Endnotes

1. Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights i 2 and xvii 19) speaks of the Discourses of Epictetus being arranged by Arrian; and Gellius (Attic Nights xix 1) speaks of a fifth book of these Discourses, but only four are extant and some fragments. The whole number of books was eight, as Photius (Codex 58) says. There is also extant an Enchiridion or Manual, consisting of short pieces selected from the Discourses of Epictetus; and there is the valuable commentary on the Enchiridion written by Simplicius in the sixth century AD and in the reign of Justinian.

   Arrian explains in a manner what he means by saying that he did not write these Discourses of Epictetus; but he does not explain his meaning when he says that he did not make them public. He tells us that he did attempt to write down in the words of Epictetus what the philosopher said; but how it happened that they were first published, without his knowledge or consent, Arrian does not say. It appears, however, that he did see the Discourses when they were published; and as Johann Schweighäuser remarks, he would naturally correct any errors that he detected, and so there would be an edition revised by himself. Schweighäuser has a note (i chapter 26, 13) on the difficulties which we now find in the Discourses. ↩

2. “This moral approving and disapproving faculty” is Bishop Butler’s translation of the δοκιμαστική and ἀποδοκιμαστική of this opening passage in his dissertation, Of the Nature of Virtue. See his note. ↩

3. The rational faculty is the λογικὴ ψυχή of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, of which Marcus Aurelius says (Meditations xi 1): “These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, analyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which it bears, itself enjoys.” ↩

4. This is what he has just named the rational faculty. The Stoics gave the name of appearances (φαντασίαι) to all impressions received by the senses, and to all emotions caused by external things. Chrysippus said: “φαντασία ἐστὶ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἑαυτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός” (Plutarch, iv chapter 12, De placita Philosophorum). ↩

5. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ii 3. Epictetus does not intend to limit the power of the gods, but he means that the constitution of things being what it is, they cannot do contradictories. They have so constituted things that man is hindered by externals. How then could they give to man a power of not being hindered by externals? Seneca (De Providentia, chapter 6) says: “But it may be said, many things happen which cause sadness, fear, and are hard to bear. Because (God says) I could not save you from them, I have armed your minds against all.” This is the answer to those who imagine that they have disproved the common assertion of the omnipotence of God, when they ask whether He can combine inherent contradictions, whether He can cause two and two to make five. This is indeed a very absurd way of talking. ↩

6. Johann Schweighäuser observes that these faculties of pursuit and avoidance, and of desire and aversion, and even the faculty of using appearances, belong to animals as well as to man: but animals in using appearances are moved by passion only, and do not understand what they are doing, while in man these passions are under his control. Claudius Salmasius proposed to change ἡμέτερον into ὑμέτερον, to remove the difficulty about these animal passions being called “a small portion of us (the gods).” Schweighäuser, however, though he sees the difficulty, does not accept the emendation. Perhaps Arrian has here imperfectly represented what his master said, and perhaps he did not. ↩

7. He alludes to the Odyssey, X 21: “κεῖνον γὰρ ταμίην ἀνέμων ποίησε Κρονίων.” ↩

8. Plautius Lateranus, consul-elect, was charged with being engaged in Piso’s conspiracy against Nero. He was hurried to execution without being allowed to see his children; and though the tribune who executed him was privy to the plot, Lateranus said nothing. (Tacitus, The Annals xv 49, 60.) ↩

9. Epaphroditus was a freedman of Nero, and once the master of Epictetus. He was Nero’s secretary. One good act is recorded of him: he helped Nero to kill himself, and for this act he was killed by Domitian (Suetonius, Domitian, chapter 14). ↩

10. This is an imitation of a passage in the Bacchae of Euripides (line 492, etc.), which is also imitated by Horace (Epistles, i, 16). ↩

11. ἡ προαίρεσίς. It is sometimes rendered by the Latin propositum or by voluntas, the will. ↩

12. Thrasea Paetus, a Stoic philosopher, who was ordered in Nero’s time to put himself to death (Tacitus, The Annals xvi, 21⁠–⁠35). He was the husband of Arria, whose mother Arria, the wife of Caecina Paetus, in the time of the Emperor Claudius, heroically showed her husband the way to die (Plinius, Letters, iii 16). Martial has immortalised the elder Arria in a famous epigram (Epigrams i 14):

    When Arria to her Paetus gave the sword,
    Which her own hand from her chaste bosom drew,
    “This wound,” she said, “believe me, gives no pain,
    But that will pain me which thy hand will do.”

    ↩

13. Gaius Musonius Rufus, a Tuscan by birth, of equestrian rank, a philosopher and Stoic (Tacitus, The History iii 81). ↩

14. Paconius Agrippinus was condemned in Nero’s time. The charge against him was that he inherited his father’s hatred of the head of the Roman state (Tacitus, The Annals xvi 28). The father of Agrippinus had been put to death under Tiberius (Suetonius, Tiberius chapter 61). ↩

15. Aricia, about twenty Roman miles from Rome, on the Via Appia (Horace, Satires i 5, 1): “Egressum magna me excepit Aricia Roma.” ↩

16. Epictetus, Enchiridion, chapter 11: “Never say on the occasion of anything, ‘I have lost it’ but say, ‘I have returned it.’ ” ↩

17. The Spartan boys used to be whipped at the altar of Artemis Orthia till blood flowed abundantly, and sometimes till death; but they never uttered even a groan (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations ii 14; v 27). ↩

18. The preconception πρόληψις is thus defined by the Stoics: ἐστι δὴ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθ’ ὅλου (Diogenes Laërtius Lives vii). “We name Anticipation all knowledge, by which I can à priori know and determine that which belongs to empirical knowledge, and without doubt this is the sense in which Epicurus used his expression πρόληψις” (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 152, 7th ed.). He adds: “But since there is something in appearances which never can be known à priori, and which consequently constitutes the difference between empirical knowledge and knowledge à priori, that is, sensation (as the material of observation), it follows that this sensation is specially that which cannot be anticipated (it cannot be a πρόληψις). On the other hand, we could name the pure determinations in space and time, both in respect to form and magnitude, anticipations of the appearances, because these determinations represent à priori whatever may be presented to us à posteriori in experience.” See also p. 8, etc. ↩

19. Nero was passionately fond of scenic representations, and used to induce the descendants of noble families, whose poverty made them consent to appear on the stage (Tacitus, Annals, xiv 14; Suetonius, Nero, chapter 21). ↩

20. The “purple” is the broad purple border on the toga named the toga praetexta, worn by certain Roman magistrates and some others, and by senators, it is said, on certain days (Cicero, Philippics ii 43). ↩

21. Helvidius Priscus, a Roman senator and a philosopher, is commended by Tacitus (The History iv 4, 5) as an honest man: “He followed the philosophers who considered those things only to be good which are virtuous, those only to be bad which are foul; and he reckoned power, rank, and all other things which are external to the mind as neither good nor bad.” Vespasian, probably in a fit of passion, being provoked by Helvidius, ordered him to be put to death, and then revoked the order when it was too late (Suetonius, Vespasianus, chapter 15). ↩

22. Baton was elected for two years gymnasiarch or superintendent of a gymnasium in or about the time of Marcus Aurelius. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

23. This is supposed, as Casaubon says, to refer to Domitian’s order to the philosophers to go into exile; and some of them, in order to conceal their profession of philosophy, shaved their beards. Epictetus would not take off his beard. ↩

24. The text is: εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐ χείρων. The sense seems to be: Epictetus is not superior to Socrates, but if he is not worse, that is enough for me. On the different readings of the passage and on the sense, see the notes in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition. The difficulty, if there is any, is in the negative μή. ↩

25. Milo of Croton, a great athlete. The conclusion is the same as in Horace, Epistles i 1, 28, etc.: “Est quodam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.” ↩

26. Epictetus speaks of God ὁ θεός and the gods. Also conformably to the practice of the people, he speaks of God under the name of Zeus. The gods of the people were many, but his God was perhaps one. “Father of men and gods,” says Homer of Zeus; and Virgil says of Jupiter, “Father of gods and king of men.” Claudius Salmasius proposed ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

27. ὁρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε μή τι τούτων ἀποβῆτε τῶν ἀτυχημάτων. John Upton compares Matthew 16:6: ὁρᾶτε καὶ προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης, etc. Upton remarks that many expressions in Epictetus are not unlike the style of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which Epictetus was teaching. Johann Schweighäuser also refers to Johann Jakob Wettstein’s New Testament. ↩

28. τὸ εὔρουν or ἡ εὔροια is translated “happiness.” The notion is that of “flowing easily,” as Seneca (Epistles 120) explains it: “beata vita, secundo defluens cursu.” ↩

29. ὑπερτέθειται. The Latin translation is: “in futurum tempus rejicit.” Hieronymus Wolf says: “Significat id, quod in Enchiridio dictum est: philosophies tironem non nimium tribuere sibi, sed quasi addubitantem expectare dum confirmetur judicium.” ↩

30. Diogenes Laërtius (Lives: Chrysippus, book vii) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word συγγράμματα means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in 280 BC, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes. ↩

31. Compare book III chapter II. The word is τόποι. ↩

32. Halteres are gymnastic instruments (Galenus i De Sanitate Tuenda; Martial, Epigrams xiv 49; Juvenal, Satires vi 420, and the Scholiast, John Upton). Halteres is a Greek word, literally “leapers.” They are said to have been masses of lead, used for exercise and in making jumps. The effect of such weights in taking a jump is well known to boys who have used them. A couple of bricks will serve the purpose, Martial says (Epigrams xiv 49):

    Quid pereunt stulto fortes haltere lacerti?
    Exercet melius vinea fossa viros.

    Juvenal (Satires vi 421) writes of a woman who uses dumbbells till she sweats, and is then rubbed dry by a man,

    Quum lassata gravi ceciderunt brachia massa.

    —⁠Arthur J. Macleane’s Juvenalis

    As to the expression, Ὄψει σὺ, καὶ οἱ ἁλτῆρες, see John Upton’s note. It is also a Latin form: “Epicurus hoc viderit,” Cicero, Academica ii chapter 7; “haec fortuna viderit,” Epistulae ad Atticum vi 4. It occurs in Marcus Aurelius, Meditations viii 41, v 25; and in Acts 18:15. ↩

33. μεταρριπίζεσθαι. Compare James 1:6: ὁ γὰρ διακρινόμενος ἔοικε κλύδωνι θαλάσσης ἀνεμιζομένῳ καὶ ῥιπιζομένῳ. ↩

34. This is said in the Crito of Plato, 1; but not in exactly the same way. ↩

35. So kings and such personages speak in the Greek tragedies. Compare what Marcus Aurelius (Meditations xi 6) says of Tragedy. ↩

36. ἀνεστάκασιν. See the note of Johann Schweighäuser on the use of this form of the verb. ↩

37. See Lecture V, “The New Academy,” Thomas Woodhouse Levin’s Six Lectures Introductory to the Philosophical Writings of Cicero, Cambridge, 1871. ↩

38. ἀπαχθείς. See the note in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition. ↩

39. Compare Cicero, Academica Priora ii 6. ↩

40. Goethe has a short poem, entitled “Gleich und Gleich” (Like and Like):

    Ein Blumenglöckchen
    Vom Boden hervor
    War früh gesprosset
    In lieblichem Flor;
    Da kam ein Bienchen
    Und naschte fein:⁠—
    Die miissen wohl beyde
    Für einander seyn.

    ↩

41. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. I have given the sense of the passage, I think. ↩

42. Cicero, De Officiis i chapter 4, on the difference between man and beast. ↩

43. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note, tom. ii p. 84. ↩

44. The original is αὐτοῦ, which I refer to God; but it may be ambiguous. Johann Schweighäuser refers it to man, and explains it to mean that man should be a spectator of himself, according to the maxim, Γνῶθι σεαυτόν. It is true that man can in a manner contemplate himself and his faculties as well as external objects; and as every man can be an object to every other man, so a man may be an object to himself when he examines his faculties and reflects on his own acts. Schweighäuser asks how can a man be a spectator of God, except so far as he is a spectator of God’s works? It is not enough; he says, to reply that God and the universe, whom and which man contemplates, are the same thing to the Stoics; for Epictetus always distinguishes God the maker and governor of the universe from the universe itself. But here lies the difficulty. The universe is an all-comprehensive term: it is all that we can in any way perceive and conceive as existing; and it may therefore comprehend God, not as something distinct from the universe, but as being the universe himself. This form of expression is an acknowledgment of the weakness of the human faculties, and contains the implicit assertion of Locke that the notion of God is beyond man’s understanding (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, etc. ii chapter 17). ↩

45. This work was the colossal chryselephantine statue of Zeus (Jupiter) by Phidias, which was at Olympia. This wonderful work is described by Pausanias (Eliaca, A, 11). ↩

46. Compare Aulus Persius Flaccus, Satires iii 66:

    Discite, io, miseri et causas cognoscite rerum,
    Quid sumus aut quidnam victuri gignimur.

    ↩

47. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations viii 50, and book II chapter XVI at 13. ↩

48. ἀφορμὰς. This word in this passage has a different meaning from that which it has when it is opposed to ὁρμή. See Thomas Gataker’s Meditations (Marcus Aurelius), ix 1 (John Upton). Epictetus says that the powers which man has were given by God; Marcus Aurelius says, from nature. They mean the same thing. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

49. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ix 1. ↩

50. The title is περὶ τῆς χρείας τῶν μεταπιπτόντων καὶ ὑποθετικῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοιων. Johann Schweighäuser has a big note on μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι, which he has collected from various critics. Elizabeth Carter translated the title “Of the Use of Convertible and Hypothetical Propositions and the like.” But “convertible” might be understood in the common logical sense, which is not the meaning of Epictetus. Schweighäuser explains μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι to be sophistical arguments in which the meaning of propositions or of terms, which ought to remain the same, is dexterously changed and perverted to another meaning. ↩

51. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on ἀποδείξειν ἕκαστα ἀποδόντα. ↩

52. These are syllogisms and figures, modes (τρόποι) by which the syllogism has its proper conclusion. ↩

53. Compare Aristotle, Topics viii 1, 22 (Giulio Pace edition, 758). Afterwards Epictetus uses τὰ ὡμολογημένα as equivalent to λήμματα (premises or assumptions). ↩

54. “The inference,” τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον. “Ἐπιφορά est ‘illatio’ quae assumptionem sequitur” (John Upton). ↩

55. This, then, is a case of μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι (book I chapter VII at 1), where there has been a sophistical or dishonest change in the premises or in some term, by virtue of which change there appears to be a just conclusion, which, however, is false; and it is not a conclusion derived from the premises to which we assented. A ridiculous example is given by Seneca, Epistles 48: “Mus syllaba est: mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit.” Seneca laughs at this absurdity, and says perhaps the following syllogism (collectio) may be a better example of acuteness: “Mus syllaba est: syllaba autem caseum non rodit: mus ergo caseum non rodit.” One is as good as the other. We know that neither conclusion is true, and we see where the error is. Gilles Ménage says that though the Stoics particularly cultivated logic, some of them despised it, and he mentions Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. John Upton, however, observes that Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius did not despise logic (he says nothing about Seneca), but employed it for their own purposes.

    It has been observed that if a man is asked whether, if every A is B, every B is also A, he might answer that it is. But if you put the conversion in this material form: “Every goose is an animal,” he immediately perceives that he cannot say, “Every animal is a goose.” What does this show? It shows that the man’s comprehension of the proposition, every A is B, was not true, and that he took it to mean something different from what the person intended who put the question. He understood that A and B were coextensive. Whether we call this reasoning or something else, makes no matter. A man whose understanding is sound cannot in the nature of things reason wrong; but his understanding of the matter on which he reasons may be wrong somewhere, and he may not be able to discover where. A man who has been trained in the logical art may show him that his conclusion is just according to his understanding of the terms and the propositions employed, but yet it is not true. ↩

56. Rufus is Musonius Rufus (book I chapter I). To kill a father and to burn the Roman Capitol are mentioned as instances of the greatest crimes. Compare Horace, Epode iii; Cicero, De Amicitia, chapter 11; Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus, chapter 20. ↩

57. The faculties, as Hieronymus Wolf says, are the faculties of speaking and arguing, which, as he also says, make men arrogant and careless who have no solid knowledge, according to Bion’s maxim, ἡ γὰρ οἴησις ἐγκοπὴ τῆς προκοπῆς ἐστιν, “arrogance (self-conceit) is a hindrance to improvement.” See viii 8. ↩

58. Things mean “propositions” and “terms.” See Aristotle, Prior Analytics i 39, δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν, etc. Ἐπιχειρήματα are arguments of any kind with which we attack (ἐπιχειρεῖν) an adversary. ↩

59. The Enthymeme is defined by Aristotle: ἐνθύμημα μὲν οὖν ἐστι συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων (Prior Analytics ii chapter 27). He has explained, in the first part of this chapter, what he means by εἰκός and σημεῖον. See also Augustus De Morgan’s Formal Logic, p. 237; and Penny Cyclopaedia: Organon, p. 6, note. ↩

60. A man, as Hieronymus Wolf explains it, should not make oratory, or the art of speaking, his chief excellence. He should use it to set off something which is superior. ↩

61. Plato was eloquent, and the adversary asks, if that is a reason for not allowing him to be a philosopher. To which the rejoinder is that Hippocrates was a physician, and eloquent too, but not as a physician. ↩

62. Epictetus was lame. ↩

63. In book I chapter XX at 15, Epictetus defines the being (οὐσία) or nature of good to be a proper use of appearances; and he also says, book I chapter XXIX at 1, that the nature of the good is a kind of will (προαίρεσις ποιά), and the nature of evil is a kind of will. But Johann Schweighäuser cannot understand how the “good of man” can be “a certain will with regard to appearances;” and he suggests that Arrian may have written, “a certain will which makes use of appearances.” ↩

64. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations v 37, has the same: “Socrates cum rogaretur, cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. Totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur.” —⁠John Upton ↩

65. It is the possession of reason, he says, by which man has communion with God; it is not by any external means, or religious ceremonial. A modern expositor of Epictetus says, “Through reason our souls are as closely connected and mixed up with the deity as though they were part of him” (book I chapter XIV at 6; book II chapter VIII at 11, 17, 33). In the Epistle named from Peter (2 Peter 2:1, 4) it is written: “Whereby are given to us exceeding great and precious promises that by these [see v. 3] ye might be partakers of the divine nature (γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως), having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust.” Elizabeth Carter, Introduction, §31, has some remarks on this Stoic doctrine, which are not a true explanation of the principles of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. ↩

66. So Jesus said, “Our Father which art in heaven.” Cleanthes, in his hymn to Zeus, writes, ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν. Compare Acts of the Apostles 17:28, where Paul quotes these words. It is not true then that the “conception of a parental deity,” as it has been asserted, was unknown before the teaching of Jesus, and, after the time of Jesus, unknown to those Greeks who were unacquainted with His teaching. ↩

67. In our present society there are thousands who rise in the morning and know not how they shall find something to eat. Some find their food by fraud and theft, some receive it as a gift from others, and some look out for any work that they can find and get their pittance by honest labor. You may see such men everywhere if you will keep your eyes open. Such men, who live by daily labor, live a heroic life, which puts to shame the well-fed philosopher and the wealthy Christian.

    Epictetus has made a great misstatement about irrational animals. Millions die annually for want of sufficient food; and many human beings perish in the same way. We can hardly suppose that he did not know these facts.

    Compare the passage in Matthew 6:25⁠–⁠34). It is said, verse 26: “Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?” The expositors of this passage may be consulted. ↩

68. The old man is Epictetus. ↩

69. He means, as Hieronymus Wolf says, “on account of the necessities of the body seeking the favor of the more powerful by disagreeable compliances.” ↩

70. John Upton refers to Cicero, Tusculan Disputations i 30; Cato Major, chapter 20; Somnium Scipionis, chapter 3 (De Republica, iv 15); the purport of which passage is that we must not depart from life without the command of God. See Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ii 17; iii 5; v 33. But how shall a man know the signal for departure, of which Epictetus speaks? ↩

71. John Upton has referred to the passages of Epictetus in which this expression is used, book I chapter XXIV at 20; book I chapter XXV at 18; book II chapter I at 19, and others; to Seneca, De Providentia chapter 6, Ep. 91; to Cicero, De Finibus iii 18, where there is this conclusion: “e quo apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, quum beatus sit; et stulti manere in vita quum sit miser.”

    Compare Matthew 6:31: “Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things,” etc. ↩

72. This passage is founded on and is in substance the same as that in Plato’s Apology, chapter 17. ↩

73. Johann Schweighäuser has a long note on this passage, to “receive from another.” I think that there is no difficulty about the meaning; and the careful reader will find none. Epictetus was once a slave. ↩

74. The meaning is obscure. Johann Schweighäuser thinks that the allusion is to a defeated enemy asking permission from the conqueror to bury the dead. Epictetus considers a man as a mere carcass who places his happiness in externals and in the favor of others. ↩

75. A “Præfectus Annonæ,” or superintendent of the supply of corn at Rome is first mentioned by Livy (History of Rome iv 12) as appointed during a scarcity. At a later time this office was conferred on Pompey for five years. Gaius Maecenas (Cassius Dio’s Roman History 52, chapter 24) advised Augustus to make a Praefectus Annonae or permanent officer over the corn market and all other markets (ἐπὶ τοῦ σίτου τῆς τε ἀγορᾶς τῆς λοιπῆς). He would thus have the office formerly exercised by the aediles. ↩

76. I cannot explain why the third person is used here instead of the second. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

77. The Stoics taught that man is adapted by his nature for action. He ought not therefore to withdraw from human affairs, and indulge in a lazy life, not even a life of contemplation and religious observances only. John Upton refers to Marcus Aurelius, Meditations v 1, viii 19, and Cicero, De Finibus v. 20. ↩

78. Johann Schweighäuser proposes a small alteration in the Greek text, but I do not think it necessary. When Epictetus says, “Why are we not active?” He means, “Why do some say that we are not active?” And he intends to say that “We are active, but not in the way in which some people are active.” I have therefore added in parentheses what is necessary to make the text intelligible. ↩

79. This passage is rather obscure. The word ἐπαναγνῶναι signifies, it is said, to read over for the purpose of explaining as a teacher may do. The pupil also would read something to the teacher for the purpose of showing if he understood it. So Epictetus also says, “But what is it to me,” etc. ↩

80. A plain allusion to restraints put on the exportation of grain. ↩

81. “When we are children our parents put us in the hands of a pedagogue to see on all occasions that we take no harm.” —⁠Epictetus, Fragment 97 ↩

82. κἂν μεταδόξῃ, “if you should change your mind,” as we say. So we may translate, in the previous part of this chapter, ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, and the like, “we had a mind to such and such a thing.” Below it is said that the causes of our actions are “our opinions and our wills,” where the Greek for “wills” is δόγματα. If we translate ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, “seemed right,” as some persons would translate it, that is not the meaning, unless we understand “seemed right” in a sense in which it is often used, that is, a man’s resolve to do so-and-so. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on ὑπόληψις and δόγμα. As Marcus Aurelius says (Meditations viii 1): “How then shall a man do this (what his nature requires)? If he has principles (δόγματα) from which come his affects (ὅρμαι) and his acts (πράξεις)?” ↩

83. He uses the word δόγματα, which contains the same element or root as δοκεῖ, ἔδοξε. ↩

84. A Scholasticus is one who frequents the schools; a studious and literary person, who does not engage in the business of active life. ↩

85. The line is from the prayer of Ulysses to Athena: “Hear me child of Zeus, thou who standest by me always in all dangers, nor do I even move without thy knowledge.” Socrates said that the gods know everything, what is said and done and thought (Xenophon, Memorabilia i 1, 19). Compare Cicero, De Natura Deorum i 1, 2; and Richard Price’s dissertation “On Providence,” section i. Epictetus enumerates the various opinions about the gods in ancient times. The reader may consult the notes in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition. The opinions about God among modern nations, who are called civilized, and are so more or less, do not seem to be so varied as in ancient times: but the contrasts in modern opinions are striking. These modern opinions vary between denial of a God, though the number of those who deny is perhaps not large, and the superstitious notions about God and his administration of the world, which are taught by teachers, learned and ignorant, and exercise a great power over the minds of those who are unable or do not dare to exercise the faculty of reason. ↩

86. “To follow God,” is a Stoical expression. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations x 11. ↩

87. This means that we ought to learn to be satisfied with everything that happens, in fact with the will of God. This is a part of education, according to Epictetus. But it does not appear in our systems of education so plainly as it does here. Marcus Aurelius (Meditations iv 23): “Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for thee.” ↩

88. John Upton has collected the passages in which this doctrine was mentioned. One passage is in Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights vi 1), from the fourth book of Chrysippus On Providence, who says: “nothing is more foolish than the opinions of those who think that good could have existed without evil.” Johann Schweighäuser wishes that Epictetus had discussed more fully the question on the nature and origin of Evil. He refers to the commentary of Simplicius on the Enchiridion of Epictetus, chapter 13 (8), and 34 (27), for his treatment of this subject. Epictetus (Enchiridion, c. 27) says that “as a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe.” Simplicius observes (p. 278, ed. Schweighäuser): “The Good is that which is according to each thing’s nature, wherein each thing has its perfection: but the Bad is the disposition contrary to its nature of the thing which contains the bad, by which disposition it is deprived of that which is according to nature, namely, the good. For if the Bad as well as the Good were a disposition and perfection of the form (εἴδους) in which it is, the bad itself would also be good and would not then be called Bad.” ↩

89. The word is ὑποθέσεις. It is explained by what follows. ↩

90. “Et quota pars homo sit terrai totius unus.” Lucretius, De Rerum Natura vi 652, and Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ii 4. ↩

91. The original is δόγμασι, which the Latin translators render “decretis,” and Elizabeth Carter “principles.” I don’t understand either. I have rendered the word by “thoughts,” which is vague, but I can do no better. It was the Stoic doctrine that the human intelligence is a particle of the divine. Carter names this “one of the Stoic extravagancies, arising from the notion that human souls were literally parts of the Deity.” But this is hardly a correct representation of the Stoic doctrine. ↩

92. Elizabeth Carter compares Job 31:15: “Did not he that made me in the womb make him (my manservant)? And did not one fashion us in the womb?” ↩

93. I suppose he means human laws, which have made one man a slave to another; and when he says “dead men,” he may mean mortal men, as contrasted with the gods or God, who has made all men brothers. ↩

94. Things appear to be separate, but there is a bond by which they are united. “All this that you see, wherein things divine and human are contained, is One: we are members of one large body” (Seneca, Epistle 95). “The universe is either a confusion, a mutual involution of things and a dispersion; or it is unity and order and providence” (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations vi 10): also vii 9, “all things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing.” See also Cicero, De Natura Deorum ii 7; and De Oratore, iii 5. ↩

95. The word is συμπαθεῖν. Cicero (De Divinatione ii 69) translates συμ πάθειαν by “continuatio conjunctioque naturae.” ↩

96. Compare Emanuel Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 349⁠–⁠356. ↩

97. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations v 27: “Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the Daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man’s understanding and reason.” Marcus Aurelius (Meditations iii 5) names this Daemon “the god who is in thee.” St. Paul (1 Corinthians 3:16) says, “Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you?” Even the poets use this form of expression:

    Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo [ipso]:
    Impetus hic sacrae semina mentis habet.

    —⁠Ovid, “Fasti” vi 5

    ↩

98. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on παραδέδωκεν. ↩

99. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

100. This is τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, a word often used by Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ii 2; vi S. ↩

101. “The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom” (Elizabeth Carter). The flowers of a fig are inside the fleshy receptacle which becomes the fruit.

     Johann Schweighäuser prints μὴ δ̓ ἂν, ἐγώ σοι λέγω, προσδόκα: and in his Latin version he prints: “Id vero, ego tibi dico, ne expectes.” I neither understand his pointing, nor his version. Hieronymus Wolf translates it, “Etsi ego tibi dixero (virtutem brevi parari posse), noli credere”: which is right. Wolf makes ἄν go with λέγω. ↩

102. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations v 33. ↩

103. See John Upton’s note on ὁδῷ. ↩

104. ᾁδοντα is Johann Schweighäuser’s probable emendation. ↩

105. Λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ διαρθρῶν. Διαρθροῦν means “to divide a thing into its parts or members.” The word “analyse” seems to be the nearest equivalent. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on ὑπὸ τίνος διαρθρωθῆ. ↩

106. This is obscure. The conclusion, “Reason therefore is analysed by itself” is not in Epictetus; but it is implied, as Johann Schweighäuser says (p. 197, notes). So Marcus Aurelius, Meditations xi 1, writes: “These are the properties of the rational soul; it sees itself, analyses itself.” If reason, our reason, requires another reason to analyse it, that other reason will require another reason to analyse that other reason; and so on to infinity. If reason then, our reason, can be analysed, it must be analysed by itself. The notes on the first part of this chapter in the edition of Johann Schweighäuser may be read by those who are inclined. ↩

107. “Our opinions.” There is some defect in the text, as Hieronymus Wolf remarks. “The opponent,” he says, “disparages Logic (Dialectic) as a thing which is not necessary to make men good, and he prefers moral teaching to Logic: but Epictetus informs him, that a man who is not a Dialectician will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching.” ↩

108. He repeats the words of the supposed opponent; and he means that his adversary’s difficulty shows the necessity of Dialectic. ↩

109. Antisthenes who professed the Cynic philosophy, rejected Logic and Physic (Johann Schweighäuser note p. 201). ↩

110. Xenophon, Memorabilia iv 5, 12, and iv 6, 7. Epictetus knew what education ought to be. We learn language, and we ought to learn what it means. When children learn words, they should learn what the thing is which is signified by the word. In the case of children this can only be done imperfectly as to some words, but it may be done even then in some degree; and it must be done, or the word signifies nothing, or, what is equally bad, the word is misunderstood. All of us pass our lives in ignorance of many words which we use; some of us in greater ignorance than others, but all of us in ignorance to some degree. ↩

111. The supposed interpreter says this. When Epictetus says “the Roman tongue,” perhaps he means that the supposed opponent is a Roman and does not know Greek well. ↩

112. Enchiridion, chapter 49. “When a man gives himself great airs because he can understand and expound Chrysippus, say to yourself: If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of.” See the rest. ↩

113. Compare Xenophon, Memorabilia i 1, 3. ↩

114. This is true. If you place before a man the fear of death, you threaten him with the fear of death. The man may yield to the threat and do what it is the object of the threat to make him do; or he may make resistance to him who attempts to enforce the threat; or he may refuse to yield, and so take the consequence of his refusal. If a man yields to the threat, he does so for the reason which Epictetus gives, and freedom of choice, and consequently freedom of will really exists in this case. The Roman law did not allow contracts or agreements made under the influence of threats to be valid; and the reason for declaring them invalid was not the want of free will in him who yielded to the threat, but the fact that threats are directly contrary to the purpose of all law, which purpose is to secure the independent action of every person in all things allowed by law. This matter is discussed by Savigny, Des Heutigen Römische Recht, iii §114. See the title “Quod metus causa,” in the Digest, 4, 2. Compare also book IV chapter I at 68, etc. ↩

115. τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι, etc.: Johann Schweighäuser has a note on the distinction between τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι and τὸ ὁρμᾶν. Compare book III chapter II at 1; book III chapter III at 2; book III chapter XXII at 43; and book I chapter IV at 11. Schweighäuser says that ὀρέγεσθαι refers to the ἀγαθόν and συμφέρον, and ὁρμᾶν to the καθῆκον, and he concludes that there is a defect in the text, which he endeavors to supply. ↩

116. Elizabeth Carter says: “The most ignorant persons often practice what they know to be evil: and they, who voluntarily suffer, as many do, their inclinations to blind their judgment, are not justified by following it. [Perhaps she means ‘them,’ ‘their inclinations.’] The doctrine of Epictetus therefore, here and elsewhere, on this head, contradicts the voice of reason and conscience: nor is it less pernicious than ill-grounded. It destroys all guilt and merit, all punishment and reward, all blame of ourselves or others, all sense of misbehavior towards our fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such philosophers did not teach repentance towards God.”

     Carter has not understood Epictetus; and her censure is misplaced. It is true that “the most ignorant persons often practice what they know to be evil,” as she truly says. But she might have said more. It is also true that persons, who are not ignorant, often do what they know to be evil, and even what they would condemn in another, at least before they had fallen into the same evil themselves; for when they have done what they know to be wrong, they have a fellow-feeling with others who are as bad as themselves. Nor does he say, as Carter seems to imply that he does, for her words are ambiguous, that they who voluntarily suffer their inclinations to blind their judgment are justified by following them. He says that men will do as they do, so long as they think as they think. He only traces to their origin the bad acts which bad men do; and he says that we should pity them and try to mend them. Now the best man in the world, if he sees the origin and direct cause of bad acts in men, may pity them for their wickedness, and he will do right. He will pity, and still he will punish severely, if the interests of society require the guilty to be punished: but he will not punish in anger. Epictetus says nothing about legal penalties; and I assume that he would not say that the penalties are always unjust, if I understand his principles. His discourse is to this effect, as the title tells us, that we ought not to be angry with the errors of others: the matter of the discourse is the feeling and disposition which we ought to have towards those who do wrong, “because they are mistaken about good and evil.”

     He does not discuss the question of the origin of these men’s mistake further than this: men think that a thing or act is advantageous; and it is impossible for them to think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another thing. Their error is in their opinion. Then he tells us to show them their error, and they will desist from their errors. He is not here examining the way of showing them their error; by which I suppose that he means convincing them of their error. He seems to admit that it may not be possible to convince them of their errors; for he says, “if they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion.”

     This is the plain and certain meaning of Epictetus which Carter in her zeal has not seen. ↩

117. Here the text, 9, 10, 11 is defective. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

118. The conclusion explains what precedes. A man can have no pain in his horns, because he has none. A man cannot be vexed about the loss of a thing if he does not possess it. John Upton says that Epictetus alludes to the foolish quibble: “If you have not lost a thing, you have it: but you have not lost horns; therefore you have horns” (Seneca, Epistle 45). Epictetus says, “You do not lose a thing when you have it not.” See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

119. Compare what is said in Xenophon, Memorabilia iv 2, 24, on the expression “Know thyself.” ↩

120. This ought to be the method in teaching children. ↩

121. That is: obstinate, as this animal is generally; and sometimes very obstinate. The meaning then is, as Johann Schweighäuser says: “a man should be invincible, not with a kind of stupid obstinacy or laziness and slowness in moving himself like an ass, but he should be invincible through reason, reflection, meditation, study, and diligence.” ↩

122. “From the rustics came the old proverb, for when they commend a man’s fidelity and goodness they say he is a man with whom you may play the game with the fingers in the dark.” Cicero, De Officiis, iii 19. See Egidio Forcellini’s Latin lexicon: “Micare.” ↩

123. The manuscripts have ὑομένος or οἰόμενος. Johann Schweighäuser has accepted John Upton’s emendation of οἰνωμένος, but I do not. The “sleep” refers to dreams. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, i 13, says: “better are the visions (dreams) of the good (ἐπιεικῶν) than those of the common sort;” and Zeno taught that “a man might from his dreams judge of the progress that he was making, if he observed that in his sleep he was not pleased with anything bad, nor desired or did anything unreasonable or unjust.” Plutarch, περὶ προκοτῆς, edited by Daniel Albert Wyttenbach, vol. i chapter 12. ↩

124. θεραπεύουσι. Epictetus continues to use the same word. ↩

125. Febris, fever, was a goddess at Rome. John Upton refers to an inscription in Jan Gruter (Inscriptiones antiquae totius orbis Romani 97), which begins “Febri Divae.” Compare Lactantius, De falsa religione, chapter 20. ↩

126. Compare book I chapter III. ↩

127. The word is φίλαυτον, self-love, but here it means self-regard, which implies no censure. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics ix chapter 8: ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι. His conclusion is: οὕτω μὲν οὖν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴρηται ὡς δ̓ οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή. See the note of Johann Schweighäuser. Epictetus, as usual, is right in his opinion of man’s nature. ↩

128. This has been misunderstood by Hieronymus Wolf. Johann Schweighäuser, who always writes like a man of sense, says: “Epictetus means by ‘our proper interests,’ the interests proper to man, as a man, as a rational being; and this interest or good consists in the proper use of our powers, and so far from being repugnant to common interest or utility, it contains within itself the notion of general utility and cannot be separated from it.” ↩

129. Such a man was named in Greek κοιτωνίτης; in Latin “cubicularius,” a lord of the bedchamber, as we might say. Seneca, De Constantia Sapientis, chapter 14, speaks “of the pride of the nomenclator (the announcer of the name), of the arrogance of the bedchamber man.” Even the clerk of the close-stool was an important person. Slaves used to carry this useful domestic vessel on a journey. Horace Satires i 6, 109 (John Upton). ↩

130. Once the master of Epictetus (book I chapter I at 20). ↩

131. Hand-kissing was in those times of tyranny the duty of a slave, not of a free man. This servile practice still exists among men called free. ↩

132. Johann Schweighäuser says that he has introduced into the text Lord Shaftesbury’s emendation, ὅπου. The emendation ὅπου is good, but Schweighäuser has not put it in his text: he has οἷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τιθέμεθα. Matthew 6:21, “for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.” So these people show by thanking God, what it is for which they are thankful. ↩

133. Isaac Casaubon, in a learned note on Suetonius, Augustus, chapter 18, informs us that divine honors were paid to Augustus at Nicopolis, which town he founded after the victory at Actium. The priesthood of Augustus at Nicopolis was a high office, and the priest gave his name to the year; that is, when it was intended in any writing to fix the year, either in any writing which related to public matters, or in instruments used in private affairs, the name of the priest of Augustus was used, and this was also the practice in most Greek cities. In order to establish the sense of this passage, Casaubon changed the text from τὰς φωνάς into τὰ σύμφωνα, which emendation Johann Schweighäuser has admitted into his text. ↩

134. A comparison of book I chapter I will help to explain this chapter. Compare also book I chapter XVII. ↩

135. Hieronymus Wolf suggests that we should read προηγουμένως instead of προηγουμένων. ↩

136. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

137. “We reckon death among the things which are indifferent (indifferentia), which the Greeks name ἀδιάφορα. But I name ‘indifferent’ the things which are neither good nor bad, as disease, pain, poverty, exile, death.” —⁠Seneca, Epistle 82 ↩

138. Zeno, a native of Citium, in the island of Cyprus, is said to have come when he was young to Athens, where he spent the rest of a long life in the study and teaching of Philosophy. He was the founder of the Stoic sect, and a man respected for his ability and high character. He wrote many philosophical works. Zeno was succeeded in his school by Cleanthes. ↩

139. Follow. See book I chapter XII at 5. ↩

140. “I now have what the universal nature wills me to have, and I do what my nature now wills me to do.” Marcus Aurelius, Meditations v 25, and xi 5.

     Epictetus never attempts to say what God is. He was too wise to attempt to do what man cannot do. But man does attempt to do it, and only shows the folly of his attempts, and, I think, his presumption also. ↩

141. Epicurus is said to have written more than any other person, as many as three hundred volumes (κύλινδροι, rolls). Chrysippus was his rival in this respect. For if Epicurus wrote anything, Chrysippus vied with him in writing as much; and for this reason he often repeated himself, because he did not read over what he had written, and he left his writings uncorrected in consequence of his hurry. Diogenes Laërtius, Lives x⁠—John Upton. See i 4. ↩

142. Precognitions (προλήψεις) is translated Praecognita by John Smith, Select Discourses, p. 4. Cicero says (Topica, 7): “Notionem appello quod Graeci tum ἔννοιαν, tum πρόληψιν dicunt. Ea est insita et ante percepta cujusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens.” In the De Natura Deorum (i 16) he says: “Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus? id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest.” Epicurus, as Cicero says in the following chapter (17), was the first who used πρόληψις in this sense, which Cicero applies to what he calls the ingrafted or rather innate cognitions of the existence of gods, and these cognitions he supposes to be universal; but whether this is so or not, I do not know. See i chapter 2; Tusculan Disputations i 24; De Finibus iii 6; and πρόληψις in book IV chapter VIII at 6. ↩

143. The word is ὅσιον, which is very difficult to translate. We may take an instance from ourselves. There is a general agreement about integrity, and about the worship of the supreme being, but a wondrous difference about certain acts or doings in trading, whether they are consistent with integrity or not; and a still more wondrous difference in forms of worship, whether they are conformable to religion or not. ↩

144. Horace, Epistles i 2. ↩

145. Iliad, i: The quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon about giving up Chryseis to her father. ↩

146. The bath was a place of common resort, where a thief had the opportunity of carrying off a bather’s clothes. From men’s desires to have what they have not, and do not choose to labor for, spring the disorders of society, as it is said in the epistle of James 4, 5:1, to which Elizabeth Carter refers. ↩

147. See note 125. ↩

148. John Upton refers to a passage in the Theaetetus (p. 150, Stephanus pagination), where Socrates professes that it is his art to discover whether a young man’s mind is giving birth to an idol (an unreality) and a falsity, or to something productive and true; and he says (p. 151) that those who associate with him are like women in childbirth, for they are in labor and full of trouble nights and days much more than women, and his art has the power of stirring up and putting to rest this labor of childbirth.

     The conclusion in the chapter is not clear. The student is supposed to be addressed by some rich old man, who really does not know what to say; and the best way of getting rid of him and his idle talk is by dismissing him with a joke. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

149. That is in the body; see book I chapter XX at 17. Compare book II chapter XX at the beginning of the chapter. ↩

150. The word ὑπονοητικοί is not intelligible. Johann Schweighäuser suggests that it ought to be προνοητικοί, “how have we any care for others?” Epicurus taught that we should not marry nor beget children nor engage in public affairs, because these things disturb our tranquillity. ↩

151. So Ovid says, Tristia iv 3, 79:

     Quae latet inque bonis cessat non cognita rebus,
     Apparet virtus argniturque malis.

     ↩

152. In the time of Domitian philosophers were banished from Rome and Italy by a Senatusconsultum (Suetonius Domitianus chapter 10; Cassius Dio’s Roman History, 67, chapter 13), and at that time Epictetus, as Aulus Gellius says (Attic Nights xv 11), went from Rome to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he opened a school. We may suppose that Epictetus is here speaking of some person who had gone from Nicopolis to Rome to inquire about the state of affairs there under the cruel tyrant Domitian. (Johann Schweighäuser.) ↩

153. Diogenes was brought to king Philip after the battle of Chaeronea as a spy (book III chapter XXII at 24). Plutarch in the treatise, Quomodo assentator ab amico dignoscatur, chapter 30, states that when Philip asked Diogenes if he was a spy, he replied, “Certainly I am a spy, Philip, of your want of judgment and of your folly, which lead you without any necessity to put to the hazard your kingdom and your life in one single hour.” ↩

154. The garment with the broad border, the laticlave, was the dress of a senator; the garment with the narrow border, the angusticlave, was the dress of a man of the equestrian order. ↩

155. The exclamation of Oedipus in the Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles, line 1390. ↩

156. This means “you can die when you please.” Compare book I chapter IX. The power of dying when you please is named by Plinius (Naturalis Historia ii chapter 7) the best thing that God has given to man amidst all the sufferings of life. Horace, Epistles ii 2, 213:

     Vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis:
     Lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti;
     Tempus abire tibi.

     ↩

157. The conclusion “and you will then see,” is not in the text, but it is what Epictetus means. The argument is complete. If we admit the existence of God, and that he is our father, as Epictetus teaches, we have from him the intellectual powers which we possess; and those men in whom these powers have been roused to activity, and are exercised, require no other instructor. It is true that in a large part of mankind these powers are inactive and are not exercised, or if they are exercised, it is in a very imperfect way. But those who contemplate the improvement of the human race, hope that all men, or if not all men a great number, will be roused to the exercise of the powers which they have, and that human life will be made more conformable to Nature, that is, that man will use the powers which he has, and will not need advice and direction from other men, who professing that they are wise and that they can teach, prove by their teaching and often by their example that they are not wise, and are incapable of teaching.

     This is equally true for those who may deny or doubt about the existence of God. They cannot deny that man has the intellectual powers which he does possess; and they are certainly not the persons who will proclaim their own want of these powers. If man has them and can exercise them, the fact is sufficient; and we need not dispute about the source of these powers which are in man Naturally, that is, according to the constitution of his Nature. ↩

158. See the end of the preceding chapter. John Upton compares Horace’s “Incidere ludum” (Epistles i 14, 36). Compare also book II chapter XVI at 37. ↩

159. A festival at Rome in December, a season of jollity and license (Livy, History of Rome xxii 1). Compare the passage in Tacitus, The Annals xiii 15, in which Nero is chosen by lot to be king: and Seneca, De Constantia Sapientis chapter 12, “Illi (pueri) inter ipsos magistratus gerunt, et praetextam fascesque ac tribunal imitantur.” ↩

160. Gyarus or Gyara a wretched island in the Aegean sea, to which criminals were sent under the empire at Rome. Juvenal, Satires i 73. ↩

161. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

162. Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher, of whom Seneca (De Beneficiis vii 1) says: “He was in my opinion a great man, even if he is compared with the greatest.” One of his sayings was; “You gain more by possessing a few precepts of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning many if you have them not at hand.” Seneca often mentions Demetrius. The saying in the text is also attributed to Anaxagoras (Lives by Diogenes Laërtius) and to Socrates by Xenophon (Apologia, 27). ↩

163. At Rome, and probably in other towns, there were seats reserved for the different classes of men at the public spectacles. ↩

164. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

165. Paradoxes (παράδοξα), “things contrary to opinion,” are contrasted with paralogies (παράλογα), “things contrary to reason” (book IV chapter I at 173). Cicero says (Prooemium to his Paradoxes), that paradoxes are “something which cause surprise and contradict common opinion;” and in another place he says that the Romans gave the name of “admirabilia” to the Stoic paradoxes.⁠—The puncture of the eye is the operation for cataract. ↩

166. ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας. “Intelligere quid verum rectumque sit, prius est et facilius. Id vero exsequi et observare, posterius et difficilius.”⁠—Hieronymus Wolf.

     This is a profound and useful remark of Epictetus. General principles are most easily understood and accepted. The difficulty is in the application of them. What is more easy, for example, than to understand general principles of law which are true and good? But in practice cases are presented to us which as Francis Bacon says, are “immersed in matter;” and it is this matter which makes the difficulty of applying the principles, and requires the ability and study of an experienced man. It is easy, and it is right, to teach the young the general principles of the rules of life; but the difficulty of applying them is that in which the young and the old too often fail. So if you ask whether virtue can be taught, the answer is that the rules for a virtuous life can be delivered; but the application of the rules is the difficulty, as teachers of religion and morality know well, if they are fit to teach. If they do not know this truth, they are neither fit to teach the rules, nor to lead the way to the practice of them by the only method which is possible; and this method is by their own example, assisted by the example of those who direct the education of youth, and of those with whom young persons live. ↩

167. “Such an intention” appears to mean “the intention of learning.” “The son alone can say this to his father, when the son studies philosophy for the purpose of living a good life, and not for the purpose of display.” —⁠Hieronymus Wolf ↩

168. I have followed Schweihaeuser’s explanation of this difficult passage, and I have accepted his emendation ἐκσείοντα, in place of the manuscripts, reading ἐκεῖ ὄντα. ↩

169. This was a large sum. He is speaking of drachmae, or of the Roman equivalents denarii. In Roman language the amount would be briefly expressed by “sexagies centena millia H. S.,” or simply by “sexagies.” ↩

170. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note; and all his notes on this chapter, which is rather difficult. ↩

171. See book II chapter XI. ↩

172. Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi, chapter 9, says: “What is the use of countless books and libraries, when the owner scarcely reads in his whole life the tables of contents? The number only confuses a learner, does not instruct him. It is much better to give yourself up to a few authors than to wander through many.” ↩

173. See Plato’s Apology, chapter 28; and Marcus Aurelius, Meditations iii 5. ↩

174. Pyrrho was a native of Elis, in the Peloponnesus. He is said to have accompanied Alexander the Great in his Asiatic expedition (Diogenes Laërtius, Lives ix 61). The time of his birth is not stated, but it is said that he lived to the age of ninety.

     See Thomas Woodhouse Levin’s Six Lectures Introductory to the Philosophical Writings of Cicero, 1871. Lecture II, “On the Pyrrhonian Ethic;” Lecture III, “On the grounds of Scepticism.” ↩

175. ἀπώλετο does not mean that the father is dead, and that the mother is dead. They survive and lament. Compare Euripides, Alcestis, v 825:

     ἀπωλόμεσθα πάντες, οὐ κείνη μόν

     ↩

176. Homer, Iliad, xii verse 328: ἴομεν, ἠὲ τῳ εὐχος ὀρέξομεν ἦέ τις ἡμῖν. ↩

177. “This means, the received opinion about the knowledge and certainty of things, which knowledge and certainty the Sceptic philosophers attack by taking away general assent or consent” (Hieronymus Wolf). Lord Shaftesbury accepts this explanation. See also Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

178. “The chief question which was debated between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics on one side, and the Stoics on the other, was this, whether there is a criterion of truth; and in the first place, the question is about the evidence of the senses, or the certainty of truth in those things which are perceived by the senses.” —⁠Johann Schweighäuser.

     The strength of the Stoic system was that “it furnishes a groundwork of common sense, and the universal belief of mankind, on which to found sufficient certitude for the requirements of life: on the other hand, the real question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense of the word, was abandoned.” Thomas Woodhouse Levin’s Six Lectures Introductory to the Philosophical Writings of Cicero, p. 70. ↩

179. ὡς πρὸς σκοπόν, Johann Schweighäuser’s emendation in place of ὡς προκόπτων. ↩

180. For the word συνήθειαν, which occurs in s. 20, Johann Schweighäuser suggests ἀλήθειαν here, and translates it by “veritas.” See his notes on this chapter, s. 15 and s. 20. ↩

181. See chapter XVIII of this book. ↩

182. We cannot conceive that the number of stars is either even or odd. The construction of the word ἀποπάσχειν is uncertain, for, says Johann Schweighäuser, the word is found only here. ↩

183. The Medea of Euripides, 1079, “where, instead of δρᾶν μέλλω of Epictetus, the reading is τολμήσω” (John Upton). “τολμήσω (Adolf Kirchoff), with the best manuscripts, for δρᾶν μέλλω, which, however is the reading cited by several ancient authors.” Frederick Apthorp Paley’s Euripides, note. ↩

184. This is the literal version. It does not mean “that it appeared right,” as Elizabeth Carter translates it. Alexander never thought whether it was right or wrong. All that appeared to him was the possessing of Helene, and he used the means for getting possession of her, as a dog who spies and pursues some wild animal. ↩

185. Johann Schweighäuser proposes to erase μὴ from the text, but it is, I suppose, in all the manuscripts: and it is easy to explain the passage without erasing the, μὴ. ↩

186. The expression τὸ φαινόμενον often occurs in this chapter, and it is sometimes translated by the Latin “sententia” or “opinio”: and so it may be, and I have translated it by “opinion.” But Epictetus says (s. 30) ἀλλὰ τί ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰθὺς ποιῶ τὸ φανέν: which means that there was an appearance, which was followed by the act. The word generally used by Epictetus is φαντασία, which occurs very often. In the Enchiridion (i 5) there is some difference between φαντασία and τὸ φαινόμενον, for they are contrasted: τὸ φαινόμενον is the phenomenon, the bare appearance: φαντασία in this passage maybe the mental state consequent on the φαινόμενον: or as Diogenes Laërtius says, Παντασία ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. ↩

187. The word is οὐσία. The corresponding Latin word which Cicero introduced is “essentia” (Seneca, Epistles 58). The English word “essence” has obtained a somewhat different sense. The proper translation of οὐσία is “being” or “nature.” ↩

188. This is the maxim of Horace, Epistles i 6; and Macleane’s note:

     Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici,
     Solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum.

     on which John Upton remarks that this maxim is explained very philosophically and learnedly by Lord Shaftesbury (the author of the Characteristics), vol. iii p. 202. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations xii 1; Seneca, De Vita Beata, chapter 3, writes, “Aliarum rerum quae vitam instruunt diligens, sine admiratione cujusquam.” Marcus Aurelius (Meditations i 15) expresses the “sine admiratione” by τὸ ἀθαύμαστον. ↩

189. This is explained by what follows. Opinion does not really conquer itself; but one opinion can conquer another, and nothing else can. ↩

190. The two chief prosecutors of Socrates (Plato, Apology, chapter 18; book II chapter II at 15). ↩

191. See book I chapter XVIII at 15. ↩

192. ὠφέλησαι. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

193. One of those who cry out “Philosopher,” etc. ↩

194. See book I chapter IX at 20. ↩

195. See book I chapter VI at 13. ↩

196. Socrates was condemned by the Athenians to die, and he was content to die, and thought that it was a good thing; and this was the reason why he made such a defense as he did, which brought on him condemnation; and he preferred condemnation to escaping it by entreating the dicasts (judges), and lamenting, and saying and doing things unworthy of himself, as others did. —⁠Plato, Apology, chapters 29⁠–⁠33. Compare book I chapter IX at 16. ↩

197. See book I chapter XXV at 8. ↩

198. Read θέλῃς instead of θέλῃ. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

199. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. This appears to be the remark of Epictetus. If it is so, what follows is not clear. Schweighäuser explains it, “But most of you act otherwise.” ↩

200. The Roman emperors kept gladiators for their own amusement and that of the people (Lipsius, Saturnalia, ii 16). Seneca says (De Providentia chapter 4), “I have heard a mirmillo (a kind of gladiator) in the time of C. Caesar (Caligula) complaining of the rarity of gladiatorial exhibitions: ‘What a glorious period of life is wasting.’ ” “Virtue,” says Seneca, “is eager after dangers; and it considers only what it seeks, not what it may suffer.” —⁠John Upton ↩

201. The word is “hypothesis” (ὑπόθεσις), which in this passage means “matter to work on,” “material,” “subject,” as in book II chapter V at 11, where it means the “business of the pilot.” In book I chapter VII hypothesis has the sense of a proposition supposed for the present to be true, and used as the foundation of an argument. ↩

202. Tropic (τροπικόν), a logical term used by Stoics, which Johann Schweighäuser translates “propositio connexa in syllogismo hypothetico.”

     The meaning of the whole is this. You do not like the work which is set before you: as we say, you are not content “to do your duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call you.” Now this is as foolish, says Hieronymus Wolf, as for a man in any discussion to require that his adversary should raise no objection except such as may serve the man’s own case. ↩

203. There will be a time when Tragic actors shall not know what their business is, but will think that it is all show. So, says Hieronymus Wolf, philosophers will be only beard and cloak, and will not show by their life and morals what they really are; or they will be like false monks, who only wear the cowl, and do not show a life of piety and sanctity. ↩

204. God is introduced as speaking. —⁠Johann Schweighäuser ↩

205. The word is Κύριος, the name by which a slave in Epictetus addresses his master (dominus), a physician is addressed by his patient, and in other cases also it is used. It is also used by the Evangelists. They speak of the angel of the Lord (Matthew 1:24); and Jesus is addressed by the same term (Matthew 8:2), Lord or master.

     Elizabeth Carter has the following note: “It has been observed that this manner of expression is not to be met with in the Heathen authors before Christianity, and therefore it is one instance of Scripture language coming early into common use.”

     But the word (κύριος) is used by early Greek writers to indicate one who has power or authority, and in a sense like the Roman “dominus,” as by Sophocles for instance. The use of the word then by Epictetus was not new, and it may have been used by the Stoic writers long before his time. The language of the Stoics was formed at least two centuries before the Christian era, and the New Testament writers would use the Greek which was current in their age. The notion of “Scripture language coming early into common use” is entirely unfounded, and is even absurd. Carter’s remark implies that Epictetus used the Scripture language, whereas he used the particular language of the Stoics, and the general language of his age, and the New Testament writers would do the same. There are resemblances between the language of Epictetus and the New Testament writers, such as the expression μὴ γένοιτο of Paul, which Epictetus often uses; but this is a slight matter. The words of Peter (Ephesians 2:1, 4), “that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature,” are a Stoic expression, and the writer of this Epistle, I think, took them from the language of the Stoics. ↩

206. The words in the text are: περὶ τῆς νήτης ʽνεάτης’ εἶναι ὑπάτην, “When ὑπάτη is translated ‘the lowest chord or note,’ it must be remembered that the names employed in the Greek musical terminology are precisely the opposite to ours. Compare νεάτη ‘the highest note,’ though the word in itself means lowest.” —⁠Thomas Hewitt Key’s Philological Essays, p. 42, note 1 ↩

207. I think that Johann Schweighäuser’s interpretation is right, that “the instructed” are those who think that they are instructed but are not, as they show by their opinion that they accept in moral matters the judgment of an ignorant man, whose judgment in music or geometry they would not accept. ↩

208. He names these “small arguments” λογάρια, which Cicero (Tusculan Disputations ii 12) names “ratiunculae.” ↩

209. “What is the profit, my brethren, if anyone should say that he hath faith and have not works?⁠ ⁠… Thus also faith, if it hath not works, is dead in itself. But a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works.” —⁠Epistle of James 2:14⁠–⁠18 ↩

210. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on ἐπέστη. ↩

211. The word is εὐσταθῶ. The corresponding noun is εὐστάθεια, which is the title of this chapter. ↩

212. John Upton supposes that Epictetus is alluding to the verse of Aristophanes (Acharnians 531), where it is said of Pericles:

     He flashed, he thundered, and confounded Hellas.

     ↩

213. He calls the uninstructed and ignorant by the Greek word “Idiotae,” “idiots,” which we now use in a peculiar sense. An Idiota was a private individual as opposed to one who filled some public office; and thence it had generally the sense of one who was ignorant of any particular art, as, for instance, one who had not studied philosophy. ↩

214. Compare the Phaedon of Plato (p. 116). The children of Socrates were brought in to see him before he took the poison by which he died; and also the wives of the friends of Socrates who attended him to his death. Socrates had ordered his wife Xanthippe to be led home before he had his last conversation with his friends, and she was taken away lamenting and bewailing. ↩

215. The reader may understand why Epictetus gave such a lesson as this, if he will remember the tyranny under which men at that time lived. ↩

216. It was the fashion of hunters to frighten deer by displaying feathers of various colors on ropes or strings and thus frightening them towards the nets. Virgil, Georgics iii 372:

     Puniceaeve agitant pavidos formidine pennae.

     ↩

217. Euripides, fragments. ↩

218. In the Phaedon, chapter 24, or p. 78. ↩

219. It was the opinion of some philosophers that the soul was a portion of the divinity sent down into human bodies. ↩

220. This was a doctrine of Heraclitus and of Zeno. Zeno (Diogenes Laërtius, Lives vii 137) speaks of God as “in certain periods or revolutions of time exhausting into himself the universal substance (οὐσία) and again generating it out of himself.” Marcus Aurelius (Meditations xi 1) speaks of the periodical renovation of all things. For man, whose existence is so short, the doctrine of all existing things perishing in the course of time and then being renewed is of no practical value. The present is enough for most men. But for the few who are able to embrace in thought the past, the present, and the future, the contemplation of the perishable nature of all existing things may have a certain value by elevating their minds above the paltry things which others prize above their worth. ↩

221. See note 70. Johann Schweighäuser says that he does not quite see what is the meaning of “ought to be open”; and he suggests that Epictetus intended to say “we ought to consider that the door is open for all occasions”; but the occasions, he says, ought to be when things are such that a man can in no way bear them or cannot honorably endure them, and such occasions the wise man considers to be the voice of God giving to him the sign to retire. ↩

222. This is an allusion to one of the Roman modes of manumitting a slave before the praetor. Compare, Persius, Satires V 75:

     —Heu steriles veri, qulbus una Quiritem
     Vertigo facit;

     and again

     Verterit hunc dominus, momento turbinis exit
     Marcus Dama.

     The sum paid on manumission was a tax of five percent, established in 356 BC (Livy, History of Rome vii 16), and paid by the slave. Epictetus here speaks of the tax being paid by the master; but in book III chapter XXVI, he speaks of it as paid by the enfranchised slave. See Dureau de la Malle, Economie Politique des Romains i 290, ii 169. ↩

223. These are the words of some pupil who is boasting of what he has written. ↩

224. The word is περιόδια. I am not sure about the exact meaning of περιόδια: see the notes of Hieronymus Wolf and Johann Schweighäuser ↩

225. No other author speaks of Socrates having written anything. It is therefore very difficult to explain this passage in which Arrian, who took down the words of Epictetus, represents him as saying that Socrates wrote so much. Socrates talked much, and Epictetus may have spoken of talking as if it were writing; for he must have known that Socrates was not a writer. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

226. The word is ὑπὸ ἀταραξίας. Elizabeth Carter thinks that the true reading is ὑπὸ ἀπραξίας, “through idleness” or “having nothing to do”; and she remarks that “freedom from perturbations” is the very thing that Epictetus had been recommending through the whole chapter and is the subject of the next chapter, and therefore cannot be well supposed to be the true reading in a place where it is mentioned with contempt. It is probable that Carter is right. John Upton thinks that Epictetus is alluding to the Sophists, and that we should understand him as speaking ironically: and this may also be right. Johann Schweighäuser attempts to explain the passage by taking “free from perturbations” in the ordinary simple sense; but I doubt if he has succeeded. ↩

227. ἐμπερπερεύσῃ. Epictetus (book III chapter II at 14) uses the adjective πέρπερος to signify a vain man. Marcus Aurelius (Meditations v. 5) uses the verb περπέρευεσθαι: and Paul (1 Corinthians 13:4), where our version is, “charity (love) vaunteth not itself.” Cicero (Epistulae ad Atticum i 14, 4) uses ἐνεπερπερευσάμην, to express a rhetorical display. ↩

228. “The whole life of philosophers,” says Cicero (Tusculan Disputations i 30), following Plato, “is a reflection upon death.” ↩

229. “Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, torture, exile, and sudden executions can be ranked among the common accidents of life, may be surprised to find Epictetus so frequently endeavoring to prepare his hearers for them. But it must be recollected that he addressed himself to persons who lived under the Roman emperors, from whose tyranny the very best of men were perpetually liable to such kind of dangers.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter. All men even now are exposed to accidents and misfortunes against which there is no security, and even the most fortunate of men must die at last. The lessons of Epictetus may be as useful now as they were in his time. See book I chapter XXX. ↩

230. Epictetus refers to the rhetorical divisions of a speech. ↩

231. Xenophon (Memorabilia iv chapter 8, 4) has reported this saying of Socrates on the authority of Hermogenes. Compare the Apology of Xenophon near the beginning. ↩

232. Johann Schweighäuser says that he can extract no sense out of this passage. I leave it as it is. ↩

233. There is some difficulty here in the original. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

234. The words may mean either what I have written in the text, or “and so he lost his suit.” ↩

235. “The meaning is, You must not ask for advice when you are come into a difficulty, but every man ought to have such principles as to be ready on all occasions to act as he ought; just as he who knows how to write can write any name which is proposed to him.” —⁠Hieronymus Wolf ↩

236. “The reader must know that these dissertations were spoken extempore, and that one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker. So the reader will not be surprised that when the discourse is on the maintenance of firmness or freedom from perturbations, Epictetus should now speak of philosophical preparation, which is most efficient for the maintenance of firmness.” —⁠Hieronymus Wolf. See also Johann Schweighäuser’s note on section 21, “Suggest something me:” and book II chapter XXIV. ↩

237. In the Enchiridion or Manual (chapter 14) it is written, “Every man’s master is he who has the power to give to a man or take away that which he would have or not have: whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither seek anything or avoid anything which is in the power of others: if he does not act thus, he will be a slave.” ↩

238. Elizabeth Carter says “This is one of the many extravagant refinements of the philosophers; and might lead persons into very dangerous mistakes, if it was laid down as a maxim in ordinary life.” I think that Carter has not seen the meaning of Epictetus. The philosopher will discover the man’s character by trying him, as the assayer tries the silver by a test.

     Cicero (De Legibus i 9) says that the face expresses the hidden character. Euripides (Medea 518) says better, that no mark is impressed on the body by which we can distinguish the good man from the bad. Shakespeare says

     There’s no art
     To find the mind’s destruction in the face.

     —⁠Macbeth act i scene 4

     ↩

239. It is not clear what is meant by women being common by nature in any rational sense. Zeno and his school said (Diogenes Laërtius, Lives vii; Zeno, p. 195. London, 1664): “it is their opinion also that the women should be common among the wise, so that any man should use any woman, as Zeno says in his Polity, and Chrysippus in the book on Polity, and Diogenes the Cynic and Plato; and we shall love all the children equally like fathers, and the jealousy about adultery will be removed.” These wise men knew little about human nature, if they taught such doctrines. ↩

240. Archedemus was a Stoic philosopher of Tarsus. We know little about him. ↩

241. A man may be a philosopher or pretend to be; and at the same time he may be a beast. ↩

242. The materials (ὕλαι) on which man works are neither good nor bad, and so they are, as Epictetus names them, indifferent. But the use of things, or of material, is not indifferent. They may be used well or ill, conformably to nature or not. ↩

243. Terence says (Adelphi, iv 7):

     Si illud, quod est maxime opus, jactu non cadit,
     Illud quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas.

     “Dexterously” is “arte,” τεχνικῶς in Epictetus. —⁠John Upton ↩

244. The word is ἁρπαστόν, which was also used by the Romans. One threw the ball and the other caught it. Chrysippus used this simile of a ball in speaking of giving and receiving (Seneca, De Beneficiis, ii 17). Martial has the word (Epigrams iv 19) “Sive harpasta manu pulverulenta rapis”; and elsewhere. ↩

245. In Plato’s Apology chapter 15, Socrates addresses Meletus; and he says, it would be equally absurd if a man should believe that there are foals of horses and asses, and should not believe that there are horses and asses. But Socrates says nothing of mules, for the word mules in some texts of the Apology is manifestly wrong ↩

246. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ii 16, iii 11, vi 44, xii 36; and Seneca, De Otio chapter 31; and Cicero, De Finibus iii 19. ↩

247. ἀπόλυτοι. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations x 24, viii 34. ↩

248. He tells some imaginary person, who hears him, that since he is come into the world, he must do his duty in it. ↩

249. This discussion is with a young philosopher who, intending to return from Nicopolis to Rome, feared the tyranny of Domitian, who was particularly severe towards philosophers. See also note 152. (Johann Schweighäuser.) Compare Pliny, Epistles i 12, and the expression of Corellius Rufus about the detestable villain, the emperor Domitian.

     The title “of Indifference” means “of the indifference of things;” of the things which are neither good nor bad. ↩

250. On τὸ συνημμένον, see book I chapter XXIX. ↩

251. Book II chapter V at 24. ↩

252. Epictetus alludes to the verses from the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Compare Marcus Aurelius (Meditations vii 40): “Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn: one man is born; another dies.” Cicero (Tusculan Disputations iii 25) has translated six verses from Euripides, and among them are these two:

     tum vita omnibus
     Metenda ut fruges; sic jubet necessitas.

     ↩

253. The story is in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (IV near the beginning) where Cyrus says that he called Chrysantas by name. Epictetus, as John Upton remarks, quotes from memory. ↩

254. So Anaxagoras said that the road to the other world (ad inferos) is the same from all places (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations i 43). What follows is one of the examples of extravagant assertion in Epictetus. A tyrant may kill by a slow death as a fever does. I suppose that Epictetus would have some answer to that. Except to a Stoic the ways to death are not indifferent: some ways of dying are painful, and even he who can endure with fortitude would prefer an easy death. ↩

255. The text has ἐπὶ Καίσαρος; but ἐπὶ perhaps ought to be ὑπό or ἀπό. ↩

256. See note 160. ↩

257. Diogenes Laërtius reports in his life of Socrates that he wrote in prison a Paean, and he gives the first line which contains an address to Apollo and Artemis. ↩

258. Divination was a great part of ancient religion, and, as Epictetus says, it led men “to omit many duties.” In a certain sense there was some meaning in it. If it is true that those who believe in God can see certain signs in the administration of the world by which they can judge what their behavior ought to be, they can learn what their duties are. If these signs are misunderstood, or if they are not seen right, men may be governed by an abject superstition. So the external forms of any religion may become the means of corruption and of human debasement, and the true indications of God’s will may be neglected. John Upton compares Lucan (Pharsalia ix 572), who sometimes said a few good things. ↩

259. A man who gives his opinion on grammar gives an opinion on a thing of which many know something. A man who gives his opinion on divination or on future events, gives an opinion on things of which we all know nothing. When then a man affects to instruct on things unknown, we may ask him to give his opinion on things which are known, and so we may learn what kind of man he is. ↩

260. Gratilla was a lady of rank, who was banished from Rome and Italy by Domitian. Pliny, Epistles iii 11. See the note in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition on ἐπιμήνια. ↩

261. As knavish priests have often played on the fears and hopes of the superstitious. ↩

262. Johann Schweighäuser reads τὸν ὀρνιθάριον. See his note. ↩

263. “Κύριε ἐλέησον, Domine miserere. Notissima formula in Christiana ecclesia jam usque a primis temporibus usurpata”⁠—John Upton. ↩

264. Johann Schweighäuser observes that the title of this chapter would more correctly be ὁ Τεὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, God in man. There is no better chapter in the book. ↩

265. Socrates (Xenophon, Memorabilia iv 6, 8) concludes “that the useful is good to him to whom it is useful.” ↩

266. I do not remember that Epictetus has attempted any other description of the nature of God. He has done more wisely than some who have attempted to answer a question which cannot be answered. But see book II chapter XIV at 11⁠–⁠13. ↩

267. Compare Cicero, De Officiis i 27. ↩

268. Noble descent. See book I chapter IX.

     The doctrine that God is in man is an old doctrine. Euripides said (Aphthonius, Sophistae Progymnasmata):

     Ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ Τεός.

     The doctrine became a common place of the poets (Ovid, Fasti vi),“Est deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo;” and Horace, Satires ii 6, 79, “Atque affigit humo divinae particulam aurae.” See note 97. ↩

269. Elizabeth Carter has a note here. “See 1 Corinthians 6:19, 2 Corinthians 6:16, 2 Timothy 1:14, 1 John 3:24, 4:12⁠–⁠13. But though the simple expression of carrying God about with us may seem to have some nearly parallel to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more venerable manner, as taking the hearts of good men for a temple to dwell in. But the other expressions here of feeding and exercising God, and the whole of the paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic system, show the real sense of even its more decent phrases to be vastly different from that of Scripture.”

     The passage in 1 Corinthians 6:19 is, “What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God and ye are not your own?” This follows 5:18, which is an exhortation to “flee fornication.” The passage in 2 Corinthians 6:16 is “And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them and walk in them,” etc. Carter has not correctly stated the sense of these two passages.

     It is certain that Epictetus knew nothing of the writers of the Epistles in the New Testament; but whence did these writers learn such forms of expression as we find in the passages cited by Carter? I believe that they drew them from the Stoic philosophers who wrote before Epictetus and that they applied them to the new religion which they were teaching. The teaching of Paul and of Epictetus does not differ: the spirit of God is in man.

     Emanuel Swedenborg says, “In these two faculties (rationality and liberty) the Lord resides with every man, whether he be good or evil, they being the Lord’s mansions in the human race. But the mansion of the Lord is nearer with a man, in proportion as the man opens the superior degrees by these faculties; for by the opening thereof he comes into superior degrees of love and wisdom, and consequently nearer to the Lord. Hence it may appear that as these degrees are opened, so a man is in the Lord and the Lord in him.” Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 240. Again, “the faculty of thinking rationally, viewed in itself, is not man’s, but God’s in man.”

     I am not quite sure in what sense the administration of the Eucharist ought to be understood in the church of England service. Some English divines formerly understood, and perhaps some now understand, the ceremony as a commemoration of the blood of Christ shed for us and of his body which was broken; as we see in Thomas Burnet’s posthumous work (de Fide et Officiis Christianorum, p. 80). It was a commemoration of the last supper of Jesus and the Apostles. But this does not appear to be the sense in which the ceremony is now understood by some priests and by some members of the church of England, whose notions approach near to the doctrine of the Catholic mass. Nor does it appear to be the sense of the prayer made before delivering the bread and wine to the Communicants, for the prayer is “Grant us, gracious Lord, so to eat the flesh of thy dear son Jesus Christ and to drink his blood that our sinful bodies may be made clean by his body and our souls washed through his most precious blood and that we may evermore dwell in him and he in us.” This is a different thing from Epictetus’ notion of God being in man, and also different, as I understand it, from the notion contained in the two passages of Paul; for it is there said generally that the Holy Ghost is in man or God in man, not that God is in man by virtue of a particular ceremony. It should not be omitted that there is after the end of the Communion service an admonition that the sacramental bread and wine remain what they were, “and that the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here; it being against the truth of Christ’s natural body to be at one time in more places than one.” It was affirmed by the Reformers and the best writers of the English church that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual presence, and in this opinion they followed Calvin and the Swiss divines: and yet in the Prayer book we have the language that I have quoted; and even Calvin, who only maintained a spiritual presence, said, “that the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament we have ‘true Communion in Christ’s body and blood’ ” (Contemporary Review, p. 464, August 1874). What would Epictetus have thought of the subtleties of our days? ↩

270. The Athena of Phidias was in the Parthenon on the Athenian Acropolis, a colossal chryselephantine statue, that is, a frame work of wood, covered with ivory and gold (Pausanias, Description of Greece i 24). The figure of Victory stood on the hand of the goddess, as we frequently see in coins. See book I chapter VI at 23, and the note in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, iii 34. ↩

271. The great statue at Olympia was the work of Phidias (Pausanias, Description of Greece v. 11). It was a seated colossal chryselephantine statue, and held a Victory in the right hand. ↩

272. An allusion to the combatants in the public exercises, who used to show their shoulders, muscles, and sinews as a proof of their strength. See book I chapter IV, book II chapter XVIII, book III chapter XXII (Elizabeth Carter). ↩

273. ἔκκλισιν. See book III chapter II. ↩

274. “The abuse of the faculties which are proper to man, called rationality and liberty, is the origin of evil. By rationality is meant the faculty of understanding truths and thence falses, and goods and then evils; and by liberty is meant the faculty of thinking, willing, and acting freely⁠—and these faculties distinguish man from beasts.” Emanuel Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 264 and also 240. See book II chapter VIII ↩

275. This seems to be a proverb. If I am eaten, let me be eaten by the nobler animal. ↩

276. A conjunctive or complex (συμπεπλεγμένον) axiom or lemma. Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights xvi 8) gives an example: “Publius Scipio, the son of Paulus, was both twice consul and triumphed, and exercised the censorship and was the colleague of Lucius Mummius in his censorship.” Gellius adds, “in every conjunctive if there is one falsehood, though the other parts are true, the whole is said to be false,” For the whole is proposed as true: therefore if one part is false, the whole is not true. The disjunctive (διεζευγμένον) is of this kind: “pleasure is either bad or good, or neither good nor bad.” ↩

277. We often say a man learns a particular thing: and there are men who profess to teach certain things, such as a language, or an art; and they mean by teaching that the taught shall learn; and learning means that they shall be able to do what they learn. He who teaches an art professes that the scholar shall be able to practice the art, the art of making shoes for example, or other useful things. There are men who profess to teach religion, and morality, and virtue generally. These men may tell us what they conceive to be religion, and morality, and virtue; and those who are said to be taught may know what their teachers have told them. But the learning of religion, and of morality and of virtue, mean that the learner will do the acts of religion and of morality and of virtue; which is a very different thing from knowing what the acts of religion, of morality, and of virtue are. The teacher’s teaching is in fact only made efficient by his example, by his doing that which he teaches ↩

278. “He is not a Stoic philosopher, who can only explain in a subtle and proper manner the Stoic principles: for the same person can explain the principles of Epicurus, of course for the purpose of refuting them, and perhaps he can explain them better than Epicurus himself. Consequently he might be at the same time a Stoic and an Epicurean; which is absurd.” —⁠Johann Schweighäuser. He means that the mere knowledge of Stoic opinions does not make a man a Stoic, or any other philosopher. A man must according to Stoic principles practice them in order to be a Stoic philosopher. So if we say that a man is a religious man, he must do the acts which his religion teaches; for it is by his acts only that we can know him to be a religious man. What he says and professes may be false; and no man knows except himself whether his words and professions are true. The uniformity, regularity, and consistency of his acts are evidence which cannot be mistaken. ↩

279. It has been suggested that Epictetus confounded under the name of Jews those who were Jews and those who were Christians. We know that some Jews became Christians. But see Johann Schweighäuser’s note 1 and note 7. ↩

280. It is possible, as I have said, that by Jews Epictetus means Christians, for Christians and Jews are evidently confounded by some writers, as the first Christians were of the Jewish nation. In book IV chapter VII, Epictetus gives the name of Galilaeans to the Jews. The term Galilaeans points to the country of the great teacher. Paul says (Romans 2:28), “For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly⁠—but he is a Jew which is one inwardly,” etc. His remarks (2:17⁠–⁠29) on the man “who is called a Jew, and rests in the law and makes his boast of God” may be compared with what Epictetus says of a man who is called a philosopher, and does not practice that which he professes. ↩

281. See book II chapter XXIV at 26; Iliad, vii 264, etc.; Juvenal, Satires xv 65,

     Nec hunc lapidem, quales et Turnus et Ajax
     Vel quo Tydides percussit pondere coxam
     Aeneae.

     —⁠John Upton

     ↩

282. Cicero (De Finibus iv 10); Seneca (Epistles 95). ↩

283. See book I chapter IX. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations vi 44: “But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world.”

     I have here translated προβάτων by “domestic animals;” I suppose that the bovine species, and sheep and goats are meant. ↩

284. This may appear extravagant; but it is possible to explain it, and even to assent to it. If a man believes that all is wisely arranged in the course of human events, he would not even try to resist that which he knows it is appointed for him to suffer: he would submit and he would endure. If Epictetus means that the man would actively promote the end or purpose which he foreknew, in order that his acts may be consistent with what he foreknows and with his duty, perhaps the philosopher’s saying is too hard to deal with; and as it rests on an impossible assumption of foreknowledge, we may be here wiser than the philosophers, if we say no more about it. Compare Seneca, De Providentia chapter 5. ↩

285. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations vi 42: “We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and others without knowing what they do.” ↩

286. A lettuce is an example of the most trifling thing. A seat probably means a seat of superiority, a magistrate’s seat, a Roman sella curulis. ↩

287. οὗτος ᾖ ἀβλαβής. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

288. Socrates: “We must by no means then do an act of injustice.” Crito: “Certainly not.” Socrates: “Nor yet when you are wronged must you do wrong in return, as most people think, since you must in no way do an unjust act.” Plato, Crito, chapter 10. ↩

289. See the beginning of book II chapter XVI. ↩

290. The same remark will apply to most dissertations spoken or written on moral subjects: they are exercises of skill for him who delivers or writes them, or matter for criticism and perhaps a way of spending an idle hour for him who listens; and that is all. Epictetus blames our indolence and indifference as to acts, and the trifling of the schools of philosophy in disputation. ↩

291. See book I chapter II. ↩

292. See Cicero’s use of “opinatio” (Tusculan Disputations iv 11). ↩

293. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

294. Doing nothing without the rule. This is a Greek proverb, used also by Persius, Satires v 119; compare Cicero, De Finibus iii 17; and Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ii 16. ↩

295. That is, so far shall I consider you from being able to judge rightly of things without a balance that I shall understand that not even with the aid of a balance can you do it, that you cannot even use a balance, and consequently that you are not worth a single word from me. Johann Schweighäuser ↩

296. This is a just conclusion. We must fix the canons or rules by which things are tried; and then the rules may be applied by the wise and good to all cases. ↩

297. This is what is said in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 472, 474. ↩

298. The word is ἔννοιαι, which Cicero explains to be the name as προλήψεις. Academica Priora ii 10. ↩

299. Socrates’ notion of envy is stated by Xenophon (Memorabilia iii 9, 8), to be this: “it is the pain or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and that such are the only envious persons.” Bishop Butler gives a better definition, at least a more complete description of the thing: “Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom we may compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is implied in desire. However this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority, by the particular means of others being brought down to our level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at is the same; namely, that equality or superiority: and consequently that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end.” —⁠Sermons Upon Human Nature, I ↩

300. I have omitted the words ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τὸν πλησιον. I see no sense in them; and the text is plain without them. ↩

301. I am not sure that I have understood rightly ἐξ ὧν δὲ αὐτός at the beginning of this sentence. ↩

302. The Symposium or Banquet of Xenophon is extant. Compare book III chapter XVI at 5, and book IV chapter V at the beginning. ↩

303. The aliptic art is the art of anointing and rubbing, one of the best means of maintaining a body in health. The iatric or healing art is the art of restoring to health a diseased body. The aliptic art is also equivalent to the gymnastic art, or the art of preparing for gymnastic exercises, which are also a means of preserving the body’s health, when the exercises are good and moderate. ↩

304. Epictetus in speaking of himself and of his experience at Rome. ↩

305. See note 206. ↩

306. In Diogenes Laërtius (Lives: Zeno, vii) there is a letter from Antigonus to Zeno and Zeno’s answer. Simplicius (note on the Enchiridion, chapter 51) supposes this Antigonus to be the King of Syria; but John Upton remarks that it is Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia. ↩

307. See book I chapter VII. ↩

308. The original is “but that person (ἐκεῖνος) has power to kill me.” “That person” must be the person already mentioned, and Elizabeth Carter has done right in adding this explanation. ↩

309. The Thirty tyrants of Athens, as they were named (Xenophon, Hellenica ii). The talk of Socrates with Critias and Charicles two of the Thirty is reported in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (i 2, 33). The defense of Socrates before those who tried him and his conversation in prison are reported in Plato’s Apology, and in the Phaedon and Crito. Diogenes was captured by some pirates and sold (book IV chapter I at 115). ↩

310. There is some corruption here. ↩

311. Enchiridion, chapter 8: “Do not seek (wish) that things which take place shall take place as you desire, but desire that things which take place shall take place as they do, and you will live a tranquil life.” ↩

312. Compare book III chapter II at 4; book IV chapter VIII at 20. Marcus Aurelius (Meditations viii 27) writes: “There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one to the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with thee.” This is precise, true and practical. Those who object to “the divine cause,” may write in place of it “the nature and constitution of things;” for there is a constitution of things, which the philosopher attempts to discover; and for most practical purposes, it is immaterial whether we say that it is of divine origin or has some other origin, or no origin can be discovered. The fact remains that a constitution of things exists; or, if that expression be not accepted, we may say that we conceive that it exists and we cannot help thinking so. ↩

313. See book I chapter XIV at 13; book II chapter VIII at 14. Socrates (Xenophon, Memorabilia i 1, 19) said the same. That man should make himself like the Gods is said also by Marcus Aurelius, Meditations x 8.⁠—See Plato, Laws i 4. (John Upton.)

     When God is said to provide for all things, this is what the Greeks called πρόνοια, providence (book I chapter XVI, book III chapter XVII). In the second of these passages there is a short answer to some objections made to Providence.

     Epictetus could only know or believe what God is by the observation of phenomena; and he could only know what he supposed to be God’s providence by observing his administration of the world and all that happens in it. Among other works of God is man, who possesses certain intellectual powers which enable him to form a judgment of God’s works, and a judgment of man himself. Man has or is supposed to have certain moral sentiments, or a capacity of acquiring them in some way. On the supposition that all man’s powers are the gift of God, man’s power of judging what happens in the world under God’s providence is the gift of God: and if he should not be satisfied with God’s administration, we have the conclusion that man, whose powers are from God, condemns that administration which is also from God. Thus God and man, who is God’s work, are in opposition to one another.

     If a man rejects the belief in a deity and in a providence, because of the contradictions and difficulties involved in this belief or supposed to be involved in it, and if he finds the contradictions and difficulties such as he cannot reconcile with his moral sentiments and judgments, he will be consistent in rejecting the notion of a deity and of providence. But he must also consistently admit that his moral sentiments and judgments are his own, and that he cannot say how he acquired them, or how he has any of the corporeal or intellectual powers which he is daily using. By the hypothesis they are not from God. All then that a man can say is that he has such powers. ↩

314. See book II chapter X, book I chapter XVII at 12, book II chapter XI at 4, etc. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations x 8. ↩

315. The original is “to add the colophon,” which is a proverbial expression and signifies to give the last touch to a thing. ↩

316. See the fragments of Menander quoted by John Upton. ↩

317. Sunt in Fortunae qui casibus omnnia ponunt,
     Et mundum credunt nullo rectore moveri.

     —⁠Juvenal, Satires xiii 86

     ↩

318. From the fact that man has some intelligence Voltaire concludes that we must admit that there is a greater intelligence. (Letter to Suzanne Necker, vol. 67, ed. Kehl. p. 278.) ↩

319. The word is ἀποκαρτερεῖν, which Cicero (Tusculan Disputations i 34) renders “perinediam vita discedere.” The words “I have resolved” are in Epictetus, κέκρικα. Pliny (Epistles i 12) says that Corellius Rufus, when he determined to end his great sufferings by starvation made the same answer, κέκρικα, to the physician who offered him food. ↩

320. The great city is the world. ↩

321. The meaning is that you cannot lead a fool from his purpose either by words or force. “A wise fool” must mean a fool who thinks himself wise; and such we sometimes see. “Though thou shouldst bray a fool in the mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness depart from him.” Proverbs 27:22. ↩

322. Hellebore was a medicine used in madness. Horace says, Satires ii 3, 82:

     Danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris.

     ↩

323. “Epictetus seems in this discussion to be referring to some professor, who had declared that he would not take money from his hearers, and then, indirectly at least had blamed our philosopher for receiving some fee from his hearers.” Johann Schweighäuser ↩

324. See book II chapter X at 25. ↩

325. “To answer to things” means to act in a way suitable to circumstances, to be a match for them. So Horace says (Satires ii 7, 85):

     Responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores
     Fortis.

     ↩

326. Perhaps this was a common puzzle. The man answers right; he cannot say. ↩

327. That is which follows praise or blame. He seems to mean making the proper use of praise or of blame. ↩

328. By the words “Sit down” Epictetus indicates the man’s baseness and indolence, who wishes God to do for him that which he can do himself and ought to do. (Johann Schweighäuser.) ↩

329. So Johann Schweighäuser explains this difficult passage. Perhaps he is right. This part of the chapter is obscure. ↩

330. “It is observable, that this most practical of all the philosophers owns his endeavors met with little or no success among his scholars. The Apostles speak a very different language in their epistles to the first converts of Christianity: and the Acts of the Apostles, and all the monuments of the primitive ages bear testimony to the reformation of manners produced by the Gospel. This difference of success might indeed justly be expected from the difference of the two systems.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter. I have not quoted this note of Carter because I think that it is true. We do not know what was the effect of the teaching of Epictetus, unless this passage informs us, if Carter has drawn a right inference from it. The language of Paul to the Corinthians is not very different from that of Epictetus, and he speaks very unfavorably of some of his Corinthian converts. We may allow that “a reformation of manners was produced by the Gospel” in many of the converts to Christianity, but there is no evidence that this reformation was produced in all; and there is evidence that it was not. The corruptions in the early Christian church and in subsequent ages are a proof that the reforms made by the Gospel were neither universal nor permanent; and this is the result which our knowledge of human nature would lead us to expect. ↩

331. See book II chapter I at 13. ↩

332. Dirce a pure stream in Boeotia, which flows into the Ismenus. The Marcian water is the Marcian aqueduct at Rome, which was constructed 144 BC, and was the best water that Rome had. Some of the arches of this aqueduct exist. The “bright stream of Dirce” is spoken of in the Hercules Furens of Euripides (line 573). The verse in the text which we may suppose that Epictetus made, has a spondee in the fourth place, which is contrary to the rule. ↩

333. The “small stones” are supposed to be the marbles which decorated Athens, and the rock to be the Acropolis. ↩

334. In the original it is Εἰσαγωγαί. It was a name used for short commentaries on the principles of any art; such as we now call Introductions, Compendiums, Elements. Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights xvi 8. ↩

335. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

336. The manuscripts have ἴσος εἰμί: but the emendation of Claudius Salmasius, σός εἰμι, is certain. ↩

337. “There are innumerable passages in St. Paul, which, in reality, bear that noble testimony which Epictetus here requires in his imaginary character. Such are those in which he glories in tribulation; speaks with a heroic contempt of life, when set in competition with the performance of his duty; rejoices in bonds and imprisonments, and the view of his approaching martyrdom; and represents afflictions as a proof of God’s love. See Acts 20:23, 24; Romans 5:3, 8:38⁠–⁠39; 2 Timothy 4:6.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

338. The meaning is uncertain. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

339. Procrustes and Sciron, two robbers who infested Attica and were destroyed by Theseus, as Plutarch tells in his life of Theseus. ↩

340. Marcus Aurelius Meditations x 28, “only to the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all.” Compare Seneca, Quaestiones Naturales ii 59. ↩

341. See book II chapter XI at 1, and book III chapter XIV at 8. ↩

342. Theorems are defined by Cicero, De Fato, chapter 6, “Percepta appelle quae dicuntur Graece θεωρήματα.” ↩

343. This rhetorician or orator, as Epictetus names him, appears to be the same person as Theopompus of Chios, the historian. ↩

344. “That Epictetus does not quite correctly compare the notion of what is wholesome to the human body with the preconceived notion (anticipata notione) of moral good and bad, will be apparent to those who have carefully inquired into the various origin and principles of our notions.” —⁠Johann Schweighäuser. Also see his note on ἀνάτεινον. ↩

345. The topic of the desires and aversions. book III chapter II. ↩

346. Compare book I chapter XXVII at 10. ↩

347. This is the meaning of what Medea says in the Medea of Euripides. Epictetus does not give the words of the poet. ↩

348. Compare book IV chapter VII at 20. ↩

349. “If you would subject all things to yourself, subject yourself to reason.” Seneca, Epistle 37. ↩

350. See book I chapter VII at 1. ↩

351. The Pseudomenos was a treatise by Chrysippus (Diogenes Laërtius Lives vii: Chrysippus). “The Pseudomenos was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks truth: if he speaks truth, he lies. The philosophers composed many books on this difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself in studying to answer it.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

352. Epictetus is ridiculing the men who compliment one another on their writings. John Upton compares Horace, Epistles ii 2, 87.

     ut alter
     Alterius sermone meros audiret honores⁠—
     Discedo Alcaeus puncto lllius? ille meo quis?
     Quis nisi Callimachus?

     ↩

353. Compare book I chapter XIX at 4. ↩

354. Johann Schweighäuser has no doubt that we ought instead of συναγωγάς, “collections,” to read εἰσαγωγάς, “introductions.” ↩

355. As to Archedemus, see book II chapter IV at 11; and Antipater, book II chapter XIX at 2. ↩

356. See book IV chapter XII. ↩

357. ἀῤῥωστήματα. “Aegrotationes quae appellantur a Stoicis ἀῤῥωστήματα” Cicero, Tusculan Disputations iv 10. ↩

358. κομψῶς σοί ἐστι. Compare the Gospel of St. John 4:52, ἐπύθετο οὖν παρ’ αὐτῶν τὴν ὥραν ἐν ᾗ κομψότερον ἔσχε. ↩

359. Placet enim Chrysippo cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere; id est quod ab iis dicitur ἡσυχάζειν. Cicero, Academica ii Pr. 29. Compare Persius, Satires vi 80:

     Depinge ubi sistam,
     Inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi.

     ↩

360. The passage is in Plato, Laws, ix p. 854, ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων, etc. The conclusion is, “if you cannot be cured of your (mental) disease, seek death which is better and depart from life.” This bears some resemblance to the precept in Matthew 6:29 “And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee,” etc. ↩

361. Hercules is said to have established gymnastic contests and to have been the first victor. Those who gained the victory both in wrestling and in the pancratium were reckoned in the list of victors as coming in the second or third place after him, and so on. ↩

362. I have followed Hieronymus Wolff’s conjecture πύκτας instead of the old reading παίκτας. ↩

363. Compare book III chapter XII at 15. ↩

364. Castor and Pollux. Horace, Odes i 12:

     Quorum simul alba nautis
     Stella refulsit, etc.

     ↩

365. Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights xix chapter 1, “visa quae vi quadam sua sese inferunt noscitanda hominibus.” ↩

366. “Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless pay.” Marcus Aurelius, Meditations xii 22. ↩

367. Hesiod, Works and Days, v 411. ↩

368. Compare Aulus Gellius Attic Nights xvii chapter 19. ↩

369. See the long note communicated to John Upton by James Harris; and Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

370. Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, lived at Alexandria in the time of Ptolemaeus Soter. He was of the school named the Megaric, and distinguished in dialectic. ↩

371. If you assume any two of these three, they must be in contradiction to the third and destroy it. ↩

372. “Speak to me,” etc. may be supposed to be said to Epictetus, who has been ridiculing logical subtleties and the grammarians’ learning. When he is told to speak of good and evil, he takes a verse of the Odyssey, the first which occurs to him, and says, “Listen.” There is nothing to listen to, but it is as good for the hearer as anything else. Then he utters some philosophical principles, and being asked where he learned them, he says, from Hellanicus, who was an historian, not a philosopher. He is bantering the hearer: “it makes no matter from what author I learned them; it is all the same. The real question is, have you examined what Good and Evil are, and have you formed an opinion yourself?” ↩

373. The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed to a happy life; but still they contended that the smallest mental excellence was superior to all other things. Cicero, De Finibus v 5, 31. ↩

374. See book II chapter VIII at 20. ↩

375. “To blame God” means to blame the constitution and order of things, for to do this appeared to Epictetus to be absurd and wicked; as absurd as for the potter’s vessel to blame the potter, if that can be imagined, for making it liable to wear out and to break. ↩

376. “Our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ,” 1 John 1:3. “The attentive reader will observe several passages besides those which have been noticed, in which there is a striking conformity between Epictetus and the Scriptures: and will perceive from them, either that the Stoics had learnt a good deal of the Christian language or that treating a subject practically and in earnest leads men to such strong expressions as we often find in Scripture and sometimes in the philosophers, especially Epictetus.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter.

     The word “fellowship” in the passage of John and of Epictetus is κοινωνία. See note 205. ↩

377. “Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod soiri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. Sic omnia latere censebat in occulto, neque ease quidquam quod oerni aut intelligi possit. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione adprobare.” Cicero, Academica Posteriora 1, 12; Diogenes Laërtius Lives ix 90 of the Pyrrhonists. ↩

378. Cicero, De Finibus ii 30, 31, speaking of the letter which Epicurus wrote to Hermarchus when he was dying, says “that the actions of Epicurus were inconsistent with his sayings,” and “his writings were confuted by his probity and morality.” ↩

379. Paul says, Corinthians 1:15, 32: “If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.” The words “let us eat and drink, etc.” are said to be a quotation from the Thais of Menander. The meaning seems to be, that if I do not believe in the resurrection of the dead, why should I not enjoy the sensual pleasures of life only? This is not the doctrine of Epictetus, as we see in the text. ↩

380. It would give security to the Epicureans, that they would enjoy all that they value, if other men should be persuaded that we are all made for fellowship, and that temperance is a good thing. ↩

381. See John Upton’s note. ↩

382. I have followed Johann Schweighäuser who suggests προσεξεργάσασθαι in place of the manuscripts’ προσεργάσασθαι. ↩

383. Polybius (The Histories vi 56), when he is speaking of the Roman state, commends the men of old time, who established in the minds of the multitude the opinions about the gods and Hades, wherein, he says, they acted more wisely than those in his time who would destroy such opinions. ↩

384. Epictetus alludes to the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae, 480 BC against Xerxes and his army. Herodotus (The Histories vii 228) has recorded the inscription placed over the Spartans:

     Stranger, go tell the Spartans, Here we lie
     Obedient to those who bade us die.

     The inscription is translated by Cicero, Tusculan Disputations i 42. ↩

385. When Xerxes was advancing on Athens, the Athenians left the city and embarked on their vessels before the battle of Salamis, 480 BC. See Cicero, De Officiis, iii 11. ↩

386. He is now attacking the Academics, who asserted that we can know nothing. ↩

387. Epictetus is speaking according to the popular notions. To deny Demeter and to eat the bread which she gives is the same thing in the common notions of the Greeks, as it would be for Epictetus to deny the existence of God and to eat the bread which he gives. ↩

388. The manuscripts have παράσχωμεν. Παράσχωσι would be in conformity with the rest of the passage. But this change of persons is common in Epictetus. ↩

389. “This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you.” Matthew 21:31. (Elizabeth Carter.)

     To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston replied, “Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you?” When the Academic denied it, Ariston said, “Who made you blind? who stole your power of sight?” (Diogenes Laërtius Lives vii 163. John Upton.) ↩

390. Johann Schweighäuser has some remarks on the title of this chapter. He says “that this discourse does not keep to the same subject, but proceeds from that with which it began to other things.” ↩

391. καταστολὰς ποιήσας. I have omitted these words because I don’t understand them; nor do the commentators. The word καταστολή occurs in book II chapter X at 15, where it is intelligible. ↩

392. Literally, “because to you or for you nothing is brought from home.” Perhaps the meaning is explained by what follows. The man has no comfort at home; he brings nothing by the thought of which he is comforted. ↩

393. See book I chapter VII. ↩

394. See book II chapter XVII at 34. ↩

395. τί με ταῦτα ὠφελήσει; Johann Schweighäuser in his note says that he has written the text thus; but he has not. He has written τί μετὰ ταῦτα ὠφελήσει; The με appears to be necessary, and he has rendered the passage accordingly; and rightly, I think. ↩

396. See note 32 on Halteres. ↩

397. See book II chapter XXV. ↩

398. “In this dissertation is expounded the Stoic principle that friendship is only possible between the good.”⁠—Johann Schweighäuser. He also says that there was another discourse by Epictetus on this subject, in which he expressed some of the opinions of Musonius Rufus (note 13). Johann Schweighäuser draws this conclusion from certain words of Joannes Stobaeus; and he supposes that this dissertation of Epictetus was in one of the last four books of Epictetus’ discourses by Arrian, which have been lost.

     Cicero (De Amicitia chapter 5) says “nisi in bonis amicitiam ease non posse,” and chapter 18. ↩

399. The first verse is from the Alcestis of Euripides, line 691. The second in Epictetus is not in Euripides. Johann Schweighäuser thinks that it has been intruded into the text from a trivial scholium. ↩

400. From the Phoenissae of Euripides, line 723, etc. ↩

401. Compare Euripides, Hecuba, line 846, etc.:

     δεινόν γε θνητοῖς ὡς ἅπαντα συμπίτνει·
     καὶ τὰς ἀνάγκας ὡς νόμοι διώρισαν,
     φίλους τιφέντες τούς γε πολεμιωτάτους
     ἐχθρούς τε τοὺς πρὶν εὐμενεῖς ποιούμενοι.

     ↩

402. Alexander did this when Hephaestion died. Arrian, Expedition of Alexander, vii 14. ↩

403. Matthew 6:21, “for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.” ↩

404. “By ‘self’ is here meant the proper Good, or, as Solomon expresses it, Ecclesiastes 7:13, ‘the whole of man.’ The Stoic proves excellently the inconvenience of placing this in anything but a right choice (a right disposition and behavior): but how it is the interest of each individual in every case to make that choice in preference to present pleasure and in defiance of present sufferings, appears only from the doctrine of a future recompense.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter. Compare Cicero, De Finibus ii 15, where he is speaking of Epicurus, and translates the words ἀποφαίνειν ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἄρα τὸ ἔνδοξον, “ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur Honestum quod est populari fama gloriosum (ἔνδοξον).” See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

405. The quarrels of the Athenians with the Lacedaemonians appear chiefly in the history of the Peloponnesian war. (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War i 1). The quarrel of the great king, the king of Persia, is the subject of the history of Herodotus (The Histories i 1). The great quarrel of the Macedonians with the Persians is the subject of Arrian’s Expedition of Alexander. The Romans were at war with the Getae or Daci in the time of Trajan, and we may assume that Epictetus was still living then. ↩

406. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics viii chapter 8. (Elizabeth Carter.) ↩

407. Johann Schweighäuser thinks that this is the plain meaning: “as wild beasts in the mountains lie in wait for men, so men lie in wait for men, not only in deserted places, but even in the forum.” ↩

408. ὅπου δόσις τοῦ καλοῦ. Lord Shaftesbury suggested δόσις καὶ λῆψις τοῦ καλοῦ: which John Upton approved, and he refers to book II chapter IX at 12, αἱ ἀκατάλληλοι λήψεις καὶ δόσεις. Johann Schweighäuser suggests διαδόσις which I have followed in the version. Schweighäuser refers to book I chapter XII at 6; book I chapter XIV at 9. The manuscripts give no help. ↩

409. The old story about Eriphyle who betrayed her husband for a necklace. ↩

410. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note ↩

411. The word for “spirit” is πνεῦμα, a vital spirit, an animal spirit, a nervous fluid, as Johann Schweighäuser explains it, or as Plutarch says (De Placitis Philosophorum iv 15), “the spirit which has the power of vision, which permeates from the chief faculty of the mind to the pupil of the eye;” and in another passage of the same treatise (iv 8), “the instruments of perception are said to be intelligent spirits (πνεύματα νοερά) which have a motion from the chief faculty of the mind to the organs.” ↩

412. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

413. See book I chapter I. ↩

414. Johann Schweighäuser has this note: “That which Epictetus names the προαιρετικὴ δυναμίς and afterwards frequently προαίρεσις, is generally translated by ‘voluntas’ (will); but it has a wider meaning than is generally given to the Latin word, and it comprehends the intellect with the will, and all the active power of the mind which we sometimes designate by the general name Reason.” ↩

415. On the Greek text John Upton remarks that, “there are many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes.” ↩

416. The general reading is καὶ προαιρετά. Claudius Salmasius proposes καὶ ἀπροαίρετα, which Johann Schweighäuser says in a note that he accepts, and so he translates it in the Latin; but in his text he has καὶ προαιρετά. ↩

417. This appears to be the book which Cicero (Tusculan Disputations iii 18) entitles on the “supreme good” (de summo bono), which, as Cicero, says, contains all the doctrine of Epicurus. The book on the Canon or Rule is mentioned by Velleius in Cicero De Natura Deorum i chapter 16 as “that celestial volume of Epicurus on the Rule and Judgment.” See also De Finibus i 19. ↩

418. This is said in a letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying in great pain (Diogenes Laërtius Lives x 22); Cicero (De Finibus ii chapter 30) quotes this letter. ↩

419. The manuscripts have προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως. Lord Shaftesbury suggested φραστικῆς and Claudius Salmasius also. Johann Schweighäuser has put φραστικῆς in the text, and he has done right. ↩

420. The Stoics taught that a man should lead an active life. Horace (Epodes i 1, 16) represents himself as sometimes following the Stoic principles:

     Nune agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis.

     but this was only talk. The Stoic should discharge all the duties of a citizen, says Epictetus; he should even marry and beget children. But the marrying may be done without any sense of duty; and the continuance of the human race is secured by the natural love of the male and of the female for conjunction. Still it is good advice, which the Roman censor Metellus gave to his fellow citizens, that, as they could not live without women, they should make the best of this business of marriage. (Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights i 6.) ↩

421. The rest of the verses are quoted in the Enchiridion, s. 52. ↩

422. Chrysippus wrote a book on the resolution of Syllogisms. Diogenes Laërtius (Lives vii) says of Chrysippus that he was so famous among Dialecticians that most persons thought, if there was Dialectic among the Gods, it would not be any other than that of Chrysippus. ↩

423. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on ἀκαταληκτικῶς. ↩

424. “That is, let us not now consider whether I am perfect in the art of speaking, and you have a mind well prepared to derive real advantage from philosophical talk. Let us consider this only, whether your ears are sufficiently prepared for listening, whether you can understand a philosophical discussion.” Johann Schweighäuser ↩

425. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

426. In the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles answers the messengers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of Achilles is a wonderful example of eloquence. ↩

427. See book II chapter XVII. ↩

428. Compare Xenophon, Memorabilia iii 9, 4. ↩

429. There is some deficiency in the text. Cicero (Academica Priora i 12), “ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi; sic snimum perspicuis cedere,” appears to supply the deficiency. ↩

430. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations v 28; x 4. ↩

431. A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, that is, both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon comprised five exercises, which are expressed by one Greek line,

     Leaping, running, the quoit, throwing the Javelin, wrestling.

     Compare Aristotle, Rhetoric i 5. ↩

432. Compare Horace, Satires ii 3, v 253.

     Quacro, faciasne quod olim
     Mutatus Polemon? etc.

     The story of Polemon is told by Diogenes Laërtius. He was a dissolute youth. As he was passing one day the place where Xenocrates was lecturing, he and his drunken companions burst into the school, but Polemon was so affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenocrates in the school of the Academy. See book IV chapter XI at 30. ↩

433. Laius consulted the oracle at Delphi how he should have children. The oracle told him not to beget children, and even to expose them if he did. Laius was so foolish as to disobey the god in both respects, for he begot children and brought them up. He did indeed order his child Oedipus to be exposed, but the boy was saved and became the murderer of Laius. ↩

434. Plato, Apology, i 9, etc. and chapter 17. ↩

435. See note 20. ↩

436. Cicero, De Finibus ii 11; Horace, Epistles i 10, 12. This was the great principle of Zeno, to live according to nature. Bishop Butler in the preface to his Sermons says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted in following nature, that it is “a manner of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true.” ↩

437. The bare use of objects (appearances) belongs to all animals; a rational use of them is peculiar to man. Elizabeth Carter, Introduction §7. ↩

438. ὅλον δι’ ὅλων αὐτὸ ποίησον. Hieronymus Wolf proposed an emendation which Johann Schweighäuser does not put in his text, but he has expressed it in the Latin version. The Greek is intelligible, if we look to what follows. ↩

439. From the Odyssey, i 37, where Zeus is speaking of Aegisthus. ↩

440. In place of προκόψαντα Johann Schweighäuser suggests that we should read προκόψοντα: and this is probable. ↩

441. καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός is the usual Greek expression to signify a perfect man. The Stoics, according to Joannes Stobaeus, absurdly called “virtue,” καλόν (beautiful), because it naturally “calls” (καλεῖ) to itself those who desire it. The Stoics also said that everything good was beautiful (καλός), and that the good and the beautiful were equivalent. The Roman expression is Vir bonus et sapiens. (Horace Epistles i 7, 22 and 16, 20). Perhaps the phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός arose from the notion of beauty and goodness being the combination of a perfect human being. ↩

442. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations xi 37, “as to sensual desire he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.” ↩

443. To point out a man with the middle finger was a way of showing the greatest contempt for him. ↩

444. As to Archedemus, see book II chapter IV at 11. Ἀπέχεις ἅπαντα: this expression is compared by John Upton with Matthew 6:2, ἀπέχουσι μισθὸν. ↩

445. Hieronymus Wolf suggests οἷος. Crinis was a Stoic philosopher mentioned by Diogenes Laërtius. We may suppose that he was no real philosopher, and that he died of fright. ↩

446. See this chapter above. ↩

447. τοὺς σιφάρους. On this reading the student may consult the note in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition. The word σιφάρους, if it is the right reading, is not clear; nor the meaning of this conclusion.

     The philosopher is represented as being full of anxiety about things which do not concern him, and which are proper subjects for those only who are free from disturbing passions and are quite happy, which is not the philosopher’s condition. He is compared to a sinking ship, and at this very time he is supposed to be employed in the useless labor of hoisting the sails. ↩

448. Compare book I chapter XIX at 11. ↩

449. Elizabeth Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, 7:21⁠–⁠23. Johann Schweighäuser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing willingly; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away by the passion which rules him. The “another” who compels is God, Schweighäuser says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must postpone everything else to that thing in which he places his Good: and he adds, that it is man’s fault if he places his good in that thing in which God has not placed it.

     Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is “compelled and allows himself to be carried away,” etc. The notion of “compulsion” is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is unlucky. He is like him “who sees,” as the Latin poet says, “the better things and approves of them, but follows the worse.” ↩

450. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on this obscure passage. ↩

451. On “preconceptions,” see book I chapter II. ↩

452. Xenophon (Memorabilia i 6, 14); but Epictetus does not quote the words, he only gives the meaning. Marcus Aurelius (Meditations viii 43) says, “Different things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes, and using everything according to its value.” ↩

453. Socrates never professed to teach virtue, but by showing himself to be a virtuous man he expected to make his companions virtuous by imitating his example. (Xenophon, Memorabilia i 2, 3.) ↩

454. John Upton explains this passage thus: “He who loves knows what it is to endure all things for love. If any man then being captivated with love for a girl would for her sake endure dangers and even death, what would he not endure if he possessed the love of God, the Universal, the chief of beautiful things?” ↩

455. The Greek is κοίνος νοῦς, the communis sensus of the Romans, and our common sense. Horace (Satires i 3, 65) speaks of a man who “communi sensu plane caret,” one who has not the sense or understanding which is the common property of men. ↩

456. This was a proverb used by Bion, as Diogenes Laërtius says. The cheese was new and soft, as the ancients used it. ↩

457. Rufus is mentioned in note 13. ↩

458. The Greek is διορθωτής. The Latin word is Corrector, which occurs in inscriptions and elsewhere. ↩

459. The Epicureans are ironically named Philosophers, for most of them were arrogant men. See what is said of them in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, i 8. Johann Schweighäuser ↩

460. Maximus was appointed by Trajan to conduct a campaign against the Parthians, in which he lost his life. Dion Cassius, ii 1108, 1126, Hermann Samuel Beimarus.

     Cassiope or Cassope is a city in Epirus, near the sea, and between Pandosia and Nicopolis, where Epictetus lived. ↩

461. ψυχικοῖς is Lord Shaftesbury’s emendation in place of ἀγαθοῖς, and it is accepted by Johann Schweighäuser. ↩

462. Diogenes Laërtius (Lives x 151), quoted by John Upton. “Injustice,” says Epicurus, “is not an evil in itself, but the evil is in the fear which there is on account of suspicion.” ↩

463. The manuscripts, with one exception, have δογματίζων τὰ καλὰ, ποιῶν τὰ αἴσχρα, but it was properly corrected by Hieronymus Wolf, as John Upton remarks, who shows from Cicero, De Finibus, ii 25 and 31, that the manuscripts are wrong. In the second passage Cicero says, “nihil in hae praeclara epistola scriptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis ejus reperietis. Ita redarguitur ipse a sese, vincunturque scripta ejus probitate ipsius ac moribus.” See book II chapter XVIII. ↩

464. John Upton compares the passage (line 333) in the Cyclops of Euripides, who speaks like an Epicurean. Not to marry and not to engage public affairs were Epicurean doctrines. See book I chapter XXIII at 3 and 6. ↩

465. The toreutic art is the art of working in metal, stone, or wood, and of making figures on them in relief or by cutting into the material. ↩

466. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

467. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

468. A codicillus is a small codex and the original sense of codex is a strong stem or stump. Lastly it was used for a book, and even for a will. Codicilli were small writing-tablets, covered with wax, on which men wrote with a stylus or pointed metal. Lastly, codicillus is a book or writing generally; and a writing or letter by which the emperor conferred any office. Our word codicil has only one sense, which is a small writing added or subjoined to a will or testament; but this sense is also derived from the Roman use of the word. (Digest 29, tit. 7, de jure codicillorum.) ↩

469. John Upton supposes this to mean, whose bedchamber man are you? and he compares book I chapter XIX. But Johann Schweighäuser says that this is not the meaning here, and that the meaning is this: He who before daybreak is waiting at the door of a rich man, whose favor he seeks, is said in a derisive way to be passing the night before a man’s chamber. ↩

470. See book I chapter IX at 20. ↩

471. See book II chapter VI at 22, ἄν σοι ποιῆ. (John Upton.) ↩

472. Johann Schweighäuser says that he does not clearly see what Epictetus means; nor do I. ↩

473. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

474. The Roman word “patronus,” which at that time had the sense of a protector. ↩

475. On the syllogism named “lying” (ψευδόμενος) see book II chapter XVII at 34. ↩

476. “Murrhina vasa” were reckoned very precious by the Romans, and they gave great prices for them. It is not certain of what material they were made. Pliny (Naturalis Historia xxxvii chapter 2) has something about them. ↩

477. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations iii 13. “As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles (δόγματα) ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a reference to things divine; nor the contrary.” ↩

478. These verses are from the Golden Verses attributed to Pythagoras. See book IV chapter VI at 32. ↩

479. The beginning of a form of prayer, as in Macrobius, Saturnalia i 17: “namque Vestales Virgines ita indigitant; Apollo Maedice, Apollo Paean.” ↩

480. This passage is obscure. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note here, and also his note on s. 6. ↩

481. εἰ νομίμως ἤθλησας. “St. Paul has made use of this very expression ἐὰν μὴ νομίμως ἀθλήσῃ, 2 Timothy 2:3.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

482. The Greek is οὐ φιλολογῶ. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

483. See book II chapter XVIII at 14. ↩

484. Et quid opus Cratero magnos promittere montes? Persius, iii 65. Craterus was a physician. ↩

485. John Upton compares Matthew 8:2. “Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.” ↩

486. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations iv 48. τᾶς ὀφρῦς⁠ ⁠… συσπάσαντες. ↩

487. To this Stoic precept Horace (Epistles i 1, 19) opposes that of Aristippus:

     Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor.

     Both wisely said, if they are rightly taken. Johann Schweighäuser, who refers to book I chapter XII at 17. ↩

488. Lord Shaftesbury proposed to read τὸν ἰατρόν for τὸν ἀδελφόν. But see Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

489. As to the divine law, see book III chapter XXIV at 32, and Xenophon’s Memorabilia, iv 4, 21, etc. (John Upton). ↩

490. The poet is Homer. The complete passage is in the Odyssey, xiv line 55, etc.:

     Stranger, I must not, e’en if a worse man come,
     Ill treat a stranger, for all come from Zeus,
     Strangers and poor.

     ↩

491. “To set up a palm tree.” He does not mean a real palm tree, but something high and upright. The climbers of palm trees are mentioned by Lucian, De Dea Syria (chapter 29). Johann Schweighäuser has given the true interpretation when he says that on certain feast days in the country a high piece of wood is fixed in the earth and climbed by the most active youths by using only their hands and feet. In England we know what this is.

     It is said that Diogenes used to embrace statues when they were covered with snow for the purpose of exercising himself. I suppose bronze statues, not marble which might be easily broken. The man would not remain long in the embrace of a metal statue in winter. But perhaps the story is not true. I have heard of a general, not an English general, setting a soldier on a cold cannon; but it was as a punishment. ↩

492. ἀνατοιχήσω. See the note of Johann Schweighäuser. ↩

493. This was done for the sake of exercise says John Upton; but I don’t understand the passage. ↩

494. There is a like fable in Aesop of the earthen pitcher and the brazen. (John Upton.) ↩

495. The text has ἀσυμμετρίαν. It would be easier to understand the passage if we read συμμετριάν as in book IV chapter I at 84 we have παρὰ τὰ μέτρα. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

496. See book I chapter XXVI at 18; and book III chapter II at 5. ↩

497. Polybius, The Histories vi 36. ↩

498. Johann Schweighäuser refers to Arrian’s Expedition of Alexander (vi 26) for such an instance of Alexander’s abstinence. There was an Apollonius of Tyana, whose life was written by Philostratus: but it may be that this is not the man who is mentioned here. ↩

499. This was the doctrine of Heraclitus “that all things were composed from (had their origin in) fire, and were resolved into it,” an opinion afterwards adopted by the Stoics. It is not so extravagant as it may appear to some persons, to suppose that the earth had a beginning, is in a state of continual change, and will finally be destroyed in some way and have a new beginning. See Seneca, Epistle 9 “cum resolute mundo, diis in unum confusis, paulisper oessante natura, adquiescit sibi Jupiter, cogitationibus suis traditus.” ↩

500. The Latin translation is: “hoe etiam nonnulli facturum eum in conflagratione mundi⁠ ⁠… aiunt.” But the word is ποιεῖ; and this may mean that the conflagration has happened, and will happen again. The Greek philosophers in their speculations were not troubled with the consideration of time. Even Herodotus (The Histories ii 11), in his speculations on the gulf, which he supposes that the Nile valley was once, speaks of the possibility of it being filled up in 20,000 years, or less. Modern speculators have only recently become bold enough to throw aside the notion of the earth and the other bodies in space being limited by time, as the ignorant have conceived it. ↩

501. See book III chapter I at 43. ↩

502. “What a melancholy description of death and how gloomy the ideas in this consolatory chapter! All beings reduced to mere elements in successive conflagrations! A noble contrast to the Stoic notions on this subject may be produced from several passages in the Scripture⁠—‘Then shall the dust return to the earth, as it was; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it,’ Ecclesiastes 12:7.”⁠—Elizabeth Carter; who also refers to 1 Thessalonians 4:14; John 6:39⁠–⁠40, 11:25⁠–⁠26; 1 Corinthians 6:14, 15:53; 2 Corinthians 5:14, etc.

     Carter quotes Ecclesiastes, but the author says nearly what Epicharmus said, quoted by Plutarch, παραμυθ. Πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον, vol. i p. 435 ed. Wytt.

     συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθε πάλιν,
     γᾶ μὲν ἐς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ’ ἄνω τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν; οὐδὲ ἕν.

     Euripides in a fragment of the Chrysippus, fragment 836, ed. Johan August Nauck, says

     τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας φύντ’ εἰς γαῖαν,
     τὰ δ’ ἀπ’ αἰθερίου βλαστόντα γονῆς
     εἰς οὐράνιον πάλιν ἦλθε πόλον.

     I have translated the words of Epictetus ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευμάτιον by “of air (spirit), to air”: but the πνευμάτιον of Epictetus may mean the same as the πνεῦμα of Epicharmus, and the same as the “spirit” of Ecclesiastes.

     An English commentator says that “the doctrine of a future retribution forms the great basis and the leading truth of this book (Ecclesiastes),” and that “the royal Preacher (Ecclesiastes) brings forward the prospect of a future life and retribution.” I cannot discover any evidence of this assertion in the book. The conclusion is the best part of this ill-connected, obscure and confused book, as it appears in our translation. The conclusion is (12:13⁠–⁠14): “Fear God and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man, for God shall bring every work into judgment with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil.” This is all that I can discover in the book which can support the commentator’s statement; and even this may not mean what he affirms.

     Johann Schweighäuser observes that here was the opportunity for Epictetus to say something of the immortality of the soul, if he had anything to say. But he says nothing unless he means to say that the soul, the spirit, “returns to God who gave it” as the Preacher says. There is a passage (book III chapter XXIV at 94) which appears to mean that the soul of man after death will be changed into something else, which the universe will require for some use or purpose. It is strange, observes Schweighäuser, that Epictetus, who studied the philosophy of Socrates, and speaks so eloquently of man’s capacity and his duty to God, should say no more: but the explanation may be that he had no doctrine of man’s immortality, in the sense in which that word is now used. ↩

503. The text has ἀρχομένων, but it probably ought to be ἀρχομένῳ. Compare book I chapter I at 8, πᾶσα δύναμις ἐπισφαλής.

     The text from φέρειν οὖν δεῖ to τῷ φθισικῷ is unintelligible. Lord Shaftesbury says that the passage is not corrupt, and he gives an explanation; but Johann Schweighäuser says that the learned Englishman’s exposition does not make the text plainer to him; nor does it to me. Schweighäuser observes that the passage which begins πᾶσα μεγάλη and what follows seem to belong to the next chapter, xiv. ↩

504. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note, and the Latin version ↩

505. All the manuscripts have “good” (καλοί), which the critics have properly corrected. As to σκόπει see Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

506. This section is not easy to translate. ↩

507. Compare Enchiridion 29.

     “This chapter has a great conformity to Luke 14:28 etc. But it is to be observed that Epictetus, both here and elsewhere, supposes some persons incapable of being philosophers; that is, virtuous and pious men: but Christianity requires and enables all to be such.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter.

     The passage in Luke contains a practical lesson, and so far is the same as the teaching of Epictetus: but the conclusion in verse 33 does not appear to be helped by what immediately precedes verses 28⁠–⁠32. The remark that Christianity “enables all to be such” is not true, unless Carter gives to the word “enables” a meaning which I do not see. ↩

508. The commentators refer us to Paul, 1 Corinthians 9:25. Compare Horace, Ars Poetica, 39:

     Versate diu quid ferre recusent,
     Quid valeant humeri.

     ↩

509. Hieronymus Wolf thought that the word παρορύσσεσθαι might mean the loss of an eye; but other commentators give the word a different meaning. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

510. In place of Euphrates the Enchiridion 29 had in the text “Socrates,” which name the recent editors of the Enchiridion altered to “Euphrates,” and correctly. The younger Pliny (i Epistle 10) speaks in high terms of the merits and attractive eloquence of this Syrian philosopher Euphrates, who is mentioned by Marcus Aurelius (Meditations x 31) and by others. ↩

511. Rufus was a philosopher. See book I chapter I, book I chapter IX. Galba is the emperor Galba, who was murdered. The meaning of the passage is rather obscure, and it is evident that it does not belong to this chapter. Lord Shaftesbury remarks that this passage perhaps belongs to chapter 11 or 14, or perhaps to the end of chapter 17. ↩

512. The word is σικχᾶναι. See Marcus Aurelius Meditations v 9. ↩

513. John Upton suggests that Sura may be Palfurius (Juvenal, Satires iv 53), or Palfurius Sura (Suetonius, Domitian, chapter 13). ↩

514. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

515. Compare book III chapter V at 4. ↩

516. I have not followed Johann Schweighäuser’s text here. See his note. ↩

517. The original is θεωρητικῶν φαντασιῶν, which is translated in the Latin version “visa theoretical,” but this does not help us. Perhaps the author means any appearances which are presented to us either by the eyes or by the understanding; but I am not sure what he means. It is said in the Index Graecitatis (Johann Schweighäuser’s ed.): “αντασίαι θεωρητικαί, notiones theoretical, iii 20, 1, quibus opponuntur Practicae ad vitam regendam spectantes.” ↩

518. Menoeceus, the son of Creon, gave up his life by which he would save his country, as it was declared by an oracle (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations i chapter 48). Juvenal (Satires xiv 238) says:

     Quarum Amor in te
     Quantus erat patriae Declorum in pectore; quantum
     Dilexit Thebas, si Graecia vera, Menoeceus.

     Euripides, Phoenissae, line 913. ↩

519. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

520. The father of Admetus was Pheres (Euripides, Alcestis) ↩

521. The meaning is not clear, if we follow the original text. Johann Schweighäuser cannot see the sense “with both hands” in the Greek, nor can I. He also says that in the words ἆρον ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρας unless some masculine noun is understood which is not expressed, ἐκεῖνος must be referred to the aliptes; and he translates βαρύτερος by “severior.” ↩

522. Elizabeth Carter quotes the epistle to the Romans (8:28): “and we show that all things work together for good to them that love God”; but she quotes only the first part of the verse and omits the conclusion, “to them who are the called according to his purpose.” ↩

523. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

524. ἀναρχίας; see book IV chapter IV at 2 and 23. ↩

525. Some abusive fellow, known to some of the hearers of Epictetus. We ought perhaps to understand the words as if it were said, “each of you ought to say to himself, Good luck to Lesbius etc.” Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

526. The practical teaching of the Stoics is contained in book III chapter VII, and it is good and wise. A modern writer says of modern practice: “If we open our eyes and if we will honestly acknowledge to ourselves what we discover, we shall be compelled to confess that all the life and efforts of the civilized people of our times is founded on a view of the world which is directly opposed to the view of the world which Jesus had” (Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 74). ↩

527. Cicero (Academica Priora ii 47) names Antipater and Archidemus (Archedemus) the chief of dialecticians, and also “opiniosissimi homines.” ↩

528. This passage is one of those which show the great good sense of Epictetus in the matter of education; and some other remarks to the same effect follow in this chapter. A man might justly say that we have no clear notion of the purpose of education. A modern writer, who seems to belong to the school of Epictetus [Long is being coy here; the writer is George Long himself. See “Of Education” in An Old Man’s Thoughts About Many Things (1872) —⁠Standard Ebooks], says: “it cannot be denied that in all schools of all kinds it ought to be the first and the chief object to make children healthy, good, honest, and, if possible, sensible men and women; and if this is not done in a reasonable degree, I maintain that the education of these schools is good for nothing⁠—I do not propose to make children good and honest and wise by precepts and dogmas and preaching, as you will see. They must be made good and wise by a cultivation of the understanding, by the practice of the discipline necessary for that purpose, and by the example of him who governs, directs, and instructs.” Further, “my men and women teachers have something which the others have not: they have a purpose, an end in their system of education; and what is education? What is human life without some purpose or end which may be attained by industry, order, and the exercise of moderate abilities? Great abilities are rare, and they are often accompanied by qualities which make the abilities useless to him who has them, and even injurious to society.” ↩

529. There was a great temple of Demeter (Ceres) at Eleusis in Attica, and solemn mysteries, and an Hierophant or conductor of the ceremonies. ↩

530. See the note of Thomas Burnet, De Fide et Officiis Christianorum, editio secunda p. 89. ↩

531. The reader, who has an inclination to compare religious forms ancient and modern, may find something in modern practice to which the words of Epictetus are applicable. ↩

532. This is a view of the fitness of a teacher which, as far as I know, is quite new; and it is also true. Perhaps there was some vague notion of this kind in modern Europe at the time when teachers of youths were only priests, and when it was supposed that their fitness for the office of teacher was secured by their fitness for the office of priest. In the present “Ordering of Deacons” in the Church of England, the person, who is proposed as a fit person to be a deacon, is asked the following question by the bishop: “Do you trust that you are inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon you this office and ministration to serve God for the promotion of his glory and the edifying of his people?” In the ordering of Priests this question is omitted, and another question only is put, which is used also in the ordering of Deacons: “Do you think in your heart that you be truly called, according to the will of our Lord Jesus Christ,” etc. The teacher ought to have God to advise him to occupy the office of teacher, as Epictetus says. He does not say how God will advise: perhaps he supposed that this advice might be given in the way in which Socrates said that he received it.

     “Wisdom perhaps is not enough” to enable a man to take care of youths. Whatever “wisdom” may mean, it is true that a teacher should have a fitness and liking for the business. If he has not, he will find it disagreeable, and he will not do it well. He may and ought to gain a reasonable living by his labor: if he seeks only money and wealth, he is on the wrong track, and he is only like a common dealer in buying and selling, a butcher or a shoemaker, or a tailor, all useful members of society and all of them necessary in their several kinds. But the teacher has a priestly office, the making, as far as it is possible, children into good men and women. Should he be “ordered” like a Deacon or a Priest, for his office is even more useful than that of Priest or Deacon? Some will say that this is ridiculous. Perhaps the wise will not think so. ↩

533. See the description of Thersites in the Iliad, ii 212. ↩

534. The office which in our times corresponds to this description of the Cynic, is the office of a teacher of religion. ↩

535. See note 153. ↩

536. Quod petis hic est,
     Est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit aequus.

     —⁠Horace, Epodes i 11, 30

     Willst du immer weiter schweifen?
     Sieh, das Gute liegt so nah.
     Lerne nur das Glück ergreifen,
     Denn das Glück ist immer da.

     —⁠Goethe, Gedichte

     ↩

537. These men are supposed to have been strong gladiators. Croesus is the rich king of Lydia, who was taken prisoner by Cyrus the Persian. ↩

538. Man then is supposed to consist of a soul and of a body. It may be useful to remember this when we are explaining other passages in Epictetus ↩

539. “It is observable that Epictetus seems to think it a necessary qualification in a teacher sent from God for the instruction of mankind to be destitute of all external advantages and a suffering character. Thus doth this excellent man, who had carried human reason to so great a height, bear testimony to the propriety of that method which the divine wisdom hath thought fit to follow in the scheme of the Gospel; whose great author had not where to lay his head; and which some in later ages have inconsiderately urged as an argument against the Christian religion. The infinite disparity between the proposal of the example of Diogenes in Epictetus and of our Redeemer in the New Testament is too obvious to need any enlargement.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

540. Some of the ancients, who called themselves philosophers, did blame God and his administration of the world; and there are men who do the same now. If a man is dissatisfied with the condition of the world, he has the power of going out of it, as Epictetus often says; and if he knows, as he must know, that he cannot alter the nature of man and the conditions of human life, he may think it wise to withdraw from a state of things with which he is not satisfied. If he believes that there is no God, he is at liberty to do what he thinks best for himself; and if he does believe that there is a God, he may still think that his power of quitting the world is a power which he may exercise when he chooses. Many persons commit suicide, not because they are dissatisfied with the state of the world, but for other reasons. I have not yet heard of a modern philosopher who found fault with the condition of human things, and voluntarily retired from life. Our philosophers live as long as they can, and some of them take care of themselves and of all that they possess; they even provide well for the comfort of those whom they leave behind them. The conclusion seems to be that they prefer living in this world to leaving it, that their complaints are idle talk; and that, being men of weak minds and great vanity, they assume the philosopher’s name, and while they try to make others as dissatisfied as they profess themselves to be, they are really enjoying themselves after their fashion as much as they can. These men, though they may have the means of living with as much comfort as the conditions of human life permit, are dissatisfied, and they would, if they could, make as dissatisfied as themselves those who have less means of making life tolerable. These grumblers are not the men who give their money or their labor or their lives for increasing the happiness of mankind and diminishing the unavoidable sufferings of human life; but they find it easier to blame God, when they believe in him; or to find fault with things as they are, which is more absurd, when they do not believe in God, and when they ought to make the best that they can of the conditions under which we live. ↩

541. The text is εἰκῆ ἐξελθόντα. Heinrich Meibom suggested εἰσελθόντα in place of ἐξελθόντα: Johann Schweighäuser appears to prefer εἰσελθόντα, and I have translated this word in the version. I think that there is no doubt about the emendation. ↩

542. “E caelo descendit γνῶθι σεαυτόν” Juvenal Satires xi 27. The expression “Know thyself” is attributed to several persons, and to Socrates among them. Self-knowledge is one of the most difficult kinds of knowledge; and no man has it completely. Men either estimate their powers too highly, and this is named vanity, self conceit, or arrogance; or they think too meanly of their powers and do not accomplish what they might accomplish if they had reasonable self confidence. ↩

543. “Compare this with the Christian precepts of forbearance and love to enemies, Matthew 5:39⁠–⁠44. The reader will observe that Christ specifies higher injuries and provocations than Epictetus doth; and requires of all his followers, what Epictetus describes only as the duty of one or two extraordinary persons, as such.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

544. John Upton quotes Hieronymus, Adversus Jovianum book ii, where the thing is told in a different way. ↩

545. I have not translated, because I do not understand, the words δτι κατηγορεῖ. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

546. This must be the meaning. Heinrich Meibom suggested that the true reading is Κυνικοῦ, and not Κυνικόν: and Johann Schweighäuser seems to be of the same mind. I have repeated the word Cynic several times to remove all ambiguity in this section. ↩

547. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on ὥστε ἄν σοι δοκῇ. ↩

548. The Stoics recommended marriage, the procreation of children, the discharge of magisterial offices, and the duties of social life generally. ↩

549. “It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word (ἀπερισπάστως) with St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 7:35, and urges the same consideration, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from marriage. His observation too that the state of things was then (ὡς ἐν παρατάξει) like that of an army prepared for battle, nearly resembles the Apostle’s (ἐνεστῶσα ἀνάγκη) present necessity. St. Paul says, 2 Timothy 2:4 (οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται etc.), no man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of life. So Epictetus says here that a Cynic must not be (ἐμπεπλεγμένον) in relations, etc. From these and many other passages of Epictetus one would be inclined to think that he was not unacquainted with St. Paul’s Epistles or that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter.

     I do not find any evidence of Epictetus being acquainted with the Epistles of Paul. It is possible that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine, but I have not observed any evidence of the fact. Epictetus and Paul have not the same opinion about marriage, for Paul says that “if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn.” Accordingly his doctrine is “to avoid fornication let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband.” He does not directly say what a man should do when he is not able to maintain a wife; but the inference is plain what he will do (1 Corinthians 7:2). Paul’s view of marriage differs from that of Epictetus, who recommends marriage. Paul does not: he writes, “I say therefore to the unmarried and widows: It is good for them if they abide even as I.” He does not acknowledge marriage and the begetting of children as a duty; which Epictetus did.

     In the present condition of the world Epictetus says that the “minister of God” should not marry, because the cares of a family would distract him and make him unable to discharge his duties. There is sound sense in this. A “minister of God” should not be distracted by the cares of a family, especially if he is poor. ↩

550. The word is ἀνάτεινον. Compare book II chapter XVII at 9. ↩

551. In the text it is γραφεῖα, τιλλάρια. It is probable that there should be only one word. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. Horace (Satires i 6, 73) speaks of boys going to school:

     Laevo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto.

     ↩

552. The wife of Crates was Hipparchia, who persisted against all advice in marrying Crates and lived with him exactly as he lived. Diogenes Laërtius, Lives vi 96. (John Upton.) ↩

553. There is some difficulty about ἀπερισπάστων here. John Upton proposed to write ἀπεριστάτων, which he explains “that which has nothing peculiar in it.” ↩

554. Schweighäuser translates κακορυγχα “male grunnientes”: perhaps it means “ugly-faced.” ↩

555. Diogenes Laërtius, Lives vi 42. ↩

556. The Cynic is in Epictetus the minister of religion. He must be pure, for otherwise how can he reprove vice? This is a useful lesson to those whose business it is to correct the vices of mankind. ↩

557. See note 421. ↩

558. This is quoted by Marcus Aurelius, Meditations xi 36. ↩

559. Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice of Sophists, Rhetoricians, and others, who made addresses only to get praise. This practice of reciting prose or verse compositions was common in the time of Epictetus, as we may learn from the letters of the younger Pliny, Juvenal, Martial, and the author of the treatise de Causis corruptae eloquentiae. (John Upton.) ↩

560. Such were the subjects which the literary men of the day delighted in. ↩

561. Dion of Prusa in Bithynia was named Chrysostomus (golden-mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rhetorician and sophist, as the term was then understood, and was living at the same time as Epictetus. Eighty of his orations written in Greek are still extant, and some fragments of fifteen. ↩

562. These words are the beginning of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, i 1. The small critics disputed whether the text should be τίσι λόγοις, or τίνι λόγῳ. ↩

563. From the Crito of Plato, chapter 6. ↩

564. The rich, says John Upton, used to lend their houses for recitations, as we learn from Pliny, Epistle viii 12, and Juvenal, Satires vii 40.

     Si dulcedine famae
     Succensus recites, maculosas commodat aedes.

     Quadratus is a Roman name. There appears to be a confusion between Socrates and Quadratus. The man says, No. Socrates would not do so: but he would do, as a man might do now. He would say on the road; I hope you will come to hear me. I don’t find anything in the notes on this passage; but it requires explanation. ↩

565. κατηγορία is one of Aristotle’s common terms. ↩

566. From Plato’s Apology of Socrates. ↩

567. Aulus Gellius Attic Nights v 1. Seneca, Epistle 52. (John Upton.) ↩

568. Cicero, De Officiis i 18: “Quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescio quomodo pleniore ore laudamus. Hino Rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctria.” ↩

569. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

570. See book II chapter V at 26. ↩

571. See book III chapter XIII at 15. ↩

572. Homer, Odyssey i 3. ↩

573. Homer, Odyssey, xvii 487. ↩

574. ἀπέχειν. See book III chapter II at 13. Paul to the Philippians 4:18. ↩

575. Suetonius (Claudius, 25) says: “Peregrinae conditionis homines vetuit usurpare Romana nomina, duntaxat gentilia. Civitatem Romanam usurpantes in campo Esquilino securi percussit.” (John Upton.) ↩

576. This is a denunciation of the hypocrite. ↩

577. “Pity” perhaps means that he will suffer the perturbation of pity, when he ought not to feel it. I am not sure about the exact meaning. ↩

578. “What follows hath no connection with what immediately preceded; but belongs to the general subject of the chapter.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter.

     “The person with whom Epictetus chiefly held this discourse, seems to have been instructed by his friends to pay his respects to some great man at Nicopolis (perhaps the procurator, book III chapter IV at 1) and to visit his house.” —⁠Johann Schweighäuser ↩

579. The reward of virtue is in the acts of virtue. The Stoics taught that virtue is its own reward. When I was a boy I have written this in copies, but I did not know what it meant. I know now that few people believe it; and like the man here, they inquire what reward they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer: “For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing or the feet for walking.” —⁠Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ix 42. Compare Seneca, De Vita Beata, chapter 9. ↩

580. It was the custom at Athens when the court (the dicasts) had determined to convict an accused person, in some cases at least, to ask him what penalty he proposed to be inflicted on himself; but Socrates refused to do this or to allow his friends to do it, for he said that to name the penalty was the same as admitting his guilt (Xenophon, Apologia, 23). Socrates said that if he did name a proper penalty for himself, it would be that he should daily be allowed to dine in the Prytaneium (Plato, Apology, chapter 26; Cicero, De Oratore, i 54). ↩

581. The character of Diogenes is described very differently by Epictetus from that which we read in common books. ↩

582. A people in Thessaly between the river Peneius and Mount Olympus. It is the same as if Epictetus had said to any remote country. ↩

583. On the word καρπιστήν see the notes in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition. The word is supposed to be formed from καρπίς, καρφίς, festuca. ↩

584. Μεταπίπτοντας. See book I chapter VII. ↩

585. This is an old practice, to go about and sell physic to people. Cicero (Pro Cluentio, chapter 14) speaks of such a quack (pharmacopola), who would do a poisoning job for a proper sum of money. I have seen a travelling doctor in France who went about in a cart and rang a bell, at the sound of which people came round him. Some who were deaf had stuff poured into their ears, paid their money, and made way for others who had other complaints. ↩

586. It was the custom in Roman triumphs for a slave to stand behind the triumphant general in his chariot and to remind him that he was still mortal. Juvenal, Satires x 41. ↩

587. Compare Marcus Aurelius Meditations xi 33 and 34. ↩

588. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations xi 35. Compare book III chapter XIII at 14, and book IV chapter VII at 75. ↩

589. John Upton altered the text οὐκέτι οὖν ἔσομαι; Οὐκ ἔσῃ ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι, οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει, into οὔκετι οὖν ἔσομαι; Ἔσῃ ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι, οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν οὐκ ἔχει. He says that he made the alteration without manuscript authority, but that the sense requires the change. Johann Schweighäuser does not accept the alteration, nor do I. Schweighäuser remarks that there may be some difficulty in the words οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει. He first supposes that the word “now” (νῦν) means after a man’s death; but next he suggests that ἄλλο τι οὗ means “something different from that of which the world has now need.” A reader might not discover that there is any difficulty. He might also suggest that νῦν ought to be omitted, for if it were omitted, the sense would be still plainer. See book III chapter XIII at 15; and book IV chapter VII at 15. ↩

590. I am not sure if Epictetus ever uses κόσμος in the sense of “Universe,” the “universum” of philosophers. I think he sometimes uses it in the common sense of the world, the earth and all that is on it. Epictetus appears to teach that when a man dies, his existence is terminated. The body is resolved into the elements of which it is formed, and these elements are employed for other purposes. Consistently with this doctrine he may have supposed that the powers, which we call rational and intellectual, exist in man by virtue only of the organisation of his brain which is superior to that of all other animals; and that what we name the soul has no existence independent of the body. It was an old Greek hypothesis that at death the body returned to earth from which it came, and the soul (πνεῦμα) returned to the regions above, from which it came. I cannot discover any passage in Epictetus in which the doctrine is taught that the soul has an existence independent of the body. The opinions of Marcus Aurelius on this matter are contained in his book, Meditations iv 14, 21, and perhaps elsewhere: but they are rather obscure. A recent writer has attempted to settle the question of the existence of departed souls by affirming that we can find no place for them either in heaven or in hell; for the modern scientific notion, as I suppose that it must be named, does not admit the conception of a place heaven or a place hell (David Friedrich Strauss, Der Alte und der Neue Glaube, p. 129).

     We may name Paul a contemporary of Epictetus, for though Epictetus may have been the younger, he was living at Rome during Nero’s reign (54⁠–⁠68 BC); and it is affirmed, whether correctly or not I do not undertake to say, that Paul wrote from Ephesus his first epistle to the Corinthians (1 Corinthians 16:8) in the beginning of 56 AD. Epictetus, it is said, lived in Rome till the time of the expulsion of the philosophers by Domitian, when he retired to Nicopolis an old man, and taught there. Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians (chapter 15) contains his doctrine of the resurrection, which is accepted, I believe, by all, or nearly all, if there are any exceptions, who profess the Christian faith: but it is not understood by all in the same way.

     Paul teaches that Christ died for our sins, that he was buried and rose again on the third day; and that after his resurrection he was seen by many persons. Then he asks, if Christ rose from the dead, how can some say that there is no resurrection of the dead? “But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen” (verse 13); and (verse 19), “if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.” But he affirms again (verse 20) that “Christ is risen and become the first fruits of them that slept.” In verse 32, he asks what advantages he has from his struggles in Ephesus, “if the dead rise not: let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.” He seems not to admit the value of life, if there is no resurrection of the dead; and he seems to say that we shall seek or ought to seek only the pleasures of sense, because life is short, if we do not believe in a resurrection of the dead. It may be added that there is not any direct assertion in this chapter that Christ ascended to heaven in a bodily form, or that he ascended to heaven in any way. He then says (verse 35), “But some man will say: How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?” He answers this question (verse 36), “Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die”: and he adds that “God giveth it (the seed) a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body.” We all know that the body, which is produced from the seed, is not the body “that shall be:” and we also know that the seed which is sown does not die, and that if the seed died, no body would be produced from such seed. His conclusion is that the dead “is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body” (σῶμα πνευματικόν). I believe that the commentators do not agree about this “spiritual body”: but it seems plain that Paul did not teach that the body which will rise will be the same as the body which is buried. He says (verse 50) that “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.” Yet in the Apostles’ Creed we pronounce our belief in the “resurrection of the body”: but in the Nicene Creed it is said we look “for the resurrection of the dead,” which is a different thing or may have a different meaning from “the resurrection of the body.” In the ministration of baptism to such as are of riper years, the person to be baptized is asked “Dost thou believe in God the Father Almighty,” etc. in the terms of the Church Creeds, but in place of the resurrection of the body or of the dead, he is asked if he believes “in the resurrection of the flesh.”

     The various opinions of divines of the English church on the resurrection of the body are stated by Augustus Clissold in the Practical Nature of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg in a Letter to Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, 1859, 2nd ed. ↩

591. Seneca De Consolatione ad Polybium chapter 30; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations iii 13. ↩

592. Compare book I chapter XII at 2; book II chapter XIV at 11; book III chapter XXVI at 28. “Compare this with the description of the universal care of Providence, Matthew 10:29⁠–⁠30, and the occasion on which it was produced.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

593. See book I chapter XIX at 19. ↩

594. On the strange words ὀρδινατίων and ὀπτικίοις, which occur in this sentence, see the notes in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition. ↩

595. Compare book III chapter XV at 4. ↩

596. These games were celebrated once in four years. ↩

597. “All the circuit of the games” means the circuit of the Pythian, Isthmian, Nemean, and Olympic games. A man who had contended in these four games victoriously was named Periodonices, or Periodeutes. (John Upton.)

     The Greeks used to put quails in a cockpit, as those who are old enough may remember that we used to put game cocks to fight with one another. Johann Schweighäuser describes a way of trying the courage of these quails from Pollux (Onomasticon ix 109); but I suppose that the birds fought also with one another. ↩

598. John Upton supposed that the words Ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅμοιον⁠ ⁠… to κακῶς ἐνεργῆσαι, in the translation, “But the one case is not⁠ ⁠… to fly from evil acts,” are said by the adversary of Epictetus, and Elizabeth Carter has followed Upton in the translation. But then there is no sense in the last sentence Οἱ πόνοι ἄρα etc., in the translation, “Sufferings then” etc. The reader may consult Johann Schweighäuser’s note. I suppose that Epictetus is speaking the words “But the one case” etc. to the end of the chapter. The adversary, who is not punished like a slave, and has no pains to remind him of his faults, is supposed so far not to have felt the consequences of his bad acts; but Epictetus concludes that sufferings of a painful character would be useful to him, as they are to all persons who do what they ought not to do. There is perhaps some difficulty in the word πειρατηρίων. But I think that Schweighäuser has correctly explained the passage. ↩

599. “Compare this chapter with the beautiful and affecting discourses of our Saviour on the same subject, Matthew 6:25⁠–⁠34; Luke 12:22⁠–⁠30.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter. The first verse of Matthew begins, “Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink” etc. No Christian literally follows the advice of this and the following verses, and he would be condemned by the judgment of all men if he did. ↩

600. It is very absurd to suppose that no fugitive slave ever died of hunger. How could Epictetus know that? ↩

601. He supposes that the man who is dying of hunger has also wife and children, who will suffer the same dreadful end. The consolation, if it is any, is that the rich and luxurious and kings will also die. The fact is true. Death is the lot of all. But a painful death by hunger cannot be alleviated by a man knowing that all must die in some way. It seems as if the philosopher expected that even women and children should be philosophers, and that the husband in his philosophy should calmly contemplate the death of wife and children by starvation. This is an example of the absurdity to which even a wise man carried his philosophy; and it is unworthy of the teacher’s general good sense. ↩

602. We see many old beggars who endure what others could not endure; but they all die at last, and would have died earlier if their beggar life had begun sooner. The living in the open air and wandering about help them to last longer; but the exposure to cold and wet and to the want of food hastens their end. The life of a poor old beggar is neither so long nor so comfortable as that of a man, who has a good home and sufficient food, and lives with moderation. ↩

603. See book III chapter II. ↩

604. Plato using the same simile “teaches that last of all disciplines dialectic ought to be learned.” (Johann Schweighäuser.) ↩

605. ἀποσαλεύεσθαι. Paul, 2 Thessalonians 2:2, has εἰς τὸ μὴ ταχέως σαλευθῆναι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ νοός. (John Upton.) ↩

606. This is good advice. When you propose to measure, to estimate things, you should first tell us what the things are before you attempt to fix their value; and what is the measure or scales that you use. ↩

607. Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno in his school, was a great example of the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties: during the night he used to draw water from the wells for the use of the gardens: during the day he employed himself in his studies. He was the author of a noble hymn to Zeus, which is extant. ↩

608. It seems strange that Epictetus should make such assertions when we know that they are not true. Shortly after he himself speaks even of the good man not being supplied with food by God. ↩

609. See book I chapter XXIX at 29. ↩

610. The word is ἐπευφημῶν. Compare ἐπευφήμησαν, Homer, Iliad i 22. ↩

611. See book I chapter XVI at 15. ↩

612. “Compare Hebrews 11 and 12, in which the Apostle and Philosopher reason in nearly the same manner and even use the same terms; but how superior is the example urged by the Apostle to Hercules and Ulysses!” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

613. The story of Ulysses asking Nausicaa and her maids for help when he was cast naked on the land is in the Odyssey vi 127. ↩

614. Manes is a slave’s name. Diogenes had a slave named Manes, his only slave, who ran away, and though Diogenes was informed where the slave was, he did not think it worthwhile to have him brought back. He said, it would be a shame if Manes could live without Diogenes, and Diogenes could not live without Manes ↩

615. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum v: “Quid est enim libertas? Potestas vivendi ut velis. Quis igitur vivit ut vult, nisi qui recta sequitur,” etc. ↩

616. προπίπτωνη. Compare book II chapter I at 10: ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὖν ἢ προπεσεῖν. ↩

617. “Whoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin” John 8:31. (Elizabeth Carter.) ↩

618. A usual form of oath. See book II chapter XX at 29. John Upton compares the Roman expression “Per Genium,” as in Horace Epistles i 7, 94:

     Quod te per Genium, dextramque, Deosque Penates
     Obsecro et obtestor.

     ↩

619. A lover’s exclusion by his mistress was a common topic, and a serious cause of complaint (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura iv 1172):

     At lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe
     Floribus et sertis operit.

     See also Horace, Odes, i 25. ↩

620. Thrasonides was a character in one of Menander’s plays, titled Μισούμενος or the Hated. ↩

621. It must have been rather difficult to manage a tame lion; but we read of such things among the Romans. Seneca, Epistles 41. ↩

622. The keeping of birds in cages, parrots and others, was also common among the Romans. Ovid (Amores ii 6) has written a beautiful elegy on the death of a favorite parrot. ↩

623. See book II chapter I at 26. The εἰκοστώναι were the Publicani, men who farmed this and other taxes. A tax of a twentieth of the value of a slave when manumitted was established at an early time (Livy History of Rome vii 16). It appears from this passage that the manumitted slave paid the tax out of his savings (peculium). See note 222. ↩

624. The reader may guess the meaning. ↩

625. A gold ring was worn by the Equites; and accordingly to desire the gold ring is the same as to desire to be raised to the Equestrian class. ↩

626. The colophon. See note 315. After the words “most splendid slavery” it is probable that some words have accidentally been omitted in the manuscripts. ↩

627. Compare book I chapter II at 6. ↩

628. Compare book I chapter XXII. ↩

629. “Sic praetextatos referunt Artaxata mores.” —⁠Juvenal, Satires ii 170. See note 20. ↩

630. Saturnalia. See note 159.

     At this season the slaves had liberty to enjoy themselves and to talk freely with their masters. Hence Horace says, Satires ii 74:

     Age, libertate Decembri,
     Quando ita majores voluerunt, utere.

     ↩

631. “Insigne hoc exemplum est τοῦ εἰκῆ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς πι μέρους οὐσίαις. De quo, vide i 22, 9; ii 11, 3; ii 17, 7.” —⁠John Upton ↩

632. Johann Schweighäuser observes that death is in our power, as the Stoics taught; and Epictetus often tells us that the door is open. He suggests that the true reading may be καὶ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν. I think that the text is right. Epictetus asks is “Life or death” in our power. He means no more than if he had said Life only. ↩

633. He means that which seems to you to be false. See book III chapter XXII at 42.

     “In the matter of assent then”: this is the third τόρος or “locus” or division in philosophy (book III chapter II at 1⁠–⁠5). As to the Will, compare note 114. Epictetus affirms that a man cannot be compelled to assent, that is to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two creeds, which begin with the words, “I believe, etc.,” he knows, or he ought to know, that he cannot compel an unbeliever to accept the same belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some persons to profess or to express the same belief: but as no pains or penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God if he denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own reflections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe; or in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough, under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to anything which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this under all circumstances.

     To return to the matter under consideration, a man cannot be compelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when he believes that it is not true; and this act of his is quite independent of the matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe because he cannot believe. Yet it is said (Mark 16:11) in the received text, as it now stands, “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned” (condemned). The cause, as it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians; but all men do not admit the explanation to be sufficient: and it does not concern the present subject. ↩

634. The word “admire” is θαυμάσῃς in the original. The word is often used by Epictetus, and Horace uses “admirari” in this Stoical sense. See note 188. ↩

635. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on μέρος. ↩

636. The word is ἀγγαρεία, a word of Persian origin (Herodotus, The Histories viii 98). It means here the seizure of animals for military purposes when it is necessary. John Upton refers to Matthew 5:41, Mark 15:21 for similar uses of the verb ἀγγαρεύω. ↩

637. Here he speaks of asses being shod. The Latin translation of the word (ὑποδημάτια) in Epictetus is “ferreas calces.” I suppose they could use nothing but iron. ↩

638. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

639. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

640. Johann Schweighäuser suggests καταβεβλήκαμεν instead of ἀποβεβλήκαμεν, though all his manuscripts have the word in the text. I do not think that his proposed alteration is an improvement. ↩

641. The word is ἀποτειχίζω, which means what I have translated. The purpose of circumvallation was to take and sometimes also to destroy a fortress. Johann Schweighäuser translates the word by “destruam,” and that is perhaps not contrary to the meaning of the text; but it is not the exact meaning of the word. ↩

642. In this passage and in what follows we find the emphatic affirmation of the duty of conformity and of the subjection of man’s will to the will of God. The words are conclusive evidence of the doctrine of Epictetus that a man ought to subject himself in all things to the will of God or to that which he believes to be the will of God. No Christian martyr ever proclaimed a more solemn obedience to God’s will. The Christian martyr indeed has given perfect proof of his sincerity by enduring torments and death: the heathen philosopher was not put to the same test, and we cannot therefore say that he would have been able to bear it. ↩

643. In this passage the distinction must be observed between θέλω and βουλομαι, which the Latin translators have not observed, nor Elizabeth Carter. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on s. 90. ↩

644. ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ: he means “on earth.” ↩

645. Johann Schweighäuser expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word (ὁρμάς) to God. He says that Hieronymus Wolf has translated it “Dei appetitionem,” and John Upton “impetum.” He says that he has translated it “consilium.”

     It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man. ↩

646. See book II chapter I at 18. Johann Schweighäuser expected that Epictetus would have said “body and possessions etc.” I assume that Epictetus did say “body and possessions etc.,” and that his pupil or some copyist of manuscripts has omitted the word “body.” ↩

647. “The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away. Job 1:21.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

648. The initiated (μύσται) are those who were introduced with solemn ceremonies into some great religious body. These ceremonies are described by Dio Chrysostom, Orations xii, quoted by John Upton. ↩

649. “And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? ‘Either tell yourself that present suffering, void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe!’ Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master’s exhortation to the persecuted Christian: ‘Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven.’ ” —⁠Elizabeth Carter.

     I do not think that Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, believers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a believer in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice.

     The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right. ↩

650. See the note of Johann Schweighäuser on this passage. ↩

651. The word is καρπίστην δίδως. See book III chapter XXIV at 76 and note 583: also John Upton’s note on this passage. Johann Schweighäuser says that he does not quite understand why Epictetus here says διδόναι καρπίστην, “dare vindicem” or “adsertorem,” instead of saying “vindicate sese in libertatem.” ↩

652. See book III chapter XXIV at 66; book II chapter XIII at 24. ↩

653. See the same story in Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights ii chapter 18), who says that Xeniades, a Corinthian, bought Diogenes, manumitted him and made him the master of his children. ↩

654. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note 15. ↩

655. See note 21. ↩

656. I do not know if dogs sweat; at least in a state of health I have never seen it. But this is a question for the learned in dog science. ↩

657. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

658. As John Upton remarks, Epictetus is referring to the four categories of the Stoics. ↩

659. Epictetus, Enchiridion chapter 52. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Thomas Gataker’s second edition 1697, Annot. p. 96. ↩

660. Stoicus occidit Baream, delator amicum,
     Discipulumque senex.

     —⁠Juvenal, Satires iii 116

     Epictetus is supposed to allude to the crime of Egnatius Celer who accused Barea Soranus at Rome in the reign of Nero (Tacitus, The Annals xvi 32). ↩

661. Elizabeth Carter says that “there is much obscurity and some variety of reading in several lines of the original.” But see Johann Schweighäuser’s notes. Epictetus is showing that talk about philosophy is useless: philosophy should be practical. ↩

662. Horace Satires ii 5. ↩

663. Aprulla is a Roman woman’s name. It means some old woman who is courted for her money. ↩

664. Compare Plato (Symposium, p. 206): “All men conceive both as to the body and as to the soul, and when they have arrived at a certain age, our nature desires to procreate. But it cannot procreate in that which is ugly, but in that which is beautiful. For the conjunction of man and woman is generation; but this act is divine, and this in the animal which is mortal is divine, conceiving and begetting.” See what is said in note 420 on marrying. In a certain sense the procreation of children is a duty, and consequently the providing for them is also a duty. It is the fulfilling of the will and purpose of the Deity to people the earth; and therefore the act of procreation is divine. So a man’s duty is to labor in some way, and if necessary, to earn his living and sustain the life which he has received; and this is also a divine act. Paul’s opinion of marriage is contained in 1 Corinthians 7. Some of his teaching on this matter has been justly condemned. He has no conception of the true nature of marriage; at least he does not show that he has in this chapter. His teaching is impracticable, contrary to that of Epictetus, and to the nature and constitution of man; and it is rejected by the good sense of Christians who affect to receive his teaching; except, I suppose, by the superstitious body of Christians, who recommend and commend the so-called religious, and unmarried life. ↩

665. Felicion. See book I chapter XIX. ↩

666. Epictetus alludes to his lameness: compare book I chapter VIII at 14; book I chapter XVI at 20; and other passages. (John Upton.) ↩

667. Johann Schweighäuser doubts if the words οὐ γὰρ ἡν, which I have omitted, are genuine, and gives his reasons for the doubt. ↩

668. Johann Schweighäuser has a note on this difficult passage, which is rather obscure. ↩

669. The sense of “law” (ὁ νόμος) can be collected from what follows. Compare the discourse of Socrates on obedience to the law. (Criton, chapter 11, etc.) ↩

670. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on ἀπεριστάτου. ↩

671. Socrates fought at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium. He is said to have gained the prize for courage at Delium. He was a brave soldier as well as a philosopher, a union of qualities not common. (Plato’s Apology.) ↩

672. Socrates with others was ordered by the Thirty tyrants, who at that time governed Athens, to arrest Leon in the island of Salamis and to bring him to be put to death. But Socrates refused to obey the order. Few men would have done what he did under the circumstances. (Plato’s Apology; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations vii 66.) ↩

673. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations i 29. ↩

674. The Dialog of Plato, named Criton, contains the arguments which were used by his friends to persuade Socrates to escape from prison, and the reply of Socrates. ↩

675. This alludes to the behavior of Socrates when he refused to put to the vote the matter of the Athenian generals and their behavior after the naval battle of Arginusae. The violence of the weather prevented the commanders from collecting and honorably burying those who fell in the battle; and the Athenians, after their hasty fashion, wished all the commanders to be put to death. But Socrates, who was in office at this time, resisted the unjust clamour of the people. Xenophon Hellenica, i chapter 7, 15; Plato, Apologia; Xenophon, Memorabilia i 1, 18. ↩

676. The original is ποῦ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ἔμενον ἐκεῖνοι; this seems to mean, if we had escaped and left the country, where would those have been to whom we might have been useful? They would have been left behind, and we could have done nothing for them. ↩

677. This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued: the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. “The life of the dead,” says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Roman jurist and Cicero’s friend, “rests in the remembrance of the living.” Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used.⁠—Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man’s daily life and his intercourse with other men: in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will; and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was as he said, to know himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle, “Know thyself (γνῶθι σεαυτόν)”: and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was conformable to his life and teaching. “Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophon, Apology of Socrates §22), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind.” (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus, by Ferdinand Christian Baur.)

     This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading.

     The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. “What prejudices, what blindness must a man have,” says Rousseau, “when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of Mary!⁠—The death of Socrates philosophising tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire; that of Jesus expiring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God.” (Rousseau, Emile, volume iii p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765.) ↩

678. He means that you must not do as he does, because he does this or that act. The advice is in substance: Do not do as your friend does simply because he is your friend. ↩

679. See Iliad, ii 216; and for the description of Agamemnon, Iliad iii 167. ↩

680. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

681. The text is obscure, and perhaps there is something wrong, Johann Schweighäuser has a long note on the passage. ↩

682. He alludes to the factions in the theatres, book III chapter IV at 4; book IV chapter II at 9. (John Upton.) ↩

683. See note 157; book IV chapter VII at 17. ↩

684. Masurius Sabinus was a great Roman jurisconsult in the times of Augustus and Tiberius. He is sometimes named Masurius only (Persius, v. 90). Gaius Cassius Longinus was also a jurist, and, it is said, a descendant of the Cassius who was one of the murderers of the dictator Julius Caesar. He lived from the time of Tiberius to that of Vespasian. ↩

685. ἀσπασμοί. See this chapter further on. ↩

686. See Bishop Butler’s remarks in the preface to his Sermons volume ii. He speaks of the “idle way of reading and considering things. By this means, time even in solitude is happily got rid of, without the pain of attention: neither is any part of it more put to the account of idleness, one can scarce forbear saying, is spent with less thought, than great part of that which is spent in reading.” ↩

687. “Sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae.” Horace, Epistles ii 2, 144. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations iii 1. ↩

688. “The readers perhaps may grow tired with being so often told what they will find it very difficult to believe: That because externals are not in our power, they are nothing to us. But in excuse for this frequent repetition, it must be considered that the Stoics had reduced themselves to a necessity of dwelling on this consequence, extravagant as it is, by rejecting stronger aids. One cannot indeed avoid highly admiring the very few who attempted to amend and exalt themselves on this foundation. No one perhaps ever carried the attempt so far in practice, and no one ever spoke so well in support of the argument as Epictetus. Yet, notwithstanding his great abilities and the force of his example, one finds him strongly complaining of the want of success; and one sees from this circumstance as well as from others in the Stoic writings, that virtue cannot be maintained in the world without the hope of a future reward.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

689. Compare Horace, Satires i 4, 133: “Neque enim cum lectulus” etc. ↩

690. See note 32; book III chapter XV at 4; and book I chapter XXIV at 1; book I chapter XXIX at 34. The athletes were oiled, but they used to rub themselves with dust to be enabled to lay hold of one another. ↩

691. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations i 17, thanks the Gods that he did not waste his time in the resolution of syllogisms. ↩

692. See book III chapter II. ↩

693. See Aulus Gellius Attic Nights xvii 19, where he quotes Epictetus on what Gellius expresses by “intolerantia” and “incontinentia.” Compare Marcus Aurelius (Meditations v. 33) on the precept Ἀνέχου and Ἀπέχου. ↩

694. Plato in the Phaedon (chapter 4) says that Socrates in his prison wrote a hymn to Apollo. ↩

695. Book I chapter XXII. ↩

696. Compare Enchiridion, 52. Cleanthes was a Stoic philosopher, who also wrote some poetry. See note 607. ↩

697. He alludes to the practice of dependents paying formal visits in the morning at the houses of the great and powerful at Rome. John Upton refers to Virgil, Georgics, ii 461. ↩

698. Compare book I chapter XIX at 6. ↩

699. Compare Horace Satires i 5, 83. ↩

700. See Marcus Aurelius, Meditations vi 2 and ix 6. “Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with everything which happens⁠—that is enough.” ↩

701. Compare John Upton’s note on ἀπέχουσι, and Johann Schweighäuser’s version, and the Index Graecitatis. These commentators do not appear to be quite certain about the meaning of the text. ↩

702. See book II chapter XII at 15. ↩

703. See Xenophon, Memorabilia, ii 2, ↩

704. The word στρατηγῆσαι may be translated either way. ↩

705. See book IV chapter I at 77, and the use of θαυμάζειν. ↩

706. See book II chapter X at 14; book IV chapter I at 120. So Plato says (Laws vi), that a man who has had right education is wont to be the most divine and the tamest of animals. (John Upton.)

     On the doing wrong to another, see Plato’s Crito, and book IV chapter I at 167. ↩

707. See book III chapter I at 40. ↩

708. Like Hercules and Diogenes. See book III chapter XII at 2. ↩

709. The allusion is to a passage (a fragment) in the Cresphontes of Euripides translated by Cicero into Latin Iambics (Tusculan Disputations i 48):

     ἔδει γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους
     τὸν φύντα φρηνεῖν εἰς ὅσ’ ἔρχεται κάκα.
     τὸν δ’αὖ φανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον
     χαίροντας, εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

     Herodotus (The Histories v. 4) says of the Trausi, a Thracian tribe: “when a child is born, the relatives sit round it and lament over all the evils which it must suffer on coming into the world and enumerate all the calamities of mankind: but when one dies, they hide him in the earth with rejoicing and pleasure, reckoning all the evils from which he is now released and in possession of all happiness.” ↩

710. The word is πανδοκεῖον, which Johann Schweighäuser says that he does not understand. He supposes the word to be corrupt; unless we take it to mean the inn in which a man lives who has no home. I do not understand the word here. ↩

711. See the note of Johann Schweighäuser on the word τετράσσαρον in the text. ↩

712. This does not mean, it is said, that Nero issued counterfeit coins, for there are extant many coins of Nero which both in form and in the purity of the metal are complete. A learned numismatist, Francis Wise, fellow of Trinity College Oxford, in a letter to John Upton, says that he can discover no reason for Nero’s coins being rejected in commercial dealings after his death except the fact of the tyrant having been declared by the Senate to be an enemy to the Commonwealth. (Suetonius, Nero, chapter 49.) When Domitian was murdered, the Senate ordered his busts to be taken down, as the French now do after a revolution, and all memorials of him to be destroyed (Suetonius, Domitian, chapter 23). Dion also reports (LX) that when Caligula was murdered, it was ordered that all the brass coin which bore his image should be melted, and, I suppose, coined again. There is more on this subject in Wise’s letter.

     I do not believe that genuine coins would be refused in commercial dealings for the reasons which Wise gives, at least not refused in parts distant from Rome. Perhaps Epictetus means that some people would not touch the coins of the detestable Nero. ↩

713. He says τὸ κήρινον, which Elizabeth Carter translates “a piece of wax.” Perhaps it means “a piece of wax in the form of an apple.” ↩

714. The word is ἐπιφύησονται, the form of which is not Greek. Johann Schweighäuser has no remark on it, and he translates the word by “adorientur.” The form ought to be ἐπιφύσονται. See Stephens’ Lexicon on the word ἐπιφύομαι. Probably the word is corrupted. ↩

715. Elizabeth Carter renders φοβερόν by “formidable,” and in the Latin translation it is rendered “formidabilem,” but that cannot be the meaning of the word here. ↩

716. Eteocles and Polynices were the sons of the unfortunate Oedipus, who quarrelled about the kingship of Thebes and killed one another. This quarrel is the subject of the Seven Against Thebes of Aeschylus and the Phoenissae of Euripides. See note 400. ↩

717. “Every man in everything he does naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good.” Bishop Butler, Analogy, Chapter 2. The bishop’s “naturally” is the φύσις of Epictetus. ↩

718. Socrates’ wife Xanthippe is charged by her eldest son Lamprocles with being so ill-tempered as to be past all endurance (Xenophon, Memorabilia ii 2, 7). Xenophon in this chapter has reported the conversation of Socrates with his son on this matter.

     Diogenes Laërtius (Lives ii) tells the story of Xanthippe pouring water on the head of Socrates, and dirty water, as Seneca says (De Constantia, chapter 18). Aelian (Varia Historia xi 12) reports that Alcibiades sent Socrates a large and good cake, which Xanthippe trampled under her feet. Socrates only laughed and said, “Well then, you will not have your share of it.” The philosopher showed that his philosophy was practical by enduring the torment of a very ill-tempered wife, one of the greatest calamities that can happen to a man, and the trouble of an undutiful son. ↩

719. This is one of the wisest and noblest expressions of Epictetus. ↩

720. See Aristophanes, The Peace, line 1188 (John Upton):

     πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ μ’ ἠδίκησαν
     ὄντες οἴκοι μὲν λέοντες,
     ἐν μάχῃ δ’ ἀλώπεκες.

     ↩

721. Here it is implied that there are things which God cannot do. Perhaps he means that as God has given man certain powers of will and therefore of action, he cannot at the same time exercise the contradictory powers of forcing man’s will and action; for this would be at the same time to give power and to take it away. Bishop Butler remarks (Analogy, chapter 5) “the present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice.” In fact all men are not convinced and cannot be convinced in the present constitution of things “what things are good and bad.” ↩

722. Something is perhaps wrong in the text here. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

723. In place of μεπαπίπτοντας Johann Schweighäuser suggests that Arrian wrote καὶ τἄλλα ὡσαύτως or something of the kind. On μεταπίπτοντας see book I chapter VII. ↩

724. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations vii 36. ↩

725. ὄψονται. See note 31. ↩

726. Johann Schweighäuser says that he has not observed that this proverb is mentioned by any other writer, and that he does not quite see the meaning of it, unless it be what he expresses in the Latin version (iv 10, 24), “alterum opus cum altero nihil commune habet.” I think that the context explains it: if you wish to obtain a particular end, employ the proper means, and not the means which do not make for that end. ↩

727. See note 432. Epictetus is making a parody of the verses of Pythagoras. See Johann Schweighäuser’s remarks on the words “He who has risen, etc.” I have of necessity translated κακοηφισάμενος in an active sense; but if this is right, I do not understand how the word is used so. ↩

728. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on the text. By the Galilaeans it is probable that Epictetus means the Christians, whose obstinacy Marcus Aurelius also mentions (Meditations xi 3). Epictetus, a contemporary of St. Paul, knew little about the Christians, and only knew some examples of their obstinate adherence to the new faith and the fanatical behavior of some of the converts. That there were wild fanatics among the early Christians is proved on undoubted authority; and also that there always have been such, and now are such. The abuse of any doctrines or religious opinions is indeed no argument against such doctrines or religious opinions; and it is a fact quite consistent with experience that the best things are liable to be perverted, misunderstood, and misused. ↩

729. “This agrees with Ephesians 5:20: ‘Giving thanks always for all things to God.’ ” —⁠Elizabeth Carter. The words are the same in both except that the Apostle has εὐχαριστοῦντες, and Epictetus has χάριυ ἔχον. ↩

730. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

731. He says that the body will be resolved into the things of which it is composed: none of them will perish. The soul, as he has said elsewhere, will go to him who gave it (note 502). But I do not suppose that he means that the soul will exist as having a separate consciousness. ↩

732. καρπιστήν, see book IV chapter I at 113. ↩

733. See note 129. ↩

734. “Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt,” Matthew 26:39. (Elizabeth Carter.) “Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect, when our will is lost and resolved up into his; when we rest in his will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good.” —⁠Bishop Butler, Sermon on the Love of God ↩

735. See note 672. ↩

736. I do not see the meaning of ὕστερον: it may perhaps mean “after leaving the school.” See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

737. Here Epictetus admits that there is some power in man which uses the body, directs and governs it. He does not say what the power is nor what he supposes it to be. “Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with.” —⁠Bishop Butler’s Analogy, chapter 1. ↩

738. The will of a fool does not make law, he says. Unfortunately it does, if we use the word law in the strict sense of law: for law is a general command from a person, an absolute king, for example, who has power to enforce it on those to whom the command is addressed or if not to enforce it, to punish for disobedience to it. This strict use of the word “law” is independent of the quality of the command, which may be wise or foolish, good or bad. But Epictetus does not use the word “law” in the strict sense. ↩

739. The word is λιφοστρώτοις, which means what we name Mosaic floors or pavements. The word λιφόστρωτον is used by John 19:13, and rendered in our version by “pavement.” ↩

740. This term (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) has been often used by Epictetus (book I chapter XXVI at 15, etc.), and by Marcus Aurelius. Here Epictetus gives a definition or description of it: it is the faculty by which we reflect and judge and determine, a faculty which no other animal has, a faculty which in many men is neglected, and weak because it is neglected; but still it ought to be what its constitution forms it to be: a faculty which “plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification” (Bishop Butler, preface to his Sermons). The words in the text (ἐκλεγόμενον, ἀπεκλεγόμενον, selection and rejection) are expressed by Cicero (De Finibus ix 2, 11) by “eligere” and “rejicere.” ↩

741. See book IV chapter IV at 44. ↩

742. Compare Horace, Epistles i 19, 12, etc.

     Quid, si quis vultu torvo ferus et pede nudo
     Exiguaeque togae simulet textore Catonem,
     Virtutemne reprs aentet moresque Catonis?

     ↩

743. See book III chapter XV at 8 ↩

744. “Yea a man may say: Thou hast faith, and I have works; show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works,” Epistle of James 2:18. So a moral philosopher may say: I show my principles, not by what I profess, but by that which I do. ↩

745. See the statues of Hephaestus, Montfaucon, L’antiquité expliquée et représentée en figures volume i, book iii, chapter 1. (John Upton.) ↩

746. “In what then was he” seems to mean “in what did he employ himself?” ↩

747. The text of Johann Schweighäuser is οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἐκστῆναι οὐδενί. He says “temere οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκεῖ ed. Bas. et seqq.” But δοκεῖ is right. ↩

748. Compare book III chapter XXII. ↩

749. The word is φαινόλη, which seems to be the Latin “paenula.” ↩

750. “The gardens of Adonis” are things growing in earthen vessels, carried about for show only, not for use. “The gardens of Adonis” is a proverbial expression applied to things of no value, to plants, for instance, which last only a short time, have no roots, and soon wither. Much things, we may suppose, were exhibited at the festivals of Adonis. (Johann Schweighäuser’s note.) ↩

751. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

752. “They, who are desirous of taking refuge in Heathenism from the strictness of the Christian morality, will find no great consolation in reading this chapter of Epictetus.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

753. Aristides was a Greek, but his period is not known. He was the author of a work named Milesiaca or Milesian stories. All that we know of the work is that it was of a loose description, amatory and licentious. It was translated into Latin by Lucius Cornelius Sisenna, a contemporary of the Dictator Sulla; and it is mentioned by Plutarch (Life of Crassus, chapter 32), and several times by Ovid (Tristia ii 413, etc.). Evenus was perhaps a poet. We know nothing of this Evenus, but we may conjecture from being here associated with Aristides what his character was. ↩

754. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on the word μυραλειφίον, which he has in his text. It should be μυραλοιφίον, if the word exists. ↩

755. The orginal is φελῆσαι δεῖ. Seneca (Epistle 80): “Quid tibi opus est ut sis bonus? Velle.” (John Upton.)

     The power of the Will is a fundamental principle with Epictetus. The will is strong in some, but very feeble in others; and sometimes, as experience seems to show, it is incapable of resisting the power of old habits. ↩

756. Virtue is its own reward, said the Stoics. This is the meaning of Epictetus, and it is consistent with his principles that a man should live conformably to his nature, and so he will have all the happiness of which human nature is capable. Elizabeth Carter has a note here, which I do not copy, and I hardly understand. It seems to refer to the Christian doctrine of a man being rewarded in a future life according to his works: but we have no evidence that Epictetus believed in a future life, and he therefore could not go further than to maintain that virtuous behavior is the best thing in this short life, and will give a man the happiness which he can obtain in no other way. ↩

757. See a passage in Plutarch on Tranquillity from Euripides, the great storehouse of noble thoughts, from which ancient writers drew much good matter: and perhaps it was one of the reasons why so many of his plays and fragments have been preserved.

     We must not quarrel with the things that are,
     For they care not for us; but he who feels them,
     If he disposes well of things, fares well.

     ↩

758. See book III chapter II. ↩

759. “Thine they were, and thou gavest them to me.” John 17:6. (Elizabeth Carter.) ↩

760. “I wish it were possible to palliate the ostentation of this passage, by applying it to the ideal perfect character: but it is in a general way that Epictetus hath proposed such a dying speech, as cannot without shocking arrogance be uttered by anyone born to die. Unmixed as it is with any acknowledgment of faults or imperfections, at present, or with any sense of guilt on account of the past, it must give every sober reader a very disadvantageous opinion of some principles of the philosophy, on which it is founded, as contradictory to the voice of conscience, and formed on absolute ignorance or neglect of the condition and circumstances of such a creature as man.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter.

     I am inclined to think that Epictetus does refer to the “ideal perfect character,” but others may not understand him in this way. When Carter says “but it is in a general⁠ ⁠… dying speech,” she can hardly suppose, as her words seem to mean, that Epictetus proposed such a dying speech for every man or even for many men, for he knew and has told us how bad many men are, and how few are good according to his measure and rule: in fact his meaning is plainly expressed. The dying speech may even be stronger in the sense in which Carter understands it, in my translation, where I have rendered one passage in the text by the words “I have not dishonored thee by my acts,” which she translates, “as far as in me lay, I have not dishonored thee;” which apparently means, “as far as I could, I have not dishonored thee.” The Latin translation “quantum in me fuit,” seems rather ambiguous to me.

     There is a general confession of sins in the prayer book of the Church of England, part of which Epictetus would not have rejected, I think. Of course the words which form the peculiar Christian character of the confession would have been unintelligible to him. It is a confession which all persons of all conditions are supposed to make. If all persons made the confession with sincerity, it ought to produce a corresponding behavior and make men more ready to be kind to one another, for all who use it confess that they fail in their duty, and it ought to lower pride and banish arrogance from the behavior of those who in wealth and condition are elevated above the multitude. But I have seen it somewhere said, I cannot remember where, but said in no friendly spirit to Christian prayer, that some men both priests and laymen prostrate themselves in humility before God and indemnify themselves by arrogance to man. ↩

761. See book IV chapter II at 2. ↩

762. These were what the Romans named “sportulæ,” in which the rich used to give some eatables to poor dependents who called to pay their respects to the great at an early hour.

     Nune sportula primo
     Limine parva sedet turbae rapienda togatae.

     —⁠Juvenal, Satires i 95

     ↩

763. “You cannot serve God and Mammon.” Matthew 6:24. (Elizabeth Carter.) ↩

764. See book IV chapter II at 5. ↩

765. Compare book I chapter XV at 18; and book I chapter IX at 20. ↩

766. See the note in Johann Schweighäuser’s edition. ↩

767. Epictetus refers to the passage in the Iliad xxiv 5, where Achilles is lamenting the death of Patroclus and cannot sleep. ↩

768. “This is a wretched idea of friendship; but a necessary consequence of the Stoic system. What a fine contrast to this gloomy consolation are the noble sentiments of an Apostle? Value your deceased friend, says Epictetus, as a broken pipkin; forget him, as a thing worthless, lost and destroyed. St. Paul, on the contrary, comforts the mourning survivors; bidding them not sorrow, as those who have no hope: but remember that the death of good persons is only a sleep; from which they will soon arise to a happy immortality.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter.

     Epictetus does not say, “value your deceased friend as a broken pipkin.” Achilles laments that he has lost the services of his friend at table, a vulgar kind of complaint: he is thinking of his own loss, instead of his friend. The answer is such a loss as he laments is easily repaired: the loss of such a friend is as easily repaired as the loss of a cooking vessel. Carter in her zeal to contrast the teaching of the Apostle with that of Epictetus seems to forget for the time that Epictetus, so far as we know, did not accept or did not teach the doctrine of a future life. As to what he thought of friendship, if it was a real friendship, such as we can conceive, I am sure that he did not think of it as Carter says that he did; for true friendship implies many of the virtues which Epictetus taught and practiced. He has a chapter on Friendship, book II chapter XXII, which I suppose that Carter did not think of when she wrote this note. ↩

769. The word is τὸ κοινωνικον. Compare book I chapter XXIII at 1; book II chapter X at 14; book II chapter XX at 6. ↩

770. In the text there are two words, καφαρός which means “pure,” and καφάριος which means “of a pure nature,” “loving purity.” ↩

771. The ξύστρα, as Epictetus names it, was the Roman “strigilis,” which was used for the scraping and cleaning of the body in bathing. Persius (Satire V, line 126) writes:

     I, puer, et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer.

     The strigiles “were of bronze or iron of various forms. They were applied to the body much in the same way as we see a piece of hoop applied to a sweating horse.” Pompeii, edited by Thomas Henry Dyer. ↩

772. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

773. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note. If the text is right, the form of expression is inexact and does not clearly express the meaning; but the meaning may be easily discovered. ↩

774. See what is said of this passage in the latter part of this chapter. ↩

775. Aristophanes, Nubes, line 225, and v. 179. ↩

776. Xenophon, Memorabilia iii 12. ↩

777. See book III chapter XXII at 88. ↩

778. Diogenes, it is said, was driven from his native town Sinope in Asia on a charge of having debased or counterfeited the coinage. (John Upton.) It is probable that this is false. ↩

779. On the word ὥστε see Johann Schweighäuser’s note. ↩

780. As to Polemon see book III chapter I at 14. ↩

781. It has been suggested that the words s. 19, (“if you do not choose to wash with warm water, wash with cold”) belong to this place. ↩

782. This is the literal translation: but it means, “will you go, etc., tear it?” ↩

783. “The youth, probably, means the scholar, who neglects neatness; and the old man, the tutor, that gives him no precept or example of it.” —⁠Elizabeth Carter ↩

784. The Greek is λέγῃ τὰς σχόλας. Cicero uses the Latin “scholas habere,” “to hold philosophical disputations.” Tusculan Disputations i 4. (John Upton.) ↩

785. See Johann Schweighäuser’s note on the words εἰώθει ὑπερτιφέμενον, in place of which he proposes ἐξωφῇ ὑπερτιφέμενος. Compare Persius, Satire V, line 66:

     “Cras hoc fiet.” Idem cras fiet, etc.,

     and Martial, Epigrams v 58. ↩

786. Compare book IV chapter IV at 39; book I chapter XIV at 12; and Enchiridion chapter 32, and the remark of Simplicius. Johann Schweighäuser explains the words τοῖς μετ’ ἐκεῖνον thus: “qui post Illum (Deum) et sub Illo rebus humanis praesunt; qui proximum ab Illo locum tenent.” ↩

787. Compare book II chapters XIII, XV, and XX; and Marcus Aurelius, Meditations vi 35: “Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason (the principles) of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him and the gods?” ↩

788. “Quid sumus, aut quidnam victuri gignimur.” Persius, Satires iii 67. ↩

789. Johann Schweighäuser thinks that the text will be better translated according to John Upton’s notion and H. Stephen’s (hors de propos) by “Quid sit abs re futurum,” “what will be out of season.” Perhaps he is right. ↩

790. Johann Schweighäuser says that the sense of the passage, as I have rendered it, requires the reading to be καταφρονήσουσι; and it is so, at least in the better Greek writers. ↩

791. See book III chapter XIV at 7; book I chapter XXIX at 64. ↩

792. Compare Marcus Aurelius, Meditations viii 22: “Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion, or an act, or a word.

     “Thou sufferest this justly, for thou choosest rather to become good tomorrow than to be good today. ↩

793. Johann Schweighäuser writes πῶς ποτε, etc., and translates “excitamur quodammodo et ipsi,” etc. He gives the meaning, but the πῶς ποτε is properly a question. ↩

794. The man, whether a soldier or not, was an informer, one of those vile men who carried on this shameful business under the empire. He was what Juvenal names a “delator.” John Upton, who refers to the life of Hadrian by Aelius Spartianus, speaks even of this emperor employing soldiers named Frumentarii for the purpose of discovering what was said and done in private houses. John the Baptist (Luke 3:14) in answer to the question of the soldiers, “And what shall we do?” said unto them “Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages.” (Upton.) ↩

795. The wheel and pitch were instruments of torture to extract confessions. See book II chapter VI at 18, and Johann Schweighäuser’s note there. ↩