Endnotes

1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution. —⁠Publius ↩

2. Aspasia, vide Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles.” —⁠Publius ↩

3. Vide Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles.” —⁠Publius ↩

4. Vide Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles.” —⁠Publius ↩

5. Vide Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles.” Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva. —⁠Publius ↩

6. Worn by the popes. —⁠Publius ↩

7. Madame de Maintenon. —⁠Publius ↩

8. Duchess of Marlborough. —⁠Publius ↩

9. Madame de Pompadour. —⁠Publius ↩

10. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states. —⁠Publius ↩

11. The Duke of Marlborough. —⁠Publius ↩

12. In the text said to have been revised by Hamilton and Madison, and adopted by Mr. J. C. Hamilton, the following additional sentences occur at this point: “and sometimes even the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations without their consent. The last war but two between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of the English merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish main. These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on the part of the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which were not more justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a just retaliation and were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the English who were taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a spirit of resentment, the innocent were, after a while, confounded with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the House of Commons, and was communicated from that body to the ministry. Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued, which in its consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years before had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial fruits. ↩

13. Vide Principes des Négociations par l’Abbé de Mably. —⁠Publius ↩

14. Divide and command. —⁠Publius ↩

15. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week⁠—on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in The Daily Advertiser. —⁠Publius ↩

16. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which contain no guard at all on this subject. —⁠Publius ↩

17. In the revised text: “This inference, from the very form of the proposition, is, at best, problematical and uncertain.” ↩

18. Spirit of Laws, vol. i, book ix, chap. i. —⁠Publius ↩

19. Recherches Philosophiques sur les Américains. —⁠Publius ↩

20. If my memory be right they amount to twenty percent. —⁠Publius ↩

21. “I mean for the Union.” —⁠Publius ↩

22. This was but another name more specious for the independence of the members on the federal head. —⁠Publius ↩

23. Christian Pfeffel, Nouvel Abrégé Chronologique de l’Histoire et du Droit Public d’Allemagne, says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition. —⁠Publius ↩

24. This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on introducing the last bill. —⁠Publius ↩

25. Encyclopedia, article “Empire.” —⁠Publius ↩

26. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the states, but they do not contain one third of the people. —⁠Publius ↩

27. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will be less than a majority. —⁠Publius ↩

28. This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of state constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: “As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up.” This is, in truth, rather a caution than a prohibition. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bills of rights, a clause to this effect: “Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up without the consent of the Legislature”; which is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of the other states, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however, that one or two states have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this respect. —⁠Publius ↩

29. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the state governments, will, in its proper place, be fully detected. —⁠Publius ↩

30. In the revised text, “or if there should be as many unconnected governments as there are states.” ↩

31. Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter. —⁠Publius ↩

32. This essay appeared as No. XXXV in the original publication in the newspapers, and therefore is here misplaced chronologically. In the first edition of 1788, however, it is printed as No. XXIX, which gives it its proper place according to subject, and for this reason the order of the first edition has been followed. ↩

33. This was the point at which No. XXXI of the original newspaper essays was divided, and this opening sentence appeared first in the McLean edition of 1788. ↩

34. In the revised text, “and from a greater disproportion between her population and territory is unlikely speedily to be, to any great extent.” ↩

35. The New England states. —⁠Publius ↩

36. Connecticut and Rhode Island. —⁠Publius ↩

37. Declaration of Independence. —⁠Publius ↩

38. In the revised text this sentence reads: “With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are scarcely any circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to be necessary. The general face of the country, whether mountainous or level, most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general principles of organization, movement, and discipline, which apply universally.” ↩

39. James Burgh’s Political Disquisitions. —⁠Publius ↩

40. 1st clause, 4th section, of the 1st article. —⁠Publius ↩

41. Particularly in the Southern states and in this state. —⁠Publius ↩

42. In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the legislature. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, one branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of impeachments. —⁠Publius ↩

43. See Cato, No. V. —⁠Publius ↩

44. Article i, section 3, clause 1. —⁠Publius ↩

45. Vide Federal Farmer. —⁠Publius ↩

46. A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of Tamony, has asserted that the king of Great Britain owes his prerogative as commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. The truth is, on the contrary, that his prerogative, in this respect, is immemorial, and was only disputed, “contrary to all reason and precedent,” as Blackstone vol. i, page 262, expresses it, by the Long Parliament of Charles I; but by the statute the 13th of Charles II, chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the sole supreme government and command of the militia within his Majesty’s realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, ever was and is the undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, kings and queens of England, and that both or either house of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same. —⁠Publius ↩

47. Vide Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. i, p. 257. —⁠Publius ↩

48. Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think the claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded. Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a government, till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned. And independent of this claim, when we take into view the other considerations, and pursue them through all their consequences, we shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion. —⁠Publius ↩

49. New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not bind him. —⁠Publius ↩

50. De Lolme. —⁠Publius ↩

51. Ten. —⁠Publius ↩

52. This was the case with respect to Mr. Fox’s India bill, which was carried in the House of Commons, and rejected in the House of Lords, to the entire satisfaction, as it is said, of the people. —⁠Publius ↩

53. Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the convention is of this number. —⁠Publius ↩

54. In the revised text: “The former, by increasing the difficulty of resolutions disagreeable to the minority.” ↩

55. The celebrated Montesquieu, speaking of them, says: “Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to nothing.” Spirit of Laws, vol. i, page 186. —⁠Publius ↩

56. Spirit of Laws, vol. i, page 181. —⁠Publius ↩

57. Vide “Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania,” Luther Martin’s speech, etc. —⁠Publius ↩

58. Vide Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 13. —⁠Publius ↩

59. Article 3, Sec. 1. —⁠Publius ↩

60. This power has been absurdly represented as intended to abolish all the county courts in the several states, which are commonly called inferior courts. But the expressions of the Constitution are, to constitute “tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court”; and the evident design of the provision is to enable the institution of local courts, subordinate to the Supreme, either in states or larger districts. It is ridiculous to imagine that county courts were in contemplation. —⁠Publius ↩

61. This word is composed of jus and dictio, juris dictio or a speaking and pronouncing of the law. —⁠Publius ↩

62. I hold that the states will have concurrent jurisdiction with the subordinate federal judicatories, in many cases of federal cognizance, as will be explained in my next paper. —⁠Publius ↩

63. No. XXXI. —⁠Publius ↩

64. Sec. 8, Art. 1. —⁠Publius ↩

65. The last sentence (“But that there⁠ ⁠…”) is omitted in the revised text. ↩

66. The last part of this sentence (“and will be in no degree⁠ ⁠…”) is omitted in the revised text. ↩

67. It has been erroneously insinuated with regard to the court of chancery, that this court generally tries disputed facts by a jury. The truth is, that references to a jury in that court rarely happen, and are in no case necessary but where the validity of a devise of land comes into question. —⁠Publius ↩

68. It is true that the principles by which that relief is governed are now reduced to a regular system; but it is not the less true that they are in the main applicable to special circumstances, which form exceptions to general rules. —⁠Publius ↩

69. Vide No. LXXXI, in which the supposition of its being abolished by the appellate jurisdiction in matters of fact being vested in the Supreme Court, is examined and refuted. —⁠Publius ↩

70. Vide Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 136. —⁠Publius ↩

71. Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 438. —⁠Publius ↩

72. To show that there is a power in the Constitution by which the liberty of the press may be affected, recourse has been had to the power of taxation. It is said that duties may be laid upon the publications so high as to amount to a prohibition. I know not by what logic it could be maintained, that the declarations in the state constitutions, in favor of the freedom of the press, would be a constitutional impediment to the imposition of duties upon publications by the state legislatures. It cannot certainly be pretended that any degree of duties, however low, would be an abridgment of the liberty of the press. We know that newspapers are taxed in Great Britain, and yet it is notorious that the press nowhere enjoys greater liberty than in that country. And if duties of any kind may be laid without a violation of that liberty, it is evident that the extent must depend on legislative discretion, respecting the liberty of the press, will give it no greater security than it will have without them. The same invasions of it may be effected under the state constitutions which contain those declarations through the means of taxation, as under the proposed Constitution, which has nothing of the kind. It would be quite as significant to declare that government ought to be free, that taxes ought not to be excessive, etc., as that the liberty of the press ought not to be restrained. —⁠Publius ↩

73. Vide Rutherford’s Institutes, vol. 2, book II, chapter X, sections XIV and XV. Vide also Grotius, book II, chapter IX, sections VIII and IX. —⁠Publius ↩

74. The last sentence (“There is no good⁠ ⁠…”) is omitted in the revised text. ↩

75. Entitled An Address to the People of the State of New York. —⁠Publius ↩

76. It may rather be said ten, for though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three fourths must ratify. —⁠Publius ↩

77. Hume’s Essays, vol. i, p. 128: “The Rise of Arts and Sciences.” —⁠Publius ↩