321⁠–⁠322. ↩
When they say that the passion for unity is the urge for a dominant One, they think of the dominant One as outside. ↩
One of the pluralists says, “I cannot see that⁠ ⁠… sovereignty is the unique property of any one association.” No, not sovereignty over “others,” but sovereignty always belongs to any genuine group; as groups join to form another real group, the sovereignty of the more inclusive group is evolved⁠—that is the only kind of state sovereignty which we can recognize as legitimate. (See chapter XXIX on “Political Pluralism and Sovereignty.”) ↩
See chapter XV. ↩
Mr. Laski is an exception to many writers on “consent.” When he speaks of consent he is referring only to the actual facts of today. Denying the sovereignty postulated by the lawyers (he says you can never find in a community any one will which is certain of obedience), he shows that as a matter of fact the state sovereignty we have now rests on consent. I do not wish to confuse the issue between facts of the present and hopes for the future, but I wish to make a distinction between the “sovereignty” of the present and the sovereignty which I hope we can grow. This distinction is implicit in Mr. Laski’s book, but it is lacking in much of the writing on the “consent of the governed.” ↩
Wherever you have the social contract theory in any form, and assent as the foundation of power, there is no social process going on; the state is an arbitrary creation of men. Group organization today must give up any taint whatever of the social contract and rest squarely and fully on its legitimate psychological basis. ↩
This is perhaps a remnant of the nineteenth-century myth that competition is the mode of progress. ↩
See note 15. ↩
Mr. Laski, I think. ↩
It does not matter in the terms of which branch of study you express it⁠—philosophy, sociology, or political science⁠—it is always the same problem. ↩
See here. ↩
Some writers talk of trade representation vs. party organization as if in the trade group you are rid of party. Have they studied the politics of trade unionism? In neither the trade group nor the neighborhood group do you automatically get rid of the party spirit. That will be a slow growth indeed. ↩
Yet perhaps the trade-union has been one of the truest groups, one of the most effective teachers of genuine group lessons which we have yet seen. Increased wages, improved conditions, are always for the group. The trade-unionist feels group-wants; he seeks to satisfy these through group action. Moreover the terms of a collective bargain cannot be enforced without a certain amount of group solidarity. In strikes workmen often sacrifice their own interests for what will benefit the union: the individual⁠—I may prefer his present wages to the privations of a strike; the group-I wants to raise the wages of the whole union. ↩
I have not in this brief statement distinguished between government “ownership,” “control,” “regulation,” etc. See War-Time Control of Industry by Howard L. Gray. ↩
“Representative Government in British Industry” by J. A. Hobson, in New Republic, September 1, 1917. ↩
See here. ↩
Following the precedent of England which provided, under the Munitions of War act and other legislation, machinery (joint boards representing employers and employed) for the prevention and adjustment of labor disputes. ↩
Christensen, Politics and Crowd Morality, p. 238. ↩
See here. ↩
It has usually been supposed that wars have been the all-important element in consolidating nations; I do not want to disregard this element, I want only to warn against its over emphasis. Moreover, the way in which wars have had a real and permanent influence in the consolidation of nations is by the pressure which they have exerted upon them in showing them that efficiency is obtained by the closest cooperation and coordination of all our activities, by a high degree of internal organization. ↩
The western states feel that they are training members of society and not individuals and that is why it seems proper to them to take public money to found state universities. ↩
A little girl I know said, “Mother, if women get the vote, shall I have to be President?” ↩
See here. ↩
Also men have less opportunity for discussion at work than formerly. ↩