Short Works - Endnotes

Endnotes

In Schweighaeuser’s edition the title is “Επικτήτου ἐγχειρίδιον. Epicteti Manuale ex recensione et interpretatione Joannis Uptoni. Notabiliorem Lectionis varietatem adjecit Joh. Schweighaeuser.” There are also notes by Upton, and some by Schweighaeuser. ↩
This passage will be obscure in the original, unless it is examined well. I have followed the explanation of Simplicius, iv. (i 4.) ↩
Appearances are named “harsh” or “rough” when they are “contrary to reason and overexciting and in fact make life rough (uneven) by the want of symmetry and by inequality in the movements. Simplicius, v. (i 5.) ↩
See the notes in Schweig.’s edition. ↩
Upton proposes to read ἐφ’ ἱπποῦ ἀγαφῷ instead of ἐπὶ ἵππῳ ἀγαφῷ. The meaning then will be “elated at something good which is in the horse.” I think that he is right. ↩
The text has τὰ γενόμενα: but it should be τὰ γινόμενα. See Upton’s note. ↩
He means, Do not chastise your slave while you are in a passion, lest, while you are trying to correct him, and it is very doubtful whether you will succeed, you fall into a vice which is a man’s great and only calamity. Schweig. ↩
The passage seems to mean, that your slave has not the power of disturbing you, because you have the power of not being disturbed. See Upton’s note on the text. ↩
Τέλειν is used here, as it often is among the Stoics, to “wish absolutely,” “to will.” When Epictetus says “you would have badness not to be badness,” he means that “badness” is in the will of him who has the badness, and as you wish to subject it to your will, you are a fool. It is your business, as far as you can, to improve the slave: you may wish this. It is his business to obey your instruction: this is what he ought to wish to do; but for him to will to do this, that lies in himself, not in you. Schweig. ↩
This is obscure. “It is true that the man is wretched, not because of the things external which have happened to him, but through the fact that he allows himself to be affected so much by external things which are placed out of his power.” Schweig. ↩
It has been objected to Epictetus that he expresses no sympathy with those who suffer sorrow. But here he tells you to show sympathy, a thing which comforts most people. But it would be contrary to his teaching, if he told you to suffer mentally with another. ↩
Compare Antoninus, xi 6, xii 36. ↩
Note, ed. Schweig. ↩
“If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ.” Gal. 1:10. Mrs. Carter. ↩
See the text. ↩
The sixth part of a drachma. ↩
“Price” is here τὸ διαφέρον. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
This passage is explained in the commentary of Simplicius, (xxxiv, in Schweig.’s ed. xxvii p. 264), and Schweighaeuser agrees with the explanation, which is this: Nothing in the world (universe) can exist or be done (happen) which in its proper sense, in itself and in its nature is bad; for everything is and is done by the wisdom and will of God and for the purpose which he intended: but to miss a mark is to fail in an intention; and as a man does not set up a mark, or does not form a purpose for the purpose of missing the mark or the purpose, so it is absurd (inconsistent) to say that God has a purpose or design, and that he purposed or designed anything which in itself and in its nature is bad. The commentary of Simplicius is worth reading. But how many will read it? Perhaps one in a million. ↩
“Compare iii 15, from which all this passage has been transferred to the Enchiridion by the copyists.” Upton. On which Schweighaeuser remarks, “Why should we not say by Arrian, who composed the Enchiridion from the Discourses of Epictetus?” See the notes of Upton and Schweig. on some differences in the readings of the passage in iii 15, and in this passage. ↩
See ii 22, 13, iv 5, 9. ↩
“It is plain enough that the philosopher does not say this, that the reckoning of our private advantage ought to be the sole origin and foundation of piety towards God.” Schweig., and he proceeds to explain the sentence, which at first appears rather obscure. Perhaps Arrian intends to say that the feeling of piety coincides with the opinion of the useful, the profitable; and that the man who takes care to desire as he ought to do and to avoid as he ought to do, thus also cares after piety, and so he will secure his interest (the profitable) and he will not be discontented.

In i 27, 14 (p. 81) it is said ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ᾖ τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ συμφέρον, οὐ δύναται σωφῆναι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἔν τινι. This is what is said here (s. 31). ↩
The story is told by Aelian (iii c. 44), and by Simplicius in his commentary on the Enchiridion (p. 411, ed. Schweig.). Upton. ↩
“Convivia cum hominibus extraneis et rudibus, discipline non imbutis” is the Latin version. ↩
The text is ὡς νόμιμον: and the Latin explanation is “qua fas eat uti; qua uti absque flagitio licet.” ↩
To admire (φαυμάζειν) is contrary to the precept of Epictetus; i 29, ii 6, iii 20. Upton. ↩
Such recitations were common at Rome, when authors read their works and invited persons to attend. These recitations are often mentioned in the letters of the younger Pliny. See Epictetus, iii 23. ↩
Compare i 25, 11, etc. ↩
See the note of Schweig. on xxxvi. ↩
Cui non conveniet sua res, ut calceus olim,
Si pede major erit, subvertet; si minor, uret.
Horat. Epp. i 10, 42, and Epp. i 7, 98.

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The word is κεντητόν “acu pictum,” ornamented by needlework. ↩
Fourteen was considered the age of puberty in Roman males, but in females the age of twelve (Justin. inst. I tit. 22). Compare Gaius, i 196. ↩
See Mrs. C.’s note, in which she says “Epictetus seems to be in part mistaken here,” etc.; and I think that he is. ↩
τὸ ἀληφὲς συμπεπλεγμένον is rendered in the Latin by “verum conjunctum.” Mrs. Carter renders it by “a true proposition,” which I suppose to be the meaning. ↩
Mrs. Carter translates this, “Unless you perfectly understand the principle [from which anyone acts].” ↩
See iii 23, 22; iv 8, 2. ↩
See iii 12. ↩
This may mean “what is proposed to you by philosophers,” and especially in this little book. Schweighaeuser thinks that it may mean “what you have proposed to yourself:” but he is inclined to understand it simply, “what is proposed above, or taught above.” ↩
τὸν διαιροῦντα λόγον. “Eam partitioned rationis intelligo, qua initio dixit, Quaedam in potestate nostra esse, quaedam non esse.” Wolf. ↩
The first four verses are by the Stoic Cleanthes, the pupil of Zeno, and the teacher of Chrysippus. He was a native of Assus in Mysia; and Simplicius, who wrote his commentary on the Enchiridion in the sixth century, AD, saw even at this late period in Assus a beautiful statue of Cleanthes erected by a decree of the Roman senate in honour of this excellent man. (Simplicius, ed. Schweig. p. 522.) ↩
The two second verses are from a play of Euripides, a writer who has supplied more verses for quotation than any ancient tragedian. ↩
The third quotation is from the Criton of Plato. Socrates is the speaker. The last part is from the Apology of Plato, and Socrates is also the speaker. The words “and the third also,” Schweighaeuser says, have been introduced from the commentary of Simplicius. Simplicius concludes his commentary thus: Epictetus connects the end with the beginning, which reminds us of what was said in the beginning, that the man who places the good and the evil among the things which are in our power, and not in externals, will neither be compelled by any man nor ever injured. ↩
Consult the Lexicons for this sense of νόστιμος. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
“He does not say this ‘that it is bad if a man by money should redeem himself from bonds,’ but he means that ‘even a bad man, if he has money, can redeem himself from the bonds of the body and so secure his liberty.’ ” Schweig. ↩
“How hardly shall they that have riches enter the kingdom of God.” Mark 10:23 (Mrs. Carter). This expression in Mark sets forth the danger of riches, a fact which all men know who use their observation. In the next verse the truth is expressed in this form, “How hard it is for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God.” The Stoics viewed wealth as among the things which are indifferent, neither good nor bad. ↩
The other member of the comparison has been omitted by some accident in the MSS. Wolf in his Latin version supplied by conjecture the omission in this manner: “ita neque in terris divitiae tibi expe tendae sunt.” Schweig. ↩
To some persons the comparison will not seem apt. Also the notion that every man should be taught to rise above the condition in which he is born is, in the opinion of some persons, a better teaching. I think that it is not. Few persons have the talents and the character which enable them to rise from a low condition; and the proper lesson for them is to stay in the condition in which they are born and to be content with it. Those who have the power of rising from a low condition will rise whether they are advised to attempt it or not: and generally they will not be able to rise without doing something useful to society. Those who have ability sufficient to raise themselves from a low estate, and at the same time to do it to the damage of society, are perhaps only few, but certainly there are such persons. They rise by ability, by the use of fraud, by bad means almost innumerable. They gain wealth, they fill high places, they disturb society, they are plagues and pests, and the world looks on sometimes with stupid admiration until death removes the dazzling and deceitful image, and honest men breathe freely again.

In the Church of England Catechism there are two answers to two questions, one on our duty to God, the other on our duty to our neighbour. Both the answers would be accepted by Epictetus, except such few words as were not applicable to the circumstances of his age. The second answer ends with the words “to learn and labour to get mine own living and to do my duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me.” ↩
Mrs. Carter says, “I have not translated this fragment, because I do not understand it.” Schweighaeuser says also that he does not understand it. I have given what may be the meaning; but it is not an exact translation, which in the present state of the text is not possible. ↩
This fragment is perhaps more corrupt than XXIX. See Schweig.’s note. I see no sense in ἔπαινος, and I have used the word οὖρος, which is a possible reading. The conclusion appears quite unintelligible. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
I am not sure about the exact meaning of the conclusion. See Schweig.’s note. ↩
This is not a translation of the conclusion. Perhaps it is something like the meaning. See Schweig.’s note. ↩
This is not clear. ↩
It is observed that the term “just” applies to Aristides; the term “god” was given to Lycurgus by the Pythia or Delphic oracle; the name “saviour” by his own citizens to Epaminondas. ↩
Schweig. quotes Polybius ix 10, 1, “a city is not adorned by external things, but by the virtue of those who dwell in it.” Alcaeus says, 22, Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, 1843⁠—

οὐ λίφοι
τειχέων εὖ δεδομάμενοι,
ἀλλ’ ἄνδρες τόλιος πύργος ἀρήϊοι.

↩
Schweig. says that in the reading ἐὰν φαυμάζῃς τὰ μικρὰ πρῶτον the word πρῶτον is wanting in four MSS., and that Schow omitted πρῶτον, and that he has followed Schow. But ποῶτον is in Schweig.’s text. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
See i 1, note 13 and 14. ↩
Rather obscure, says Schweig. Compare Frag. lviii and lxvi. ↩
Compare lviii. Schweig. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
Schweig. suggests that ὁ λόγος has been omitted before the words ὁ τὸ κριτήριον ἔχων. See the fragment of Chilo on the stone which tries gold. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, ed. 1, p. 568. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
Pittacus was one of the seven wise men, as they are named. Some authorities state that he lived in the seventh century BC. By this maxim he anticipated one of the Christian doctrines by six centuries. ↩
See Mrs. Carter’s note, who could only translate part of this fragment: and Schweig.’s emendation and note. ↩
LXXIII⁠–⁠LXXV⁠—Schweig. has enclosed these three fragments in [ ]. They are not from Epictetus, but from Plutarch’s treatise εἰ πρεσβυτέρω πολιτευτέον. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. There is evidently something omitted in the text, which omission is supplied by the words enclosed thus [ ]. Schweig. proposes to change κυβερνᾷν into κυβιστᾶν. See his remark on πᾶσαν⁠ ⁠… πόλιν. Perhaps he is right. ↩
The marbles of Carystus in Euboea and the marbles of Taenarum near Sparta were used by the Romans, and perhaps by the Greeks also, for architectural decoration. (Strabo, x 416, and viii 367, ed. Cas.) Compare Horace, Carm. ii 18.

Non ebur neque aureum
Mea renidet in domo lacunar, etc.

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This fragment contains a lesson for the administration of a state. The good must be protected, and the bad must be improved by discipline and punishment. ↩
I am not sure what μέρει means. ↩
See in the Index Graecitatis the word δυσωπεῖν. ↩
Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i 4, 17.

The body is here, and elsewhere in Epictetus, considered as an instrument, which another uses who is not the body; and that which so uses the body must be something which is capable of using the body and a power which possesses what we name intelligence and consciousness. Our bodies, as Bishop Butler says, are what we name matter, and differ from other matter only in being more closely connected with us than other matter. It would be easy to pass from these notions to the notion that this intelligence and power, or to use a common word, the soul, is something which exists independent of the body, though we only know the soul while it acts within and on the body, and by the body. ↩
This bag is the body, or that part of it which holds the food which is taken into the mouth. ↩
See Schweig.’s excellent note on this fragment. There is manifestly a defect in the text, which Schweig.’s note supplies. ↩
Mrs. Carter suggests that ἀπάρεστον in the text should be ἀπάρεστοι: and so Schweig. has it. ↩
Mrs. Carter in her notes often refers to the Christian precepts, but she says nothing here. The fragment is not from Epictetus; but, whether the story is true or not, it is an example of the behaviour of a wise and good man. ↩
See Schweig.’s interpretation and emendation. I doubt if he is right. ↩
χολερὰ γὰρ ἀποφθέγξῃ. See Schweig.’s note. ↩
This is the doctrine of God being in man. See the Index. ↩
Compare Lucretius ii the beginning. ↩
Compare M. Antoninus, vi 6. ↩
For οὐδὲν Mrs. Carter prefers οὐδὲν μᾶλλον: and also Schweig. does, or οὐδὲν ἄλλο μᾶλλον. ↩
This fragment is not from Epictetus. See Schweig.’s note. ↩
The meaning of the second part is confused and uncertain. See Schweig.’s note. ↩
In place of ἀφαιρεῖ τὴν Mrs. Carter proposes to read ἀφαιρετήν. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
See Schweig.’s note. ↩
This is a valuable fragment, and I think, a genuine fragment of Epictetus. There is plainly a defect in the text, which Schweighaeuser has judiciously supplied. ↩
See Schweig.’s note on this fragment; and his remark on this words οὐκ εὐφωνότερον οὐδὲν, and his proposed emendation. ↩
See Schweig.’s note, and his remark on the last line of the text. ↩
See M. Antoninus, iv 41. ↩
See the translation of M. Antoninus, xi 37; where I have translated this passage a little differently from the present translation. The meaning is the same. I do not know which is the better translation. ↩
See M. Antoninus, xi 38. ↩
Arrian, Dissert. ii, 19. ↩
“Nempe ubi ratio deficit, ibi sola fiducia in Deum reposita et obsequio voluntati ejus ab ipso declaratae unice subjeto agendum est.” Schweig. See Encheirid. xxxii. ↩